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 Chapter 1 ─ Introduction 
In my dissertation, I look at several psychological factors affecting the utility of 
decision makers. Having a strong interest in social and environmental causes, I particularly 
focus on ethical and socially responsible decisions of consumers (chapters 2 to 4) and of 
workers (chapter 5).  
The first two chapters of my thesis investigate the issue of food waste. Since most of 
this issue is generated at the household level, the purpose of this research is to better 
understand what leads individuals to discard edible food. Chapter 2 looks at the 
psychological mechanism behind people’s food waste practices, while chapter 3 studies what 
types of personality traits can best predict such behaviors.  
Chapter 2 presents the results of a lab-in-the-field experiment jointly developed with 
Prof. Roberto Weber where we investigate the psychological effect of freshness information 
on people’s experienced utility of consumption. Previous research finds that date labels play 
an important role in individuals’ decision to throw away food. People’s gustatory experience 
of food was also shown to decrease along the shelf-life of food and to drop at the expiry 
date. However, these existing studies have several weaknesses and none investigates the 
psychological mechanism explaining people’s food waste practices. In particular, it remains 
unclear whether individuals dispose of old food only for safety reasons or also for freshness 
ones. In our study, we disentangle those two possible drivers of food waste behavior. We 
investigate the effects of information on the (lack of) freshness of a food item on individuals’ 
gustatory experience, provided that the food is safe to eat ─ a phenomenon that we call 
psychological depreciation.  
Chapter 3 is based on the survey data collected in the experiment presented in chapter 
2. In this work, I look at how certain individuals’ psychological factors relate to their food 
waste practices. More precisely, I look at whether risk preferences (in general, in the food 
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and in the health/safety domains), descriptive norms (how much food individuals believe 
people usually throw away), and personal attitudes towards food waste (more specifically, 
how important it is for individuals to minimize the amount of food that they discard) can 
predict individuals’ reported tendency to dispose of edible food. In a second step, I 
investigate which of these predictors performs best. Finally, I also look at the behavioral 
consistency of participants self-declared food waste practices by testing whether their 
reported behavior significantly correlates with their actual one in the laboratory.  
Overall, the findings of these two studies provide a better understanding of individuals’ 
behaviors towards “old” food and thus useful insights to policymakers aiming to effectively 
address the issue of food waste. Our results may also be of interest for actors in the food 
industry who would like for instance to reduce the amount of unsold perishable food items. 
Chapter 4 looks at consumers’ happiness with their choices. In the last century, the 
offer of products and services, as well as the number of possible life options (e.g. where to 
live, what job to choose, what education to follow) have dramatically increased, leading 
individuals to encounter a growing number of decisions every day. In this context, it 
becomes particularly relevant to better understand what drives people’s satisfaction (or lack 
thereof) with their choices. In this paper, Reto Odermatt, Itay Sisso, and I look at how the 
choice set impacts individuals’ satisfaction with their choice. We hypothesize that even after 
having chosen one’s preferred option, the opportunity costs formed by the rejected 
alternative (in a choice set consisting of two goods) may diminish the post-choice utility 
one derives from the selected good. We also suggest that the size of opportunity costs 
matters: rejecting an attractive alternative may be more detrimental for post-choice utility 
than rejecting a less desirable one. We denote the extent to which opportunity costs matter 
for satisfaction by psychological opportunity costs (POCs); Psychological since we expect 
these opportunity costs to have a negative impact on people’s post-decision satisfaction. 
INTRODUCTION  
3 
 
This concept contradicts the standard economic view that opportunity costs are only 
relevant for the decision-making process and do not matter anymore once the decision has 
been made. Our results allow to better understand what can enhance or diminish consumers’ 
happiness with their choices, and may therefore be of interest not only for companies aiming 
to retain their customers, but also for governments that want to increase the well-being of 
their population. 
In the last chapter of my dissertation, Florian Schneider, Prof. Roberto Weber and I 
study immoral labor markets and workers’ psychological aversion to perform immoral jobs. 
We define a job as immoral if it can potentially cause harm to society. In the last decades, 
several corporate scandals made public the existence of such behaviors within firms. For 
instance, the 2008 financial crisis revealed that bankers had intentionally sold toxic assets 
to unsuspecting clients (US Department of Justice, 2016). Also, tobacco companies were 
accused of using marketing strategies to mislead the public about the harmful effects of 
smoking (Heath, 2016) or to encourage youth smoking (Bates and Rowell, 1998). Besides, 
there are also jobs that inherently involve immoral acts by their nature (e.g. manufacturing 
weapons, marketing cigarettes, or engaging in predatory lending). While there is a 
widespread perception that immoral jobs pay a wage premium to compensate for workers’ 
aversion to act immorally, there is only suggestive evidence for this mechanism. Also, no 
previous studies looked at whether heterogeneity in willingness to perform unethical work 
leads to differential labor market outcomes. In Chapter 5, we attempt to address these 
questions using both laboratory experiments and survey data. 
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 Chapter 2 ─ Psychological Depreciation and Food Waste 
Joint with Roberto A. Weber1 
2.1 Introduction 
Imagine that every household, once per day, prepared a nutritious meal and 
immediately threw it in the trash without taking a bite. While this is perhaps a shocking 
example, the reality is that households regularly do precisely this without noticing. 
Around one third of the food produced worldwide is lost or wasted every year. This 
represents about 1.3 billion tons of discarded edible food (FAO, 2011). For example, in 
Switzerland the equivalent of 320 grams of food, i.e. almost a whole meal, is discarded every 
day for every inhabitant (WWF, 2012). Food waste is also harmful to the environment—
food production is responsible for one third of all greenhouse gas emissions (Garnett, 2011), 
and is highly resource-intensive (e.g. water, energy, land etc., FAO, 2013; Godfray et al., 
2010; NRDC, 2012). Food waste is also costly from households’ perspective: in developed 
countries, households spend 7% of their income on food, 30% of which is wasted (FOA, 
2016). This represents an annual loss estimated between $1,350 and $2,275 for a typical 
American four-person household (NRDC, 2012). The loss of edible food takes place 
throughout the whole food supply chain (FAO, 2011), but an important part of it (from 
52% for Europe to 61% for North America and Oceania, in percent of kcal wasted) takes 
place at the household level (Lipinski et al., 2013).  
While there are many causes of food waste, explicit freshness informational cues—such 
as date labels—seem to play an important role. In 2012, the Swiss federal office for the 
environment analyzed the content of citizens’ trash cans to discover that 20% of total waste 
                                       
1 Please cite as Brun, Fanny and Roberto A. Weber (2018) “Psychological Depreciation and Food Waste,” 
Working Paper. 
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was unopened packaged food that had passed the expiry date (SFOE, 2012). In the United 
Kingdom, about 27% of household waste is due to food spoilage from not being used in time 
(WRAP, 2015). While it is certainly reasonable to discard hazardous or inedible food, paying 
too much attention to the date labels when deciding whether to eat or discard a product 
may be suboptimal. Indeed, date labels are loosely regulated and may provide limited 
information about actual food quality. For instance, in the USA or in Switzerland, sellers 
of food items are free to set the expiry dates as they want. However, they must be fit for 
consumption (for the USA: NRDC, 2013; for Switzerland: DFI, 2017), otherwise they can 
be held responsible if it caused health issues. As a consequence, expiry dates are usually 
conservative and quite noisy signals of quality and safety. Moreover, expiry dates confound 
two possible kinds of inferences that consumers may draw about a food product, since a 
proximate or past expiry date can indicate both that a product is unsafe or that it has lower 
levels of quality or freshness.  
We report an experiment that attempts to hold as much possible constant about the 
actual quality and safety of a food item, to isolate whether informational cues about 
freshness alone lead to the decision to forgo eating food and thus contribute to food waste. 
In particular, we are interested in investigating whether knowledge that a food item is “new” 
versus “old” influences consumers’ perceptions of the food’s quality and their experiences 
when eating the food. We focus our attention on people’s perception of food freshness with 
respect to how long an item has been stored. This is important, as the time that has passed 
since a food product was made or purchased is often an easily accessible cue to people 
evaluating whether to eat or discard the food. Moreover, an expired food item is not only 
unfresh but also potentially harmful for one’s health. By focusing on old but unexpired 
products, we rule out the potential negative effect of people’s safety concerns on their 
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gustatory experience. Our findings thus address whether freshness concerns alone lead 
people to discard food.  
In our study, we measure people’s experienced utility of consuming a food item in a 
controlled and real-choice situation, where we vary by treatment the provision of 
information on the production date. More precisely, we test if the knowledge of a production 
date far in the past affects individuals’ gustatory experience negatively, a phenomenon that 
we call psychological depreciation. Psychological depreciation is potentially important for 
understanding food waste, as it may lead people to make suboptimal decisions and produce 
avoidable waste. That is, if people find food less appealing simply because it is older, they 
may dispose of it more readily based on cues about how fresh it is, even when its objective 
qualities would still make it desirable—i.e., when the food’s actual depreciation is much 
smaller than its psychological depreciation. Finding evidence for the existence—or the 
absence—of this phenomenon would provide useful insights on how to set up effective 
interventions to combat food waste. 
In our lab-in-the-field study, we distribute halves of packaged sandwiches to students 
on a university campus over the lunch break. Participants state how eager they are to eat 
their sandwich before starting it. Then while eating, they fill out a survey where they 
indicate, among others, the taste of the sandwich and their willingness-to-pay (WTP 
hereafter) for receiving the second half of the exact same sandwich. They have to return 
the completed survey and any remaining unfinished portions of the sandwich to receive 
their participation fee. If they are willing to pay at a randomly drawn price, this price is 
deducted from the participation fee and they receive the second half of their sandwich.  
This experiment is a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, where we vary whether the 
production date is close (Fresh) or far (Old) in the past, and whether the production date 
is disclosed (Salient) or hidden (Blind). We chose a specific type of packaged sandwich with 
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a long storage duration for which quality is likely to remain stable over time. Importantly, 
participants were always informed that their sandwich is safe to eat (the expiry date was 
always respected). Although we intentionally selected a good for which we expected the 
quality would remain fairly stable over time, we allow the possibility that participants in 
the Blind conditions will enjoy the old sandwich to a slightly lesser extent than a fresh one, 
reflecting the possibility of actual depreciation of sandwich quality over several additional 
days of storage. However, the main hypothesis we test—of psychological depreciation—is 
that this gap will become bigger when the participants receiving an old sandwich are 
informed about its distant production date. In other words, we hypothesize that knowing 
that one’s sandwich has been produced 7 days ago has a detrimental psychological effect on 
the gustatory experience. 
Our study stands out from existing research in several ways. First, we look at the 
effect of freshness information on people’s experienced consumption utility rather than only 
on their expectations. Second, we use a natural and realistic type of consumption—i.e., the 
sandwiches we use are typically consumed within the time frames of our experiment—where 
we make clear that the food item distributed is safe to eat, thereby isolating the sole 
psychological effect of freshness considerations on people’s gustatory experience. Third, our 
Blind condition allows us to neatly assess the latter effect by controlling for the objective 
taste of the sandwich. Finally, contrary to existing research, our experiment is designed so 
as to minimize the size of eventual demand effects. 
Previewing our results, first, we find that 7-day-old and 1-day-old sandwiches do not 
objectively differ: they do not provide a distinct consumption experience, as measured by 
taste ratings and WTPs, to participants who are unaware of the actual freshness of their 
sandwich. This remarkable stability of sandwich quality over time provides us with an ideal 
setting to test for the existence of psychological depreciation, as the only factor left that 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPRECIATION AND FOOD WASTE  
9 
 
could explain a difference in consumption utility between groups is the knowledge of the 
production date. Surprisingly, however, we do not find a psychological effect of freshness 
information on subjects’ gustatory experience. More specifically, participants who knowingly 
received an old sandwich do not indicate a significantly lower experienced utility of 
consumption than subjects who either consciously ate a fresh sandwich or ate an old one 
ignoring its distant production date. Our results therefore suggest that consumers are not 
overly sensitive to information regarding food’s freshness. That is, they appear to enjoy the 
food in our study equally well when it is new or old and when they do or do not know this 
freshness information. This finding may, for example, encourage stores to keep food for sale 
for longer than they might otherwise if consumers actually exhibited psychological 
depreciation. In the conclusion, we further elaborate on our findings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the literature. We then describe our experimental design and our main outcome variables. 
In section 2.4, we define our behavioral hypotheses, followed by the presentation of the 
results in section 2.5. We conclude in section 2.6 with a discussion of our findings. 
2.2 Literature review 
In the last few decades, much research, mostly in marketing and food sciences, has 
studied consumers’ preferences for freshness. Freshness informational cues were shown to 
be a relevant factor in people’s purchase and consumption decisions (e.g. WRAP, 2011; 
IFICF, 2007; Food Safety, 2009; Newsome et al., 2014; Dinnella et al., 2014; Verbeke and 
Ward, 2005; Harcar and Karakaya, 2005). Evidence shows that perishable food items 
approaching their expiry dates are perceived as less acceptable for consumption and as less 
safe (e.g. Sen and Block, 2008; Wansink and Wright, 2006; FSA, 2012; Tsiros and Heilman, 
2005), even in cases where the latter is not justified (Ransom, 2005; NRDC, 2013). These 
presumptions may explain why we observe a decrease in people’s expected utility over the 
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shelf life of food items (e.g. Kerley et al., 2008; Tsiros and Heilman, 2005; Sen and Block, 
2008; De Hooge et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2017). While this research focuses on people’s 
predictions of food taste, it but does not say anything about their actual gustatory 
experience. 
Only a few studies have participants tasting and rating food items. For instance, 
Wansink and Wright (2006) run a within-subject experiment where participants are asked 
to try and rate yoghurts displaying different (fake) freshness dates, such that some of them 
are (supposedly) expired or not. They find that people’s perception of freshness and 
healthfulness is declining over the shelf life and beyond, with a drop at the time of 
expiration. Similarly, Samotyja (2015) observes a decrease in participants’ acceptance of 
potato chips when they believe that the chips are close to their freshness date.  
While the above mentioned literature focuses on people’s preferences change around a 
product’s expiration or freshness date, our interest resides more in the effects of varied 
storage times of an unexpired item on people’s consumption utility. Indeed, while deciding 
whether to consume or not an item at home, consumers may discard foods past their 
expiration date, but may also throw away food that has been stored for longer durations 
even if an expiration date is irrelevant or has not been reached (Parizeau et al., 2015). 
Dinnella et al. (2014) investigated the effect of storage duration information on people’s 
sensory evaluation of food. They presented subjects with four pre-cut and pre-washed salad 
samples that had been stored for 0, 3, 7 or 9 days since their conditioning. Participants 
were asked to try and rate them under three different conditions: with no information, with 
true information and with wrong information on storage time. While subjects only 
marginally preferred the salad freshly made to the one stored for 9 days in the no 
information condition, perception of freshness steadily and significantly decreased over 
storage time, remaining but identical between 7 and 9 days of storage in the true information 
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treatment. Based on the two conditions with information, they find that indication of a 
short (long) storage time on the packaging affect positively (negatively) how fresh the salad 
is perceived, independently of its true storage time. Similar effects of storage time 
information on experienced utility were also found for other perishable food items such as 
cod fish (Kole et al., 2009; Østli et al., 2012).  
These findings suggest the existence of a psychological effect of freshness information 
on people’s experienced utility. However, this evidence needs to be validated by measuring 
individuals’ preferences through more general survey questions (i.e. asking about overall 
liking rates rather than freshness perception) and also through incentivized behavioral 
measures. Lund et al. (2005), the closest study to ours, provide some evidence in this regard. 
They measure subjects’ expected and experienced utility in an incentivized setting, where 
participants express their preferences over new Granny Smith apples (that have been stored 
for 2 months) and old ones (that have been stored for 8 months). Depending on the 
treatment, participants are materially endowed with a kilo of old or new apples. They are 
then informed about the age of their apples and can assess them visually and through touch. 
Afterwards, they are randomly allocated to experimental markets of 6 people to play a 
Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961). In each out of five rounds, the subjects have to submit 
their willingness-to-pay WTP (willingness-to-accept WTA) to exchange their old (new) 
apples for a bag of new (old) apples. Then, the subjects have to knowingly try samples of 
apples of both ages before playing, again, five rounds in the same auction market. One out 
of the ten market rounds is then selected for implementation, and the buyer (i.e. the winner) 
pays the market price out of his earnings. Before and after having tasted the fruits, 
participants are also asked to state their preferences (i.e. what apples they (would) prefer 
to consume) and their hedonic liking (i.e. how much do (would) they like old and new apples 
on a scale from 1: dislike extremely to 9: like extremely). The results indicate that people 
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mispredict how tasty the old apples are compared to the new ones. The authors find that 
stated preferences and hedonic liking are much higher for the new than for the old apples 
before the tasting phase, while these ratings become similar for both apples’ ages after 
tasting. Data on WTP and WTA also reveals that subjects initially value new apples more 
than old ones. However, the tasting phase has heterogeneous effects on people’s valuations: 
while some consumers decide that the new apples have no value after having tasted them, 
some others maintain their high valuations.  
While Lund et al’s study reveals that participants mispredict how well food items 
varying in freshness will taste, it cannot cleanly identify the psychological effect of the 
storage duration on participants’ food evaluation as the authors do not have participants 
evaluate food products without awareness of their freshness. This is not the case of our 
study. Our experimental setting allows us to not only compare the consumption utility of 
individuals who either received or did not receive freshness informational indication, but 
also to control for the existence of the objective depreciation of the sandwich’s taste over 
time. In addition, we also make clear that the food item that we are offering is safe to eat, 
thereby ruling out any psychological effects that safety concerns may have on the gustatory 
experience. Another weakness of Lund et al’s study is that subjects are put in a rather 
unrealistic situation where they evaluate 2- or 8-month-old apples. While supermarkets may 
store apples for this amount of time, households usually do not do so. Our participants face 
a more credible situation in which they evaluate a 1- or 7-day-old food item, a reasonable 
storage and consumption period for the kind of food we employ. Finally, unlike Lund et 
al.’s and related work, we attempt to minimize the size of eventual demand effects. We do 
so by providing participants with additional product information different from the 
production date and by running a between-subjects design where participants are unaware 
of the existence of other treatments (at the time of the food evaluation).  
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2.3 Study design 
2.3.1 Design overview 
We recruited students on the campus of the University of Zurich by approaching them 
in the corridors between 11:45 and 13:00. We asked them whether they would be interested 
in participating in a 20 minute study about food evaluation that would remunerate them 
with 10 CHF and a free sandwich. If they showed interest, and fulfilled eligibility criteria,2 
they were directed to our desk at a classroom’s entrance. At the desk, participants were 
allocated an ID corresponding to their seat number and their self-reported hunger was 
measured using a one-question survey.  
Once seated in the classroom, every subject was brought the first half of a sandwich 
that they were instructed not to start eating before the completion of Part I. After having 
filled out the first part of the questionnaire and eaten at least three bites of their sandwich, 
Part I was collected and Parts II and III were distributed one after the other.  The questions 
in each part are discussed in more detail below. Once Part III was filled out, the 
experimenter brought back the Part II of the questionnaire previously completed by the 
same person and made her roll a die to implement an incentivized behavioral measure. 
Finally, participants were asked go back to the desk outside the classroom to receive their 
payment and, if purchased, the second half of their sandwich. 
2.3.2 The treatments 
The four conditions of our 2 x 2 between-subjects design are summarized in Table 1. 
We varied two dimensions: the freshness of the sandwich and the disclosure of its production 
                                       
2 To participate, a person should not have any allergies, intolerances or diet restrictions that would prevent 
them from eating the sandwich, should understand written English, and should not have previously 
participated in our study. 
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date. Participants received a sandwich that had been produced either 1 day (Fresh) or 7 
days (Old) before the experiment took place, and were either informed (Salient) or not 
(Blind) of its production date. Importantly, all participants were explicitly told that their 
sandwich was safe to eat. In the rest of the paper, we use the following abbreviations for 
the different conditions: BO for Blind-Old, BF for Blind-Fresh, SO for Salient-Old and SF 
for Salient-Fresh. 
Table 1: Summary of the four conditions 
 Blind 
(Production date not provided) 
Salient 
(Production date provided) 
Old 
(7-day-old sandwich) Blind, Old (BO) Salient, Old (SO) 
Fresh 
(1-day-old sandwich) Blind, Fresh (BF) Salient, Fresh (SF) 
 
2.3.3 The sandwich 
We bought packaged egg sandwiches made out of toast bread in a Swiss supermarket 
(a picture is provided in Appendix A, Figure A1). The packages were transported in a cool 
box with ice packs and were stored in a fridge at the university with the temperature 
continuously monitored. On the day of the experiment, we used a portable fridge if the 
classroom was not equipped with a refrigerator. The packages were opened right before 
distribution.  
This type of sandwich was especially adequate for our setting in many regards. First, 
its compatibility with vegetarianism maximized the pool of eligible participants. Second, it 
consisted of two halves of 82.5 grams each. This is a relevant element as we wanted students 
to remain hungry after having eaten their first sandwich half since one of our measures of 
consumption utility is the subjects’ willingness-to-pay for the second half of their sandwich. 
Finally, the sandwich had a long storage duration (up to eight days), and its packaging was 
optimized so as to well preserve its quality over time. This is important as a sandwich’s 
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stable taste and quality provides us with an ideal environment to neatly identify the sole 
effect of the provision of the production date on experienced utility of consumption.  
2.3.4 The survey 
Overall, the survey consisted of four distinct parts: the “hunger” question, Part I, Part 
II and Part III. When a subject was done with one of the parts and had signaled this to the 
experimenter, she received the next part in exchange for the completed one.3 Every 
participant’s randomly allocated ID indicated her seat number and also assigned her to one 
of the four conditions, which varied within sessions. The subjects’ ID was printed on every 
sheet of instructions. All instructions are available in Appendix A. 
The “hunger” question 
Before entering the classroom, the participants indicated their level of hunger by 
crossing a number between 1: Not at all hungry, to 9: Extremely hungry, on a small slip of 
paper. The collection of this information outside the classroom ensured that the answer was 
not influenced by viewing of the sandwich potentially triggering salivation or disgust.4 
Part I: Treatment 
The main purpose of Part I was to provide freshness information to participants in 
the Salient conditions. We did so by listing general information on the sandwich (i.e. the 
production date, the weight of the sandwich half, and its main ingredients) in the context 
of providing them information specific to a study on food evaluation.5 The production date 
was removed from the instructions for subjects in the Blind conditions. 
                                       
3 This mechanism prevented subjects from changing their choices in already completed parts.  
4 Note that the traffic of sandwiches was organized in such a way that new participants would not see any 
sandwich before entering the classroom.  
5 To make sure that participants attentively read the general information, they were asked three control 
questions at the end of Part I. The experimenter systematically checked the correctness of these answers 
before collecting Part I and distributing Part II. 
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Once seated, the participants received their sandwich half on a white paper plate. 
They were instructed not to eat it before having rated its appearance (using a scale from 1: 
Not at all appetizing to 9: Extremely appetizing), its smell (1: Smells very bad, to 9: Smells 
very good), and having indicated how eager they were to eat the sandwich (1: Not at all 
eager, to 9: Extremely eager). We use the latter question as an indicative measure of 
subjects’ expected utility of consumption.6  
At the end of Part I, participants were instructed to eat at least three regular-sized 
bites of their sandwich half in order to receive the next part of the questionnaire.  
Part II: Outcome variables 
Part II was used to collect the two main measures of experienced utility of 
consumption: taste ratings and an incentivized behavioral measure, namely the willingness-
to-pay for the second half of the person’s sandwich.  
Participants first had to report the experienced taste of their sandwich on a scale from 
1: Extremely bad, to 9: Extremely good. Then, we used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
method (Becker et al., 1964) to collect participants’ willingness-to-pay (hereafter WTP) for 
the second half of their sandwich. They had to indicate, for every price increment of 0.20 
CHF between 0 CHF and 2.20 CHF, whether they would buy or not buy the second half. 
They were informed that their answers together with their random draw of a price at the 
end of the experiment would determine whether they would purchase the second half. 
Finally, subjects had to rate how healthy and nutritious they considered their sandwich to 
be (from 1: Not at all healthy and nutritious, to 9: Extremely healthy and nutritious). 
                                       
6 Although it also captures a person’s level of hunger, we preferred this question over asking directly for taste 
expectations as individuals may have reported the same answer when asked later to rate the actual taste of 
the sandwich for the sake of being consistent throughout the survey. 
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Part III: Manipulation check and individual characteristics 
The purpose of Part III was to test if our treatments worked and to assess a wide 
range of individual behaviors, beliefs, opinions and preferences that we briefly define below. 
For a more extensive description of these variables, see Brun (2018), which examines them 
in more detail.  
Manipulation check: A precondition for the production date to affect participants’ 
consumption expectations and experiences is that subjects in the Salient conditions properly 
remembered the production date of their sandwich while eating it. For this reason, we asked 
them if they recalled whether their sandwich had been made 1 or 7 days before the day of 
the experiment. 
Individual characteristics: Throughout Part III, we asked a wide range of questions that 
allow to assess individuals’: 
- level of familiarity with eating sandwiches, 
- behaviors towards- and opinions about food waste, 
- beliefs about social norms in the domain of food waste, 
- health concerns, 
- and risk preferences (in general, in the health/safety domain and in the food domain). 
Subjects indicated whether they had already eaten this type of sandwich in the past 
(Yes/No). They were also asked if they experienced a serious case of food poisoning in the 
past, and in the positive case, to indicate the type of food that made them sick. This 
question conveys information on a person’s sensitivity to food and prior aversive experiences 
with food. In addition, we elicited several demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, 
nationalities, highest achieved educational degree, and fields of study. We also asked 
whether they had previously heard of this study before participating and what they heard 
in the case of a positive answer.  
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When a participant was done with Part III, the experimenter brought back her 
previously completed Part II as well as a 12-faced die to implement the incentivized measure 
of WTP. The participant was instructed to roll the die to randomly draw a price p of the 
second sandwich half (every face of the die corresponded to a price p ∈{0, 0.2, 0.4, …, 2.2} 
CHF), and therefore determine in combination with her answers whether she would actually 
buy or not at that price. If a purchase took place, the participant received the second half 
of her sandwich as well as a participation fee of 10 – p CHF. Otherwise, she simply received 
her full participation fee. 
Participants who had completed the study but had not finished their sandwich had to 
either finish eating it in the classroom or to give back to us its remaining portion in order 
to leave. We use the weight of the unfinished first sandwich halves as a secondary behavioral 
measure of experienced utility, since a high (low) weight may reflect a bad (good) gustatory 
experience. We did not allow them to leave the classroom with their sandwich leftovers, as 
we would not have been able to observe if they would have thrown away the unfinished 
sandwich instead of eating it entirely.  
We conducted 10 sessions in March and April 2018, in two classrooms located in 
distinct areas of the campus of the University of Zurich. Every session consisted of 22 to 29 
participants. We recruited 269 participants in total but the loss of some data points7 lead 
to a final dataset of 259 observations distributed across conditions as follows: 66 in the 
Salient-Old, 65 in the Salient-Fresh, 63 in the Blind-Old and 65 in the Blind-Fresh 
condition.  
                                       
7 8 participants were mistakenly given Part III of the instructions before Part II. As the content of Part III 
made the problem of food waste salient, it may have influenced participants’ answer to Part II, which is the 
reason why we dropped these observations.  We also dropped one participant who did not rate the taste of 
the sandwich and another one who had heard too much about the study before participating. 
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2.4 Behavioral hypotheses 
Our two behavioral hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. 
H1: The objective sandwich quality may depreciate over time 
We expressly selected this type of sandwich because it is designed to persist in taste 
and quality over several days of storage. Thus, our goal was to have a design in which the 
objective quality of the sandwich is very similar after 1 or 7 days. However, we still allow 
for the possibility that some objective depreciation may occur and that the sandwich tastes 
slightly worse after 7 days of storage duration than after 1 day. Over time, the bread may 
for instance become drier on its outside, and softer on its inside because of the moist content 
of the sandwich. This assumption is tested by comparing the gustatory experience of 
participants in the Blind conditions since it is exempted from any eventual psychological 
influence of knowledge of the production date (see H1 in Figure 1). More formally: 
ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|ܤ݈݅݊݀,ܨݎ݁ݏℎ) ≥ ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|ܤ݈݅݊݀,ܱ݈݀) 
Figure 1: Illustration of the behavioral hypotheses 
 
H2: A distant production date generates psychological depreciation  
Previous studies found that people’s experienced utility of consumption shrinks as the 
storage time increases (Lund et al., 2005; Dinnella et al., 2014; Kole et al., 2009; Østli et 
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al., 2013). However, none of these studies can disentangle whether this trend is solely driven 
by the objective qualitative deterioration of the food item, or/and by the psychological 
effect of the distant production date on the consumption experience. We hypothesize that 
the simple knowledge of the sandwich’s lack of freshness hinders experienced utility of 
consumption, phenomenon that we call psychological depreciation (see H2 in Figure 1). We 
test for its existence by doing the following difference-in-difference comparison:  [ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|݈ܵܽ݅݁݊ݐ,ܱ݈݀) − ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|݈ܵܽ݅݁݊ݐ,ܨݎ݁ݏℎ)] 
− [ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|ܤ݈݅݊݀,ܱ݈݀) − ܷ(ܵܽ݊݀ݓ݅ܿℎ|ܤ݈݅݊݀,ܨݎ݁ݏℎ)] < 0 
2.5 Results 
Our final sample consists of 259 individuals between 18 and 35 years old, with 52% of 
them being women and 79% having the Swiss nationality. Only 3% of the participants had 
heard of our study beforehand but most did not know any critical information.8 Importantly, 
all subjects in the Salient conditions were able to subsequently correctly report the 
production date of their sandwich, evidence that our manipulation worked. Participants’ 
hunger level varied a lot (see its distribution in Figure 2). A two-sided t-test reveals that 
they were on average rather hungry (ܪݑ݊݃ݎݕതതതതതതതതതതത = 5.39, p-value = 0.001). This is important 
as this is a prerequisite for individuals to provide a weakly positive WTP for the second 
sandwich half. 
                                       
8 They mostly reported having friends who recommended to participate in our study without providing them 
with any further information. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of hunger levels 
 
Notes: Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. N=259. 
 
We define a subject’s willingness-to-pay as the maximum price at which she still 
indicates preferring buying the second half rather than giving it up. However, we code it 
differently for eleven subjects who provided inconsistent answers by changing between 
columns more than once (see question 5 in the instructions provided in Appendix A). 
Answers of this kind do not provide a clear threshold price. However, they are still 
informative of a person’s valuation of her second sandwich half. We therefore recode these 
observations using a formula that essentially weights the maximum price a person is willing 
to pay by the ratio of the sum of the prices that she agrees to pay below that level to the 
sum of all possible prices below that level.9 This formula never produces a higher outcome 
                                       
9 More formally, let ݇ є{0, 0.2, 0.4 … 2.2} be the set of all possible prices and let ݔ௜௞ take the value 1 if an 
individual i is willing to receive the second half at price ݇, and 0 otherwise. Define the maximum willingness-
to-pay of an individual i as ݇௜,௠௔௫ = max௞ ݇ ∗  ݔ௜௞. A person i’s willingness-to-pay ݓݐ݌పෟ   is then obtained by 
applying the following formula: ݓݐ݌పෟ = ൬൫݇௜,௠௔௫ + 0.2൯ ∗  ∑ [ݔ௜௞ ∗ (݇ + 0.2)]௞೔,೘ೌೣ௞ୀ଴ ∑ (݇ + 0.2)௞೔,೘ೌೣ௞ୀ଴ൗ  ൰ − 0.2. We 
add 0.2 to all prices as this ensures that the formula penalizes inconsistencies at 0 (for example, a person who 
does not want the sandwich for free, but agrees to pay every price up to 1 CHF, is allocated a lower WTP 
than a person who would agree to receive the sandwich for any price from 0 (included) to 1 CHF). We but 
center the outcome of the formula to 0 to obtain ݓݐ݌పෟ. 
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than the participant’s maximum reported price, sensibly responds to different amounts 
chosen below the maximum one, and delivers the maximum price for consistent people (i.e 
those who switch columns only once).  
Out of 259 participants, 6010 did not finish their first half, and 3711 did not even want 
the second half of the sandwich for free (coded as WTP<0 in Figure 3b). Overall, the 
sandwiches were not especially well or badly evaluated. The average WTP for the second 
sandwich half reached 0.78 CHF (among the 222 participants who indicated a weakly 
positive WTP). The average taste and smell ratings of 5.35 and 5.92, respectively, were 
both significantly higher than 5 and the sandwiches were judged slightly less appetizing 
than 5 with 4.67 (the p-values of two-sided t-tests are all <0.001). Individuals experienced 
very heterogenous levels of consumption utility as indicated by the fair distributions of taste 
ratings, WTP and weight of unfinished first halves (see Figures A2a, A2b and A2c in 
Appendix A, respectively). This high variance may not only ensue from our treatments but 
also from the wide range of hunger levels among participants (see Figure 2). General 
summary statistics of the relevant variables of our study are available in Table A1 
(Appendix A). For an analysis of the data collected on participants’ personality traits and 
reported food waste behaviors, please refer to Brun (2018). 
Throughout the paper, we do not focus our main analyses on the weights of the 
unfinished first sandwich halves, as many reasons others than a bad gustatory experience 
have led to these leftovers.12 In addition, subjects were eating the sandwich while answering 
an extensive survey on opinions, beliefs and behaviors towards food waste. This may have 
affected their decision to finish or not finish the sandwich.  
                                       
10 These 60 observations are distributed across conditions as follows: NBO: 11, NBF: 19, NSO: 16, and NSF: 14. 
11 These 37 observations are distributed across conditions as follows: NBO: 6, NBF: 11, NSO: 12, and NSF: 8. 
12 Subjects typically reported having to leave to attend a lecture, having just had lunch or being willing to 
have a proper lunch. 
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2.5.1 Objective difference between a 7-day-old and a 1-day-old sandwich 
In this section, we investigate whether the experienced consumption utility objectively 
(i.e. without any psychological influence of freshness information) differs between an old 
and a fresh sandwich. For this purpose, we focus exclusively on the Blind conditions. If the 
sandwich’s quality decreases over time, subjects in the Blind-Old condition would indicate 
lower taste ratings and would be willing to buy the second half of their sandwich at a lower 
price than individuals in the Blind-Fresh group. Also, if a difference is noticeable between 
a 7-day-old and a 1-day-old sandwich, subjects would provide an accurate guess of their 
sandwich’s freshness and the quantity of unfinished first halves would be lower in the Blind-
Fresh than in the Blind-Old condition. 
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c plot the cumulative distribution function of participants’ taste 
ratings, WTP, and of their guess about their sandwich’s freshness, respectively. At first 
sight, there is no obvious visual difference of the distributions between the Blind-Old and 
the Blind-Fresh conditions, independently of the variable considered.  
We perform two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and t-tests to test for differences in 
distributions and in means, respectively. We do not find any significant differences in the 
taste ratings’ distributions and in the average taste ratings between the Blind-Old and the 
Blind-Fresh conditions (ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതത஻ை=5.49, ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതത஻ி=5.45, p-value>0.1 for both tests). The 
same conclusion holds when examining the difference in WTPs (ܹܶܲതതതതതതത஻ை=0.74, ܹ ܶܲതതതതതതത஻ி=0.86, 
p-value>0.1 for both tests)13 and in guesses about when the sandwich was made 
(ܩݑ݁ݏݏതതതതതതതത஻ை=4.08, ܩݑ݁ݏݏതതതതതതതത஻ி=4.15, p-value>0.1 for both tests).14 The distribution and the mean 
                                       
13 Note that throughout the paper, tests to compare the means of WTPs across groups are performed on a 
reduced sample (NBF=54, NBO=57) since we remove observations with a negative WTP. This concerns 11 (6) 
observations in the Blind-Fresh (Blind-Old) condition, respectively. However, as rank-sum tests treat the data 
as ordinal, we perform them on the entire sample.   
14 Subjects who are more familiar with eating sandwiches provided more accurate guesses. However, they 
neither experienced a different taste nor indicated a different WTP than subjects who do not regularly eat 
sandwiches.  
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of the weight of unfinished first halves are also not significantly different between the two 
groups (ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതത஻ை=10.4, ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതത஻ி=16.5, p-values>0.1 for both tests).  
The inability of subjects to correctly guess how fresh their sandwich is may not be 
only explained by the absence of gustatory difference, but also by the similar appearance 
and smell of both types of sandwiches (see Table A2, Appendix A, for the tests of means 
and distributions of smell and appearance ratings). Interestingly, participants tend to 
believe that their sandwich is rather fresh, independently of the condition in which they are 
(ܩݑ݁ݏݏതതതതതതതത஻ை and ܩݑ݁ݏݏതതതതതതതത஻ி are both significantly lower than 5, p-values<0.05 of two-sided t-
tests), although they are aware of their equal chance to have been allocated an old or a 
fresh sandwich.  
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of taste ratings (a), willingness-
to-pay for the second half (b) and of participants’ guess about the freshness 
of their sandwich (c) in the blind conditions 
(a) (b) 
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To summarize, we do not find evidence for a clear difference in the quality of a 7-day-
old and of a 1-day-old sandwiches. These two types of sandwiches do not provide distinct 
gustatory, visual or olfactory experiences, and are similarly valued financially. Subjects are 
also unable to correctly guess the freshness level of their sandwich. This absence of actual 
food quality depreciation over time is ideal in our setting as it allows us to rule out the 
effect of quality deterioration on our measures of experienced utility. In other words, any 
evidence for unequal utility of consumption between old and fresh sandwiches must be solely 
triggered by the psychological effect of freshness information. We investigate this in the 
following section. 
2.5.2 Psychological effect of the date on experienced utility 
In this section, we investigate whether freshness information has a direct 
(psychological) effect on individuals’ gustatory experience. More specifically, we test if the 
simple fact of being aware that one’s sandwich has been produced 7 days ago negatively 
affects one’s utility of consumption, a phenomenon that we call psychological depreciation. 
The absence of quality deterioration found in the previous section implies that the 
 
(c) 
Notes: Taste=1: Extremely bad taste, =9: Extremely good taste; WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF, WTP=-0.1 if a 
person does not even want the second half for free; Guess=1: Was definitely made 1 day ago, =5: I can’t 
really tell, =9: Was definitely made 7 days ago. ܰ஻ை=63 and ஻ܰி=65. 
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differences in experienced utility that we would find between the Blind-Old and the Salient-
Old conditions, and between the Salient-Fresh and the Salient-Old conditions, would solely 
be driven by the knowledge of the distant production date. It thus makes sense to start this 
section by comparing the average and distribution of experienced utility between the 
relevant conditions, and refine our investigations by running regression analyses. 
Mean and distributions comparisons between treatment groups 
Figures 4a and 4b plot the average taste ratings and the cumulative distribution of 
WTPs in each of the four conditions, respectively. We do not primarily consider average 
WTPs since this would imply ignoring individuals who do not even want their second half 
for free, as we do not know what financial compensation they would require to receive it.15 
There is visually and statistically no significant differences between the Blind-Old and the 
Salient-Old conditions either when performing two-sided t-tests of the means of taste ratings 
(ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതത஻ை=5.49, ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതതௌை=5.19, p-value=0.283) or two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of 
taste ratings and WTPs (the p-value is above 0.1 in both cases). We draw the same 
conclusion when considering the Salient-Fresh and Salient-Old conditions (ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതതௌி=5.28, 
ܶܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതതௌை=5.19, p-value of the two-sided t-test is 0.744 and the p-values of two-sided 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on taste ratings and on WTPs are above 0.1). 
In a second step, we examine the weight of the remaining first sandwich halves in the 
four conditions. The results are qualitatively aligned with our hypothesis: the quantity of 
leftovers is higher when subjects are aware of the oldness of their sandwich (Salient-Old) 
than when they are not (Blind-Old) or than when they knowingly received a fresh sandwich 
(Salient-Fresh) (ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതത஻ை=10.43, ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതത஻ி=16.46, ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതതௌை=13.15, and 
ܹ݁ଓ݃ℎݐതതതതതതതതതതௌி=10.58). However, none of the relevant mean and distribution differences are 
                                       
15 However, we provide the graphical representation of the average WTP in each condition (calculated on the 
reduced sample of weakly positive WTPs) in Figure A3 in Appendix A. 
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significant, even at a 10% level. The large confidence intervals remind us that the weight 
of sandwiches’ leftovers is a noisy measure of consumption utility, and that our main 
conclusions should not mainly rely on this metric. 
Figure 4: Average taste ratings and cumulative distributions of willingness-
to-pay in each of the four conditions 
 
(a) (b) 
Notes: (a): Taste=1: Extremely bad taste, =9: Extremely good taste. (b): WTP in [-0.1; 2.2] CHF. N=259 
with ஻ܰை=65, ஻ܰி=63, ௌܰை=65 and ௌܰி=66. 
 
This preliminary set of results points towards the absence of psychological 
depreciation: participants who are informed about the distant production date of their 
sandwich do not experience a significantly lower gustatory experience than subjects who 
either are not aware of the lack of freshness of their sandwich or know that their sandwich 
was produced on the previous day. In the following paragraphs, we test for the existence of 
psychological depreciation by running several difference-in-differences estimations where we 
account for potential treatment randomization failures. 
Regression analyses 
Table 2 displays the results of linear (columns 1 to 3) and of ordered Probit (columns 
4 to 6) regressions of the taste ratings on the treatment and on control variables. Columns 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Ta
st
e
Fresh sandw. Old sandw.
Salient Blind
95% cond. int.
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1 and 4 indicate that none of our treatment has a significant effect on the participants’ 
taste ratings. In particular, there is no evidence for the existence of psychological 
depreciation (β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧∗ை௟ௗ is not significant). These findings are not surprising considering 
the very low explanatory power of these models (R2=0.007 in column 1, and pseudo 
R2=0.002 in column 4).16 Controlling for individual characteristics (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) 
and sessions’ fixed effects (columns 3 and 6) does not impact any of the treatment effects. 
As a robustness check, we recode the taste ratings such that they only consist of three 
categories17 and find similar results (see Table A3 in Appendix A).  
Out of 259 participants (with N୆୓=65, N୆୊=63, Nୗ୓=65 and Nୗ୊=66), 37 of them did not 
even want the second half of their sandwich for free, and 39 subjects indicated a willingness-
to-pay of 0. To account for these two types of preferences, we implement a hurdle model 
which consists of a Probit model (to explain the acceptance or refusal to pay a (weakly) 
positive price for the second sandwich half), and of a linear model truncated at 0 (to predict 
the price a person is willing to pay conditional on having accepted to pay a weakly positive 
price). Results are reported in Table 3. As for the taste ratings, variations in our treatments 
do not induce substantial changes in subjects’ willingness-to-pay (pseudo R2=0.012 in 
column 1) which is further reflected by the absence of significant treatment effects in 
columns 1 and 2 (β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧∗ை௟ௗ is not significant). When adding control variables to the model 
(columns 3 to 6), the variables Old and Salient*Old seem to significantly explain the 
subjects’ decision to pay or not a weakly positive price for their second sandwich half (β෠ை௟ௗ 
                                       
16 R2 statistics are not available for ordered Probit and Tobit models but have an equivalent metric called the 
McFadden pseudo R2. This measure is obtained by the following formula: ܴெ௖ி௔ௗௗ௘௡ଶ = 1 −  ୪୭୥ (௅ಷೠ೗೗)୪୭୥ (௅಺೙೟.) , where 
ܮி௨௟௟  (ܮூ௡௧.) denotes the maximized likelihood value of the full model (of the model that only contains an 
intercept), respectively. Therefore, a value close to 1 (0) indicates a high (low) explanatory power of the 
model, respectively.   
17 We replaced Taste by Taste cat. where Taste cat.=1 if the person indicated a low taste rating (i.e. Taste 
<5), =2 if the person’s gustatory experience was neither bad nor good (i.e. Taste =5), and =3 if the subject 
indicated a high taste rating (i.e. Taste>5). 
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and β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧∗ை௟ௗ are significant at the 10% and 5%-level, respectively, in both columns 3 and 
5), but the different treatments can still not explain the financial amount individuals are 
willing to pay across conditions18 (β෠ை௟ௗ , β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧ , and β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧∗ை௟ௗ are not significant in 
columns 4 and 6). While these results seem to show some support for the existence of 
psychological depreciation, a deeper inspection of the data casts some doubts on this 
conclusion. First, a simple visual analysis of the average WTPs in each condition (see Figure 
A3 in Appendix A) does not corroborate the hypothesized relationship between treatments. 
Also, the coefficients of our three treatment variables are jointly only weakly significant 
(the p-value of a Chi-squared test on the Probit models in columns 1, 3 and 5 equals 0.464, 
0.095 and 0.059, respectively). Finally, running linear- and ordered Probit regressions on 
the whole sample by specifying WTP as a categorical variable (with WTP cat.=1 if 
WTP<0, WTP cat.=2 if WTP=0, and WTP cat.=3 if WTP>0) do not indicate any 
significant differences in WTPs across the different conditions (see Table A5, Appendix A). 
                                       
18 Note that linear as well as Tobit regressions implemented on a reduced sample without negative willingness-
to-pay values do also not produce any significant treatment effects (see Table A4 in Appendix A). 
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Table 2: Relationship between the taste ratings and the treatments 
Dependent 
variable: 
Taste 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Old 0.0459 0.104 0.113 0.0440 0.0837 0.0925  
(0.17) (0.40) (0.43) (0.24) (0.47) (0.52) 
Salient -0.169 -0.182 -0.200 -0.110 -0.127 -0.142  
(-0.66) (-0.71) (-0.77) (-0.65) (-0.73) (-0.81) 
Salient*Old -0.133 -0.249 -0.228 -0.108 -0.193 -0.181  
(-0.35) (-0.67) (-0.60) (-0.42) (-0.75) (-0.70) 
Already eat.  0.462** 0.437**  0.332** 0.318**  
 (2.36) (2.20)  (2.47) (2.36) 
Hungry  0.108* 0.127**  0.0773** 0.0919**  
 (1.95) (2.30)  (2.03) (2.43) 
Food pois.  -0.0275 0.00137  -0.0245 -0.0124  
 (-0.14) (0.01)  (-0.18) (-0.09) 
Female  0.0473 0.0599  0.0662 0.0822  
 (0.25) (0.31)  (0.52) (0.63) 
Age  -0.0633** -0.0530*  -0.0436** -0.0370*  
 (-2.03) (-1.68)  (-2.03) (-1.71) 
Constant 5.446*** 5.986*** 5.791***    
 (31.54) (7.63) (6.85)    
N 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R2 0.00656 0.0616 0.0868 0.00195 0.0184 0.0257 
Session FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Columns 4 to 6: Estimated marginal 
effects of ordered Probit models. Dependent variable: Taste=1: Extremely bad taste, =9: Extremely good 
taste. Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already eaten 
this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food 
poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. Estimated cuts for ordered 
Probit models are omitted from the table, McFadden pseudo R2 are provided in columns 4 to 6, robust 
standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Relationship between the willingness-to-pay and the treatments using 
a hurdle model 
Dependent 
variable: 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Old 0.352 -0.0431 0.546* -0.0426 0.557* -0.0497 
 (1.23) (-0.50) (1.92) (-0.50) (1.95) (-0.60) 
Salient 0.203 0.0419 0.245 0.0234 0.245 0.0119 
 (0.74) (0.55) (0.85) (0.31) (0.86) (0.16) 
Salient*Old -0.603 0.00877 -0.897** 0.00911 -0.976** 0.0511 
 (-1.53) (0.07) (-2.29) (0.08) (-2.46) (0.44) 
Already eat.   0.419** 0.113* 0.503** 0.122** 
   (2.02) (1.83) (2.34) (2.14) 
Hungry   0.152*** 0.0208 0.135*** 0.0202 
   (3.07) (1.39) (2.71) (1.34) 
Food pois.   -0.00249 0.0658 0.115 0.0802 
   (-0.01) (1.08) (0.53) (1.31) 
Female   -0.427** -0.0578 -0.539** -0.0617 
   (-2.12) (-1.00) (-2.57) (-1.08) 
Age   -0.0435 -0.00257 -0.0384 -0.00285 
   (-1.46) (-0.28) (-1.20) (-0.31) 
Constant 0.957*** 0.923*** 1.138 0.809*** 0.881 0.800*** 
 (5.18) (15.74) (1.55) (3.61) (1.05) (3.16) 
Sigma  0.391***  0.383***  0.369*** 
  (14.64)  (14.40)  (14.27) 
N 259 183 259 183 259 183 
Pseudo R2 0.0124  0.101  0.150  
Session FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns 1, 3 and 5: Estimated marginal effects of Probit models. Dependent variable: WTP weakly 
pos.=1 if WTP>=0, and WTP weakly pos.=0 if WTP<0. Columns 2, 4 and 6: Estimated marginal effects of 
a truncated regression at 0. Dependent variable: WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF. Independent variables: Old, Salient, and 
Female are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food 
pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: 
Extremely hungry. R2 for the Probit models are McFadden pseudo R2. R2 are not available for truncated models. 
Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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We turn now to the analyses of our secondary measure of consumption utility, namely 
the weight of the unfinished first sandwich halves. Given the low number of observations 
with a positive weight (only 60 cases), we assess the effects of our treatments on the 
likelihood that a person does not produce food waste. For this purpose, we generate a binary 
variable that equals 1 if a person has finished her sandwich and 0 otherwise. The absence 
of robust treatment effects on taste ratings and WTP is partly supported by regression 
results regarding the weight of the leftovers (see the estimated Probit models in Table 4). 
The coefficient estimates for Salient are not significant (columns 1 to 3). The same holds 
true regarding Old and Salient*Old (column 1, p-value>0.1) except when control variables 
are added to the model (columns 2 and 3). While linear probability models produce similar 
results (see Table A6, Appendix A), this apparent evidence for psychological depreciation 
should be interpreted with caution. First, and similarly to the analysis of WTPs, this 
phenomenon does not show up when comparing the average probability of finishing the first 
sandwich half in each of the four treatment groups (see Figure A4 in Appendix A for a 
graphical representation). This is not surprising given the very similar cumulative 
distribution of the leftovers’ weight across conditions (see Figure 5). Also, we cannot 
confidently reject a joint test of the absence of the treatments effects when considering the 
estimated Probit model (the p-value of a Chi-squared test is 0.14) or linear probability 
model (an F-test produces a p-value of 0.09). Further analysis suggests that the significance 
and positive sign of β෠ை௟ௗ in columns 2 and 3 from Table 4 is driven by unobserved individual 
characteristics that make subjects in the Salient-Old condition finish their sandwich more 
than what our control variables predict.19 This in turn has direct consequences on the 
estimated magnitude and significance of β෠ௌ௔௟௜௘௡௧ିை௟ௗ. 
                                       
19 Our control variables predict that 73% of the subjects in the Blind-Old condition should finish their 
sandwich, while 83% actually do so. This difference is much smaller when comparing the other conditions: 
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Table 4: Relationship between the decision to finish 
entirely the first half of the sandwich and the 
treatments 
Dependent 
variable: First half entirely eaten 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Old 0.118 0.148** 0.152** 
 (1.58) (2.21) (2.29) 
Salient 0.0728 0.0679 0.0703 
 (1.01) (1.03) (1.05) 
Salient*Old -0.145 -0.193** -0.211** 
 (-1.39) (-2.09) (-2.28) 
Already eat.  0.143*** 0.159*** 
  (3.18) (3.70) 
Hungry  0.0559*** 0.0528*** 
  (5.00) (4.72) 
Food pois.  -0.0187 -0.0190 
  (-0.37) (-0.37) 
Female  -0.223*** -0.243*** 
  (-5.02) (-5.23) 
Age  -0.00796 -0.0101 
  (-1.05) (-1.30) 
N 259 259 259 
Pseudo R2 0.00942 0.204 0.226 
Session FE No No Yes 
Notes: Estimated marginal effects of Probit models. Dependent variable: First 
half is entirely eaten in {0;1}. Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female 
are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the 
past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food 
poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. 
McFadden pseudo R2 are provided, robust standard errors, t-statistics in 
parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
  
                                       
(݌̅̂ௌை = 0.79, ݌̅ௌை = 0.76;   ݌̅̂ௌி = 0.78, ݌̅ௌி = 0.78;   ݌̅̂஻ி = 0.77, ݌̅஻ி = 0.71, where ݌̅̂ (݌̅) is the predicted 
(actual) average probability of finishing the first sandwich half, respectively). 
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of the weight of 
unfinished first sandwich halves by condition 
 
Notes: N=259 with ஻ܰை=65, ஻ܰி=63, ௌܰை=65 and ௌܰி=66. 
 
To sum, we have seen that our treatments are rather bad predictors of variations in 
our primary (taste ratings and WTP) and secondary (weight of unfinished first halves) 
measures of subjects’ consumption utility. The participants’ gustatory experience does not 
seem to be significantly affected by freshness information. In particular, mean and 
distribution comparisons as well as regression analyses did not deliver robust evidence for 
the existence of psychological depreciation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Lately, there has been a growing discussion around the issue of food waste and the 
urgent need to address it. As a large share of food waste arises at the consumer level, it is 
particularly important to understand the factors that influence households’ decisions to 
discard edible food. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to better understand the 
potential psychological mechanism whereby temporal cues influence perceptions of foods’ 
taste and freshness, leading individuals to dispose of edible food.  
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More precisely, we investigate the effect of disclosing freshness informational 
indications of a packaged sandwich on people’s experienced consumption utility. We do so 
by distributing halves of sandwiches varying in freshness levels (produced 1 or 7 days before 
the experiment) to students on a university campus over the lunch break and by revealing 
or not revealing the production date and duration of storage. We hypothesized that 
participants informed about the lack of freshness of their sandwich would enjoy their 
sandwich to a lesser extent than individuals who were either unaware of when their 
sandwich was produced or who knowingly received a fresh sandwich. In other words, we 
expect the disclosure of a distant production date to generate what we call the psychological 
depreciation of food.  
We first show that participants who are unaware of the production date of their 
sandwich do not notice any difference in taste, smell or appearance between old and fresh 
sandwiches, and do not financially value them distinctively. This finding provides an ideal 
setting to test for the psychological effect of a long storage date on experienced utility, as 
the sandwich’s actual quality does not appear to be influenced by time. However, we do not 
find robust evidence that the disclosure of the production date significantly affect either 
taste ratings, individuals’ willingness-to-pay for a 2nd sandwich half or the weight of 
sandwich’s leftovers. Hence, we find no evidence supporting our hypothesis of psychological 
depreciation. 
These results may be explained by the absence of underlying psychological mechanism, 
namely the effect of freshness information on expected consumption utility that we initially 
aimed at testing in a follow-up study. Indeed, we find suggestive evidence for the lack of 
influence of freshness information on subjects’ expectations, i.e. individuals who knowingly 
received an old sandwich were not less eager to eat their sandwich than subjects who knew 
that their sandwich was fresh (see Table A7 in Appendix A).  
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A cautious interpretation of our findings is that, by removing the likelihood that 
extended duration impacts food safety—recall that our subjects were explicitly told that 
their sandwiches were safe to eat and had not exceeded any maximum storage dates—we 
removed the main impediment to eating old food. That is, while previous studies 
demonstrate that people are more reluctant to eat food close to or past the expiration date, 
these studies typically confound the possibility that the food may be unsafe. In our study, 
on the other hand, when this is not a factor, we find virtually no difference in subjects’ 
evaluations between sandwiches that are fairly fresh and considerably older. Thus, 
psychological depreciation alone—the idea that old food is simply perceived as tasting less 
good—may not be an important factor underlying food waste. 
Of course, there remain other explanations. One explanation may come from the 
previous finding that incentives reshape people’s beliefs about what the outcome entails, 
and in turn influence their decisions (Ambühl, 2017). In our experiment, the sandwich is 
part of the reward for participation. Individuals may thus have convinced themselves of the 
decent taste of their sandwich. The fact that participants in the Blind-Old condition believe 
on average that their sandwich is rather fresh actually supports this mechanism. Finally, 
an alternative reason for the lack of psychological depreciation may be that, in our setting, 
participants are forced to evaluate the smell and appearance of their sandwich. This first 
sensory evaluation may have raised their presumptions about the taste of old food and thus, 
may have made them more objective. In addition, the framing of our study’s purpose—
evaluating food—may have encouraged participants to rate the sandwich as an expert 
would, namely, based on objective sensory factors and voluntarily abstracting from any 
psychologically influencing cue.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper that studies the causal connection 
between information on the food’s production date and gustatory experiences in a real-
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choice setting, and with the purpose to better understand food waste behaviors. Our findings 
not only complement the existing literature but also have direct implications for 
governments and food retailers. First, evidence shows an important drop in subjects’ 
experienced consumption utility when the label (falsely) suggests that the item is expired 
or almost expired (e.g. Wansink and Wright, 2006; Samotyja, 2015). However, it remains 
unclear whether the negative effect of post-expiration on consumption utility is solely driven 
by people’s safety concerns or also by their freshness considerations. Our setting allows us 
to rule out the first (safety) channel, as our participants are explicitly told that their 
sandwich is safe to eat. Therefore, our results indicate that when individuals consider eating 
or not an old food item, health prevails over perceived depreciation of quality. This finding 
is interesting from a policy perspective: Brun (2018) shows that individuals hold rather 
conservative beliefs when it comes to food safety. Correcting people’s beliefs and 
misperceptions about food safety, e.g. through education, may thus be an effective way to 
reduce people’s excessive tendency to discard old food. Also, policymakers may reconsider 
whether to impose the indication of the production instead of the expiry date on perishable 
food items since individuals’ expected and experienced consumption utility seem to be less 
affected by the former. Second, our results may also be of interest for actors in the food 
industry. As individuals in our experiment neither seemed to expect a difference in taste nor 
experienced different taste for an old and a fresh food item, retailers may reconsider selling 
instead of discarding food items that have passed their freshness date. Unlike expired 
products, goods that have passed their best before date can still be sold20 and may be equally 
valued by consumers. Nevertheless, retailers will often remove such items from shelves under 
the perception that consumers will not buy them. Results like ours suggest that such food 
should not be undervalued. Making the safety of these items public knowledge and 
                                       
20 This is for instance the case for Switzerland, Germany and the USA. 
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eventually offering a price reduction in cases where the quality actually depreciates would 
prevent food waste and monetary losses from discarding usable items. Retailers could also 
invite their clients to help them reduce food waste by redirecting their purchases towards 
old food products. This measure would not only make them save money, but additionally, 
they would potentially benefit from a better image towards their clients as evidence suggests 
(Theotokis et al., 2012). Note that the success of companies such as Ässbar in Switzerland 
or Sirplus in Germany, specialized in the resale of discounted old (and safe) food items, 
proves the success of this marketing strategy. 
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 Chapter 3 ─ Exploring Attitudes Towards Food Waste21 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last few years, the issue of food waste has attracted growing attention from 
governments, NGOs, businesses, and scholars from various disciplines. This is not 
surprising: worldwide, 1.3 billions of tons of food is wasted every year, which represents 
approximately one third of all food produced for human consumption (FAO, 2013) and a 
yearly financial loss estimated at USD 750 billion (FAO, 2013). The consequences of food 
waste are not only financial, but also societal and environmental. Reducing the volume of 
global food waste will be key to ensuring food security for future worldwide populations 
(Godfray et al., 2010; Parfitt et al., 2010) and to slow down the growing demand for 
agricultural land that puts pressure on already shrinking forests (FAO, 2013). Food waste 
also heavily contributes to the release of greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Venkat, 2011; 
WRAP, 2008a, 2009a) and to water wastage (e.g. Lundqvist et al., 2008). While food waste 
takes place along the entire food supply chain, half of it occurs at the household level (Gooch 
et al., 2010; Stenmarck et al., 2016). For instance, in the UK, the amount of food wasted 
by individuals corresponds to emitting 330 kg of CO2 per year (i.e. equivalent to one third 
of the yearly electricity consumption per person, WRAP, 2011a, 2011b), accounts for about 
243 liters of water per person wasted every day (WRAP, 2011a), and costs yearly around 
£700 to an English household with children (WRAP, 2017). Altogether, these facts 
emphasize the necessity to figure out the factors leading individuals to discard edible food. 
Although it is urgent to better understand individuals’ perceptions and behaviors 
related to food waste, there is for now still little research on this topic. As consumers play 
an important role in global food waste generation, the literature has principally investigated 
                                       
21 Please cite as Fanny Brun (2018) “Exploring Attitudes Towards Food Waste,” Working Paper. 
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individuals’ food waste perceptions and practices (see Hebrok and Boks, 2017, and Schanes 
et al., 2018 for literature reviews). The causes of food waste at the consumer level have been 
shown to be complex and multifaceted. In the current study, we complement the existing 
literature by looking at potential psychological drivers of food waste behaviors by using part 
of the survey and behavioral data gathered by Brun and Weber (2018) in their lab-in-the 
field experiment. We investigate to what extent risk preferences, descriptive norms and 
individuals’ attitudes towards food waste generation are relevant predictors of self-assessed 
food waste behaviors, and which of these personal characteristics forms the best predictor. 
We also test the validity of our measure of reported food waste practices by comparing it 
to subjects’ actual behavior towards food waste in the experiment previously mentioned. 
In the following, we briefly review existing research that sheds light on the main 
determinants of individuals’ food disposal behaviors, with a focus on the role played by food 
risks perceptions, norms and attitudes. We then explain in more details what our 
contribution is. 
3.1.1 Previous findings  
Several factors were found to be directly or indirectly related to consumers’ food waste 
practices. First, many studies investigated what are the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the biggest food waste producers. This part of the literature is relevant as it provides 
information on who policies or initiatives should primarily target. It was typically found 
that younger people (e.g. Brook Lyndhurst, 2007; Visschers et al., 2016; Quested et al., 
2013), women (Visschers et al., 2016, Secondi et al., 2015), more educated individuals 
(WRAP, 2008b; Secondi et al., 2015), and those with a higher disposable income (WRAP, 
2008b) generate more food waste.22 In the current study, we also look at what demographic 
                                       
22 While we are interested in food waste practices at the individual level, note that another part of the literature 
looked at what households’ characteristics are associated with the tendency to throw away edible food. It was 
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traits are related to the tendency to waste food, although the sample in the dataset is 
limited in this regard. Our main focus is on the analysis of more fundamental drivers of 
food waste behaviors such as preferences, beliefs and attitudes. 
Another facet of the literature investigates why individuals discard edible food. 
Knowing the causes of food waste is important as it provides key information to any 
institution aiming to design effective measures against food waste. Many studies emphasized 
what behaviors lead households’ purchased food to become spoiled. Several domestic food-
related practices and habits, in particular, food management skills, were found to be at the 
origin of households’ food waste (see e.g. WRAP, 2009a; Brook Lyndhurst, 2007; Evans, 
2011, 2012; Exodus, 2007; Stefan et al., 2013; Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Porpino et al., 
2016). Individuals were also typically shown to cook, prepare and serve too much (WRAP, 
2009a) as a way to reinforce their image of “good food provider” towards their family 
members or guests (e.g. Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Porpino et al., 2016; Visschers et al., 
2016). More importantly for the current study, research also looked at what psychological 
factors are related to individuals’ disposal of edible food. In particular, financial motivations, 
food risks, social norms, and concerns about food waste were shown to be relevant 
determinants of food waste behaviors.  
Earlier work found that people’s motivation to minimize the amount of food they 
throw away is mainly financial rather than environmental or social, as discarding food is 
perceived as a waste of money (e.g. Quested et al., 2013; Neff et al., 2015; Graham-Rowe et 
al., 2014) and as individuals are not aware of the various detrimental impacts of food waste 
(Brook Lyndhurst, 2007; Quested et al., 2011). Financial motivations were further shown 
to be positively associated with lower amounts of reported food discarded (Abeliotis et al., 
                                       
found that families with more than two adults or with children (Koivupuro et al., 2012; Parizeau et al., 2015; 
Williams et al., 2012), or with a larger food budget (Parizeau et al., 2015) contribute more to food waste. 
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2014). In the current paper, we focus on different motives associated with food waste 
behaviors, namely, on individuals’ fear of foodborne illness, on their willingness to behave 
consistently with social norms or simply on people’s intrinsic desire to reduce the amount 
of food that they discard. In the following, we provide an overview of what was previously 
found in the literature in this regard. 
Food risk: Food safety concerns are an important determinant of households’ food 
disposal (Neff et al., 2015; Evans, 2011; Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Visschers et al., 2016). 
This is particularly true for individuals with a strong fear of foodborne illness (Exodus, 
2007). Research showed that this fear enters directly in conflict with a desire to avoid 
throwing away food (Watson and Meah, 2013); however, consumers still prefer discarding 
suspicious food rather than taking the risk to be poisoned (Graham-Rowe et al., 2014).  
Social norms about food waste: subjective norms (i.e. “what I think people think 
of my behavior”) increase individuals’ intention to reduce food waste but do not affect their 
behaviors per se (Graham-Rowe et al., 2015; Visschers et al., 2016; Stancu et al., 2016). 
More interestingly for the current study, descriptive norms (i.e. “what I think most people 
do”) do not significantly predict individuals’ intention to reduce the amount of edible food 
discarded (Graham-Rowe et al., 2015). 
Attitudes towards food waste: Individuals’ own opinion about the importance of 
reducing food waste may also affect the way they manage food items. Indeed, despite being 
a widespread practice, individuals consider wasting food as inappropriate behavior (Porpino 
et al., 2015) and feel guilty about it (Brook Lyndhurst, 2007; Stefan et al., 2013; Quested 
et al., 2013; Parizeau et al., 2015). Also, individuals holding personal norms (i.e. having own 
moral standards (Schwartz, 1977)) that oppose food waste or who are concerned with this 
issue (Visschers et al., 2016; Principato et al., 2015) report wasting less food.    
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3.1.2 Contribution 
The current study contributes to this literature in several ways. First, our work 
provides an additional rigorous test of existing findings. Previous research generally 
approximated individuals’ overall food waste behaviors based on a single survey question 
about subjective estimations of the frequency or amount of food wasted. The aggregated 
nature of our measure of food waste behaviors allows a reduction of the bias induced by 
potential measurement errors. Moreover, unlike earlier work, we look at the behavioral 
validity of our construct of reported food waste practices by testing for its capacity to 
predict participants’ actual behaviors towards food disposal in the context of an experiment. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, no research so far has looked at the link between 
descriptive norms and reported behaviors related to food waste. As mentioned earlier, 
Graham-Rowe et al. (2015) only tested for the effect of this variable on people’s intentions 
to reduce the volume of edible food that they discard.  
More generally, we are also the first study that aims at ranking risk preferences, 
descriptive norms and attitudes towards food waste reduction according to how well each 
of these variables predicts reported food waste practices.  This information is crucial to any 
institution willing to know through what channel it can most effectively reduce the level of 
individuals’ food waste. Note that such a ranking cannot be established based on a 
comparison of the results from existing studies as some of them are qualitative (e.g. Exodus, 
2007; Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Brook Lyndhurst, 2007) while others are quantitative (e.g. 
Vissenchers et al., 2016; Principato et al., 2015; Parizeau et al., 2015; Stancu et al., 2016; 
Stefan et al., 2013) and do not measure individuals’ characteristics and behaviors in a 
homogenous way.  
Finally, we not only look at the relationship between food risk perceptions and food 
waste behaviors, but also consider risk preferences in the health/safety domain and in 
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general. The latter variable is potentially an interesting one to include in future studies on 
the topic of food waste as it is easily measurable (general risk preferences can be reliably 
estimated by one single question (Dohmen et al., 2011)), and has been extensively studied. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 3.2, we explain in detail 
our study design. In section 3.3, we describe our survey measures and provide some 
descriptive statistics of the data collected, while in section 3.4 we present the results of our 
data analyses. Section 3.5 offers a discussion of our findings and the final section concludes. 
3.2 Method  
The present study is based on data collected in the context of Brun and Weber (2018)’s 
lab-in-the-field experiment. Over the lunch break, they invited students from the University 
of Zurich to take part in a 20 min study on food evaluation. Their participation was 
rewarded with half of a packaged egg sandwich and 10 CHF. If they wanted to participate 
and fulfilled the eligibility criteria,23 they were invited into a classroom where they received 
their sandwich half. They were asked to eat it, rate its taste, and provide their willingness-
to-pay (WTP, hereafter) for receiving their sandwich’s second half. While eating, they 
completed an extensive questionnaire that aimed at measuring their behaviors towards food 
waste and several personality traits. If they had not entirely eaten their first sandwich half 
by the end of the study, they were invited to either finish it or give it back to the 
experimenter (such that he could weigh it). At the end of the experiment, a die roll together 
with the subjects’ reported WTP determined whether (and at what price, p) they would 
buy the second sandwich half. If the purchase took place, the subjects received their second 
                                       
23 To participate, a person should not have any allergies, intolerances or diet restrictions that would prevent 
them from eating the sandwich, should understand written English, and should not have previously 
participated in the study. 
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sandwich half and 10 – p CHF, otherwise, they were simply given their full participation 
fee of 10 CHF. 
This was a 2x2 between-subjects design where two dimensions were varied: subjects 
received a sandwich half that had been produced either 1 (Fresh) or 7 (Old) days before the 
experiment took place and they were either informed about the production date of their 
sandwich (Salient) or not (Blind).24 While Brun and Weber (2018) analyze the effects of 
freshness information provision on participants’ gustatory experience, here we focus our 
attention on the data collected via the questionnaire to better understand people’s food 
waste practices. We then compare these data to subjects’ actual tendency to waste food in 
the experiment, as measured by the weight of their potentially unfinished first sandwich 
half when leaving the experiment, and by their WTP to prevent their second half from 
being wasted. 
3.3 Description and analysis of survey measures 
Our sample consists of 258 students25 who are between 18 and 35 years old, the median 
age being 22. Women comprise 52%, 79% are Swiss (potentially with an additional 
nationality), and 48% study natural sciences26 (as a primary or secondary subject). In the 
following, we describe the data collected on reported individuals’ behaviors, beliefs, and 
attitudes towards food waste reduction, as well as risk preferences. 
3.3.1 Behaviors towards food waste 
Quantity of food trashed: Participants indicated the percentage of what they buy 
or cook that ends up being thrown away (ca 0%, <10%, <20%, <30%, <40%, <50%, >50%, 
                                       
24 For more details about the experimental design, please refer to Brun and Weber (2018). 
25 The number of observations in each condition is as follows: NBlind-Fresh=65, NBlind-Old=63, NSalient-Fresh=65 and 
NSalient-Old=65.   
26 Natural sciences typically include: environmental sciences, physics, biology, chemistry, health sciences, earth 
sciences…  
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or they could also indicate “I never have this kind of food”) for different product categories 
(fresh fruits and vegetables, self-prepared meals and leftovers, and milk and dairy products). 
The distribution of the percentage of food trashed is very similar across the three types of 
food (see Figure 6), with the median participant reporting throwing away less than 10% of 
the food he bought or prepared (conditional on having this type of food).27  
Figure 6: Distribution of the percentage of the (edible part of) 
purchased or cooked food that ends up being thrown away 
Notes: N=258. 
 
Behaviors towards old food: Subjects were provided with a list of eleven 
descriptions of old food items. For each food type, they indicated how likely they would be 
to eat it (1: Not at all likely, 2: Moderately likely, 3: Very likely). They were asked to assume 
that these items had been bought fresh, had been stored in an appropriate environment, 
and that they smelled and looked fine when inspecting or opening them. Table 5 (column 
1) provides participants’ average answers to each of the eleven questions. Participants’ 
                                       
27 Using a sample of Swiss inhabitants, Visschers et al. (2016) also finds that the distribution of fruits and 
vegetables as well as dairy products thrown away is positively skewed, however, a much higher rate of 
respondents report not wasting any item of these two categories at all (34% and 51%, respectively). 
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reported behaviors are fairly diverse within each item, suggesting a wide heterogeneity of 
preferences. 
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Table 5: Average ratings of the likelihood and safety to eat some food items 
  How likely would 
you be to eat this 
item? 
(1) 
 How safe do you 
think it is to eat this 
item? 
(2) 
nr Food item description: 
N
ot
 a
t a
ll 
lik
el
y 
M
od
er
at
el
y 
lik
el
y 
V
er
y 
lik
el
y 
 
N
ot
 a
t a
ll 
sa
fe
 
M
od
er
at
el
y 
sa
fe
 
C
om
pl
et
el
y 
sa
fe
 
1 
A delivered (reheated) pizza with vegetables 
and meat that has been sitting in your fridge 
for 3 days 
0.29 0.33 0.38  0.1 0.64 0.26 
2 
3-day-old leftovers of a home-made chicken-
curry 0.17 0.33 0.5  0.09 0.54 0.37 
3 
(Reheated) leftovers of a pre-prepared veggie 
lasagna that you baked 4 days ago 0.24 0.35 0.41  0.11 0.58 0.31 
4 
An unopened plain (i.e., unflavored) yoghurt 
that expired 10 days ago 0.52 0.01 0.48  0.19 0.47 0.34 
5 
An unopened UHT milk carton that expired 
2 months ago 0.51 0.29 0.21  0.38 0.41 0.22 
6 
An unopened pack of dry spaghetti that 
expired 1 year ago  0.11 0.2 0.69  0.05 0.26 0.69 
7 
An unopened can of tuna that expired 1 week 
ago 0.24 0.23 0.53  0.14 0.27 0.59 
8 A raw broccoli that you bought 1 week ago  0.04 0.28 0.68  0.02 0.27 0.71 
9 Hard boiled eggs that you cooked 1 week ago 0.35 0.24 0.41  0.24 0.36 0.4 
10 Pre-packaged hummus opened 5 days ago 0.15 0.44 0.41  0.07 0.58 0.35 
11 
A jar of green pesto that you opened 2 weeks 
ago 0.19 0.41 0.4  0.16 0.51 0.33 
Notes: Nnr=258 for nr in {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11} where nr represents the item number. Some participants missed some 
questions both in columns 1 and 2, implying: N3= N10=257, N6=256, and some questions in column 2, implying: N9=257.  
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Behaviors towards moldy cheese: Participants were further asked what they 
would do if they would notice some mold on a hard cheese just taken out of their fridge (1: 
I eat it, 2: I remove only the moldy part (i.e., as little as possible) to maximize the quantity 
of cheese left to eat, 3: I cut out any part that is at all close to the mold and eat the rest, 
and 4: I throw the piece of cheese away). Table 6 shows a wide variety of attitudes in such 
a situation.28 
Table 6: Behavior towards moldy cheese 
 Percentage 
I eat it 0.8% 
Remove only the moldy part 22.9% 
Cut out if close to mold 45% 
Throw it away 31.4% 
Notes: N=258. 
 
 
3.3.2 Descriptive norms and personal attitudes 
Descriptive norms in the domain of food waste (FW Guess): To measure 
beliefs about how much food people usually throw away, subjects were asked to provide 
their best guess of how much of the food in households in Europe is wasted (as a percentage 
of the total food bought).29 On average, participants indicated a slightly higher number 
than the estimation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations of 
33% (FAO, 2013; ܨܹ ܩݑ݁ݏݏതതതതതതതതതതതതതത = 0.37, p-value of a two-sided t-test = 0.000), and the guesses 
were widely dispersed, as shown in Figure 7. 
                                       
28 In the case the curious reader wonders, participants with the Swiss nationality (i.e. for whom cheese is 
omnipresent in their culinary culture) do not display significantly different attitudes compared to foreigners 
(a two-sided t-test delivers a p-value=0.96).  
29 Brun and Weber (2018) did not incentivize the belief elicitation to avoid making the payment phase more 
complex and longer. However, recent experimental evidence shows that beliefs elicited in a non-incentivized 
way are informative (e.g. Armantier and Treich, 2013; Trautmann and Gijs van de Kuilen, 2015). 
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of participants’ 
guesses about the percentage of food bought by 
European households that is wasted (FW Guess) 
  
Notes: N=258. Vertical line at 33% which is the percentage estimated 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 
2013). 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of participants’ personal 
attitudes towards  food waste (Min Waste) 
 
Notes: N=258. Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 1 
means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 
0 otherwise.  
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Personal attitudes towards food waste (Min Waste): To find out what 
participants think about the problem of food waste, they had to tell how important it is for 
them to minimize the amount of food that they usually throw away, on a scale from 1: Not 
at all important to 9: Extremely important. After normalizing this variable to make it lie 
between 0 and 1, we find that 88% of the sample reported a value equal or above 0.75 (see 
Figure 8 for the whole distribution). The issue of food waste thus seems to generally matter 
to the subjects. 
3.3.3 Risk preferences 
Risk preferences were evaluated in different domains using self-assessment questions. 
Note that all our analyses are performed on recoded measures of risk preferences such that 
they take values between 0 and 1. 
Risk preferences in general (Risk General): Participants’ general risk preferences 
were evaluated using the same question as in Falk et al. (2017), namely: Please tell us, in 
general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks? (on a scale from 1: Completely 
unwilling to take risks, to 9: Very willing to take risks). A two-sided t-test indicates that 
participants tend on average to be slightly risk seeking (ܴଓݏ݇ ܩ݁݊݁ݎ݈ܽതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത = 0.54, p-
value=0.009). However, general risk preferences vary extensively among participants as 
illustrated by Figure 9. 
Risk preferences in the food domain (Risk Food): Participants indicated, for 
each of the same eleven old food items described in Table 5 (see section 3.3.1), how safe 
they think it is to eat it (1: Not at all safe, 2: Moderately safe, 3: Completely safe). Table 5 
(column 2) shows that beliefs regarding the safety of old food varies substantially across 
items and individuals. We average the eleven answers within each individual to obtain an 
aggregate measure of risk preferences in the food domain (Risk Food). On average, subjects 
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tend to believe that these food items are rather safe, with 75% of the average ratings lying 
above 0.5 (see Figure 9 for the cumulative distribution of Risk Food).   
Risk preferences in the health/safety domain (Risk Health): An adapted 
version of the 9-items scale elaborated by Weber et al. (2002) is used to estimate individuals’ 
degree of risk-taking in the health/safety domain. Respondents must indicate how likely 
they are to engage in each of nine different unhealthy or unsafe activities using a scale from 
1: Extremely likely, to 5: Extremely unlikely (the list of items is provided in Table B2, 
Appendix B). We calculate the average rating provided to the nine items within individuals 
to obtain a measure of individuals’ risk preferences in the health/safety domain (Risk 
Health). A two-sided t-test reveals that individuals in our sample are slightly risk averse 
when it comes to health or safety (ܴଓݏ݇ ܪ݈݁ܽݐℎതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത = 0.47, p-value=0.001), but the distribution 
of risk preferences in this domain remains wide (see Figure 9). 
These three measures of risk preferences positively and significantly correlate with 
each other (see Table 7). In particular, the correlation between Risk General and Risk Food 
of 0.3 (p-value <0.01) indicates that individuals’ risk preferences in the food domain are 
not necessarily (solely) driven by a lack of expertise in evaluating the safety of old food 
items but also by more general preferences for risk. 
Additional information on individual characteristics was collected as it may influence 
participants’ reported and actual behaviors towards food waste. More precisely, participants 
were asked whether they had already experienced a serious case of food poisoning in the 
past (Food Pois.), at what frequency they prepare meals using raw ingredients (Prep. 
Meals), whether they had already eaten the type of sandwich received in the experiment 
(Already Eat.), and they also provided their level of hunger before starting the experiment 
(Hungry). Summary statistics for these variables as well as for the ones described throughout 
this section are available in Appendix B, Table B1.  
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of risk 
preferences in general, in the food domain and in 
the health/safety domain 
 
Notes: N=258. Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and Risk 
Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk 
taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food domain 
and in the health/safety domain, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Correlation between the three measures of 
risk preferences 
 Risk 
General 
Risk Food 
Risk  
Health 
Risk General 1 - - 
Risk Food 0.298*** 1 - 
Risk Health 0.429*** 0.302*** 1 
Notes: N=258. Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and Risk 
Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk taking 
and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food domain and in the 
health/safety domain, respectively. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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3.4 Results  
In the following, we first construct an index – Food Waste – allowing us to classify 
individuals from small to large producers of food waste, and then investigate which of these 
types are more prominent across different demographic characteristics. Second, we look at 
whether risk preferences, descriptive norms, and subjects’ personal attitudes towards food 
waste reduction can predict individuals’ tendency to waste food. We hypothesize that 
participants who are not especially risk averse, who believe that people, on average, do not 
throw much edible food away, and/or who are concerned about the issue of food waste tend 
to dispose of less edible food. We also look at which of these personal characteristics best 
predict our construct.  Finally, we test if our measure of reported food waste practices can 
predict subjects’ actual behaviors in the experiment in which they participated. We expect 
individuals who reported wasting little food in the survey to be more likely to finish their 
first sandwich half in the experiment, and to be willing to pay more money to prevent their 
second sandwich half to be discarded. 
3.4.1 Construction and descriptive analysis of Food Waste 
We create a measure of individuals’ tendency to waste food by calculating a simple 
arithmetic mean of all 15 items30 capturing subjects’ reported behaviors towards food waste 
(see section 3.3.1). We obtain a new variable – Food Waste – that we normalize to lie 
between 0 and 1 such that Food Waste is 1 when a person wastes a lot of food, and 0 when 
she wastes very little food. The cumulative distribution of Food Waste shows a fair 
heterogeneity of behaviors within our sample (see Figure 10). On average, participants tend 
not to throw too much food away (ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത = 0.38,ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁) = 0.37).  
                                       
30 4 participants missed one out of these 15 questions, and 7 other subjects answered “I never have this kind 
of food” when asked about the percentage of food (i.e. fruits and vegetables, self-prepared meals and leftovers, 
or milk and dairy products) that they throw away. In these 11 cases, Food Waste was obtained by computing 
an arithmetic mean over the 14 remaining answered questions.   
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In Table B3 in Appendix B, we provide the average value of Food Waste for different 
individual characteristics. Men, individuals with the Swiss nationality and students in 
natural sciences produce slightly less food waste than women, foreigners, and students in 
other study fields, respectively. Although one could expect that individuals who experienced 
a serious case of food poisoning in the past are more conservative when it comes to eating 
potentially unsafe food, we do not find evidence for this pattern. While there is no existing 
research on the three latter characteristics, previous work found similar results regarding 
the relationship between food waste behaviors and gender (Visschers et al., 2016, Secondi 
et al., 2015).  Also, as found in previous studies (Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Brook 
Lyndhurst, 2007), the subjects who report cooking often throw away on average less food 
than those who declare preparing meals less regularly.  
Figure 10: Cumulative distribution of participants’ 
reported behaviors towards food waste 
 
Notes: N=258. Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person 
wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food. 
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3.4.2 Determinants of Food Waste 
In the following, we look at what are the main predictors of individuals’ behaviors 
towards food waste by running regression analyses. We then compute coefficients of partial 
determination to find out what individual trait can best explain variations in subjects’ 
tendency to discard edible food. 
Table 8 displays the coefficient estimates from linear regressions of our measure of 
individuals’ reported behaviors towards food waste on individuals’ risk preferences in general 
(columns 1 and 2), in the food domain (columns 3 and 4) or in the health/safety domain 
(columns 5 and 6) as well as on descriptive norms and on attitudes towards food waste 
generation. Kruskal-Wallis H tests indicate that Food Waste as well as subjects’ personality 
traits are properly randomized across the four conditions to which individuals were allocated 
in Brun and Weber (2018)’s experiment, except for individuals’ risk preferences in the 
health/security domain (p-value=0.08, see Table B4 in Appendix B). As a matter of 
precaution, we therefore add dummy variables for treatment in each model (i.e. Old, Salient 
and Salient*Old). In columns 2, 4, and 6 we also control for additional individual 
characteristics (i.e. age, gender, people’s level of hunger and whether they already 
experienced a serious case of food poisoning in the past).  
Independently of adding all these variables, all three individual traits significantly 
explain subjects’ reported behaviors towards food waste.31 Individuals who take risks (in 
general, in the food domain, or in the health/safety domain) or who think that food waste 
is an important problem report wasting significantly less food (ߚመோ௜௦௞  ீ௘௡௘௥௔௟ < 0, ߚመோ௜௦௞ ி௢௢ௗ <0, ߚመோ௜௦௞  ு௘௔௟௧௛ < 0, p-values < 0.01; ߚመெ௜௡ ௐ௔௦௧௘ < 0, p-value<0.05). Descriptive norms are 
related to individuals’ food waste practices in an intuitive direction: subjects who believe  
                                       
31 Note that the inclusion of sessions’ fixed effect does neither affect the significance, nor the magnitude or the 
sign of the coefficients in a significant manner. 
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Table 8: Relationship between reported food waste behaviors and several 
individual traits  
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Waste 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk General -0.198*** -0.197*** 
    
 (-4.51) (-4.46) 
    
Risk Food 
  
-0.770*** -0.768*** 
  
 
  
(-20.23) (-20.22) 
  
Risk Health 
    
-0.257*** -0.259*** 
 
    
(-3.97) (-3.68) 
FW Guess 0.280*** 0.284*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.309*** 0.321*** 
 (3.49) (3.48) (2.85) (2.79) (3.65) (3.73) 
Min Waste -0.137** -0.141** -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.168** -0.171** 
 (-2.07) (-2.15) (-4.08) (-4.13) (-2.43) (-2.50) 
Hungry 
 
-0.00352 
 
-0.00270 
 
-0.00439 
 
 
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.83) 
 
(-0.77) 
Food Pois. 
 
0.0191 
 
0.0112 
 
0.0152 
 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.66) 
Female 
 
0.00278 
 
0.00477 
 
-0.00587 
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(-0.27) 
Age 
 
0.00236 
 
-0.000743 
 
0.00152 
 
 
(0.76) 
 
(-0.40) 
 
(0.48) 
Constant 0.525*** 0.488*** 0.944*** 0.970*** 0.554*** 0.542*** 
 (7.17) (4.57) (20.51) (15.69) (6.62) (4.65) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.180 0.187 0.656 0.658 0.157 0.162 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food. Independent variables: 
Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates 
aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety domain, 
respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in 
Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 
1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} 
where 1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the 
treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, and =0 if 
received a 1-day-old sandwich, and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know 
it. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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that people in Europe waste a lot of food throw more food away themselves (ߚመிௐ ீ௨௘௦௦ > 0, 
p-values<0.01).   
To check for the robustness of these results, we run the same analyses with two 
alternative constructions of Food Waste – Food Waste A and Food Waste B – that 
aggregate the same information as Food Waste but in a different manner. While Food 
Waste equally weighs the 15 items capturing individuals’ behaviors towards food waste, 
namely, the quantity of food trashed (3 items), behavior towards old food (11 items), and 
behavior towards moldy cheese (1 item) (see section 3.3.1), Food Waste A equally weighs 
the average behavior in each of these three sub-categories. Food Waste B, in contrast, 
consists of an average of two means: the mean of the three items measuring people’s quantity 
of food trashed (Food Trashed), and the mean of the 11+1=12 remaining items capturing 
individuals’ behaviors towards old food32 (Dislikes Old Food). Food Waste B therefore 
captures people’s behaviors towards food waste by giving an equal importance to their 
reported food discarding practices and their likelihood to eat old food.33 Independently of 
the alternative construct considered, regression results are similar to the ones obtained with 
Food Waste (see Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B).  
We further compute coefficients of partial determination (CPD hereafter) for each 
individual trait to assess which of them can explain the largest part of variations in Food 
Waste. The estimated CPDs are reported in Table 9, where risk preferences are either 
captured by Risk Food (column 1), Risk General (column 2) or Risk Health (column 3). 
Independently of the domain in which risk preferences are measured, this individual  
                                       
32 We consider here moldy cheese as an old food item and therefore treat the question related to this product 
in the same way as the 11 ones about behaviors towards old food. 
33 Food Waste B is another meaningful way to capture individuals’ behaviors towards food waste since the 
two variables that it equally weighs, Food Trashed and Dislikes Old Food, relate differently to subjects’ 
individual traits (see regression results in Tables B5 and B6, and coefficients of partial determination in Table 
B9 in Appendix B). 
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Table 9: Coefficients of partial determination based on the regressions of 
Food Waste on individual traits 
Dependent 
variable:  
Food Waste 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Risk Food 0.621*** - - 
Risk General - 0.088*** - 
Risk Health - - 0.063*** 
FW Guess 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 
Min Waste 0.063*** 0.023** 0.034*** 
Notes: N=258. Coefficients of partial determination of regressing Food Waste on Risk Food (col. 1), Risk 
General (col. 2) or Risk Health (col. 3) as well as FW Guess and Min Waste.  Dependent variable: Food 
Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very 
little food. Independent variables: Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, Risk Food and Risk 
Health are in [0.1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, 
in the food- or in the health/safety domain, respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's 
belief about how much of the food in households in Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food 
bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 1 means that it is very important for the 
person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise.* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
characteristic significantly explains a larger part of individuals’ tendency to waste food than 
the two other traits. While the very high CPD of Risk Food may reflect its similar 
construction to Food Waste,34 Risk General, which is based on a single question, still reduces 
the sum of squared residuals (SSRs hereafter) substantially when added to the regression 
model (ܥܲܦோ௜௦௞ ீ௘௡௘௥௔௟ = 0.09, p-value<0.01). This latter variable even outperforms the 
marginal contribution of Risk Health that is based on a 9-items scale. The introduction of 
descriptive norms (FW Guess) or individuals’ attitudes regarding food waste reduction (Min 
Waste) significantly decrease the SSRs when added to any of the three models, but to a 
smaller extent (the reduction of SSRs lies between 3.7% and 5.4% for FW Guess, and 
between 2.3% and 6.3% for Min Waste, depending on the model considered). When 
considering Food Waste A and Food Waste B, risk preferences remain the best predictor of 
                                       
34 These two indices rely on the evaluation of the same food items listed in Table 5. 
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variations in people’s behaviors towards food waste, except when considering risk 
preferences in the health/security domain. In this case, FW Guess as well as Min Waste 
tend to outperform it (see Table B10 in Appendix B).  
In brief, we find that the three individual traits that we consider are valid predictors 
of individuals’ reported tendency to discard edible food.  In particular, risk seeking subjects, 
those who think that a low percentage of the food purchased by consumers is trashed, and 
those who consider food waste as an important problem report throwing less food away. We 
also find that risk preference is the factor that can best explain variations in subjects’ 
reported behaviors towards food waste.  
3.4.3 Validation of Food Waste  
In this section, we look at whether individuals’ reported behaviors towards food waste 
are informative of their actual behavior in a real-choice situation. As mentioned in section 
3.2, participants took part in an experiment where each of them received a sandwich half 
that they had to eat and evaluate while answering a survey. We use their willingness-to-
pay (WTP hereafter) for the second sandwich half, and the weight of their potentially 
unfinished first half as an approximation of actual behaviors towards food waste. Indeed, if 
a subject does not like throwing away food, she would be willing to pay a high price to 
prevent that her second sandwich half ends up in the trash can, and would be more likely 
to eat her first sandwich half entirely.  
Figure 11 displays the cumulative distributions of subjects’ WTP for their second 
sandwich half (a), and of the weight of their first half when leaving the experiment (b), 
with respect to whether they reported a low (ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁ ≤ ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁)) or a 
high (ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁ > ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁)) tendency to waste food. There is no visual 
difference between the distributions of WTPs across the two groups. This impression is 
supported by a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value=0.99). When considering each 
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treatment group separately, there is also no clear visual difference between the two 
distributions (see Figure B1 in Appendix B), and the p-value of two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests is above 0.5 for each treatment group considered. However, Figure 11(b) 
shows that subjects reporting a low tendency to waste food (ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁ ≤
ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܨ݋݋݀ ܹܽݏݐ݁)) behave accordingly in the experiment by leaving behind a lower 
amount of unfinished sandwich than their peers.35 This difference in distributions is (weakly) 
significant (the p-value of a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 0.081) and a two-sided t-
test36 of the means indicates that the weight of sandwich leftovers is 9.1 grams higher when 
Food Waste is above its median than when it is below it (p-value = 0.003).  
In order to cleanly estimate the relationship between reported- and actual food usage 
behavior, we run regression analyses (see Table 10) to control for several individual  
                                       
35 We do not report this graph for every treatment group separately since only 60 participants did not finish 
their sandwich, translating into only 11 to 19 observations per condition. 
36 This test is performed on the whole sample (258 observations). 
Figure 11: Cumulative distributions of subjects’ willingness-to-pay for the 
second sandwich half (a) and of the weight of their unfinished first half (b) 
with respect to their reported food waste behaviors  
(a) (b) 
Notes: N=258. Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means 
that she wastes very little food. 
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Table 10: Relationship between individuals’ actual- and reported food waste 
behaviors   
Dependent 
variable: 
WTP 
weakly pos. 
(1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly pos. 
(1/0) 
WTP First half entirely 
eaten (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Food Waste -0.174 -0.104 0.124 -0.0457 -0.506*** -0.347*** 
 (-0.31) (-0.71) (0.22) (-0.31) (-3.53) (-2.73) 
Already Eat.   0.419** 0.111*  0.133*** 
   (2.01) (1.78)  (3.00) 
Hungry   0.151*** 0.0207  0.0540*** 
   (3.04) (1.38)  (4.86) 
Food Pois.   -0.0115 0.0669  -0.00987 
   (-0.05) (1.12)  (-0.20) 
Female   -0.427** -0.0546  -0.209*** 
   (-2.09) (-0.91)  (-4.70) 
Age   -0.0448 -0.00241  -0.00724 
   (-1.50) (-0.26)  (-0.93) 
Constant 1.028*** 0.966*** 1.119 0.824***   
 (3.48) (11.18) (1.48) (3.59)   
N 258 183 258 183 258 258 
Pseu. R-sq. 0.013  0.101  0.049 0.228 
Notes: Columns 1, 3, 5 and 6: Estimated marginal effects of Probit models. Columns 2 and 4: Estimated marginal 
effects of a truncated regression at 0. Columns 1 to 4 represent two hurdle models. Dependent variable: col. 1 and 
3: WTP weakly pos.=1 if WTP>=0, and =0 if WTP<0; col. 2 and 4: WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF; col. 5 and 6: First 
half is entirely eaten =1 if the subject finished to eat his first sandwich half, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables: 
Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little 
food; Already Eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} 
where 1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female =1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the 
treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, =0 if received 
a 1-day-old sandwich and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know it. McFadden 
Pseudo R2 are provided. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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characteristics37 (columns 3, 4 and 6), and for the treatments to which subjects where 
allocated in the experiment (all columns).38 To account for the two clusters of observations 
at WTP < 0 (37 observations) and at WTP = 0 (38 observations), we run a hurdle model 
where we regress the decision to submit a weakly positive willingness-to-pay (columns 1 and 
3) and the willingness-to-pay (conditional on being weakly positive, columns 2 and 4) on 
Food Waste, using Probit and truncated regression models, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 
show the estimated coefficients of Probit regressions of individuals’ decision to finish or not 
their sandwich on our measure of individuals’ behaviors towards food waste. 39  
We find that individuals’ reported behaviors towards food waste are not predictive of 
how much they are willing to pay to prevent their second sandwich half to be discarded 
(the p-value of ߚመி௢௢ௗ ௐ௔௦௧௘  is never below 5% in columns 1 to 4). Estimation of a Tobit 
model (on the restricted sample of weakly positive willingness-to-pay’s, see Table B11 in 
Appendix B), and of a hurdle model with Food Waste A and Food Waste B as explanatory 
variables (see Table B12 in Appendix B) confirms this conclusion. However, Food Waste is 
predictive of subjects’ decision to finish or not their sandwich: individuals who report 
throwing a lot of food away (Food Waste=1) are 35% less likely to eat their first sandwich 
half entirely (p-value <0.01, column 6). This result is confirmed by simple linear regression 
analyses (see columns 1 and 2 in Table B13, Appendix B) or when considering our 
alternative measures of reported food waste practices (Food Waste A and Food Waste B) 
using a Probit model (see columns 3 to 6 in Table B13, Appendix B).  
                                       
37 We do not only control for demographics, but also for variables that are likely to correlate with participants’ 
WTP and with their amount of sandwiches’ leftovers, namely: whether subjects had already eaten this type 
of sandwich in the past (Already Eat.), their current hunger level (Hungry), as well as whether they had 
experiences food poisoning in the past (Food Pois.). 
38 Adding sessions fixed effects do neither change the magnitude, nor the sign or the significance of coefficients 
substantially. 
39 Provided that only 60 out of 258 individuals did not entirely eat their sandwich, we focus our analysis on 
explaining the decision to finish or not the sandwich, rather than on predicting the weight of eventual leftovers. 
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To summarize, our measure of reported behaviors towards food waste is partly 
predictive of subjects’ actual behavior in the experiment. Individuals who declare throwing 
little food away are not more willing to pay to prevent their second sandwich half to be 
discarded. However, they are significantly more likely to finish the sandwich half that they 
have started eating. While several reasons can explain the partial validation of Food Waste, 
one should mention that this index is a general measure of reported behaviors towards food 
waste. However, individuals’ actual behaviors were observed in the specific environment of 
an experiment with decisions to make about a single food item. This context is not 
representative of the broad range of situations and choices that can lead to disposing of 
food on a typical day and may therefore explain the limited predictive power of our 
construct.  
3.5 Discussion  
The aim of the present article was to better understand what psychological factors 
drive individuals to discard edible food. Based on survey data, we find that risk preferences, 
descriptive norms, and individuals’ attitudes towards the generation of food waste are 
relevant predictors of our construct of individuals’ (reported) tendency to discard food. We 
further find that risk preferences can best explain variations in the latter measure, 
independently of the kind of risk preferences considered (i.e. risk preferences in general, in 
the food domain, or in the health/security domain). Taking advantage of existing behavioral 
data for the participants, we also test the validity of our index of reported food waste 
practices. We find some support for our construct to explain actual behaviors towards food 
waste in a real-choice situation.  
Overall, our results may be of high interest for any institution or leader willing to 
address the issue of food waste at the consumer level in an efficient manner. In particular, 
our analyses suggest that any initiative or campaign against food waste that targets 
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individuals’ perceived food risks may have a bigger impact if it influences descriptive norms 
or people’s attitudes towards food waste reduction.  
In the following, we first elaborate on the role played by descriptive norms for 
individuals’ food waste behaviors. We then take a closer look at people’s food risks 
perceptions by comparing them to actual food risks. Finally, we point out limitations of our 
study. 
3.5.1 The role of descriptive norms 
While we validate existing evidence on the role played by food risk perceptions (Neff 
et al., 2015; Evans, 2011, 2012; Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; Visschers et al., 2016) and 
attitudes towards food waste generation (Principato et al., 2015), we are the first study 
showing the additional relevant role of descriptive norms. Previous work suggested that 
people who feel morally obliged not to waste food also behave so (Visschers et al., 2016), 
and that those who think that their social group judges discarding food as a bad act have 
a stronger intention to reduce the amount of food that they throw away (Graham-Rowe et 
al., 2015; Stefan et al., 2013; Visschers et al., 2016; Stancu et al., 2016). We find that the 
simple belief that most of the population wastes little food is associated with lower amounts 
of discarded food. As 58% of our subjects overestimate the percentage of food wasted in 
Europe, an initiative aiming at correcting this belief may be a straightforward way to reduce 
the volume of edible food discarded by individuals holding these beliefs. Evidence indeed 
suggests that communicating information about the food waste issue via online media or 
the newspapers is negatively related to individuals’ food waste generation (Principato et al., 
2015).  
3.5.2 Perceived food safety 
Among the three types of risk preferences that we consider, we find that risk 
preferences in the food domain best predict our measure of food waste behaviors. This 
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validates existing evidence that food safety concerns are an important determinant of 
households’ food disposal (Neff et al., 2015; Evans, 2011; Graham-Rowe et al., 2014; 
Visschers et al., 2016). In this context, the question of whether individuals hold reasonable 
beliefs regarding the safety of old food products is appealing. To assess the actual safety of 
the food items presented in Table 5 (see section 3.3.1), we asked for the opinion of a Swiss 
association of consumers and of a food scientist. We also looked at two reliable summary 
reports about food’s shelf-life (FRC, 2012 and Rivet-Bonjean, 2018) and researched what 
the Swiss law prescribes in terms of products’ bacterial content and of hygiene standards in 
the production of food. In Table B14 (see Appendix B), we provide the results of our 
investigations as well as subjects’ evaluation of each food item’s safety. We find evidence 
that for many food items, subjects’ safety assessments are overly conservative. While an 
expired unopened plain yoghurt / UHT milk carton / pack of dry spaghettis / can of tuna, 
as well as a week-old raw broccoli are completely safe to eat (provided that they look and 
smell fine), 66%, 79%, 31%, 41% and 29% of the subjects, respectively, rated these items as 
not at all safe or moderately safe (see Table B14 in Appendix B). Also, when considering a 
hard cheese with some mold on it, more than 30% of the participants would throw the 
entire cheese away (see Table 6 in section 3.3.1), while removing only the moldy part would 
be sufficient to make the cheese safe to eat.40 In addition to revealing people’s conservative 
beliefs, these results also indicate that individuals do not rely enough on their senses to 
evaluate food,41 and are not aware of the existence of different date labels (or of their 
meaning) even on common food products. For example, dried spaghettis are labelled with 
a “best before” date, implying that only their quality may deteriorate once the date is 
                                       
40 This statement represents the opinion of a food specialist working for one of the biggest Swiss supermarket 
and of a nutritionist dietician who published an article in a recognized French journal specialized in nutrition 
and health (Rivet-Bonjean, 2018). 
41 They were explicitly told to imagine that each item from Table 5 looks and smells fine when inspecting 
them. 
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passed, not their safety level. Therefore, a simple sensory evaluation would be sufficient to 
decide whether or not to consume them.  
In our study, we do not only find that people’s food risks perceptions are generally 
overestimated, but also that they are highly correlated with the tendency to waste food. 
Therefore, educating individuals to improve their ability to disentangle old- from hazardous 
food, by using their senses and correctly interpreting the various date labels, may be an 
effective way to help reduce the amount of food daily thrown away by individuals.42  
3.5.3 Limitations 
Our study has a few limitations. First of all, participants’ general behaviors towards 
food waste are self-assessed. This is problematic for several reasons. First, individuals’ 
reported amount of food trashed is subject to measurement errors as people may be overly 
influenced by the amount of food they recently discarded or they may simply not remember 
precisely the amount of food that they usually throw away. Kormos and Gifford (2014) 
indeed showed that people do not pay much attention to their daily behaviors. Second, 
although subjects were explicitly informed that their anonymity would be preserved 
throughout the study, they may still have underreported the quantity of food that they 
throw away to avoid feelings of shame and because they knew that their answers were not 
verifiable.43 However, note that this concern may not be too prevailing as research showed 
that social desirability does not have a significant effect on self-reported pro-environmental 
behaviors (e.g. Kaiser et al., 1999; Milfont, 2009). Also, although we constructed an index 
of individuals’ general tendency to waste food, it was still able to partly predict participants’ 
                                       
42 Note that such measures were also suggested by several scholars (e.g. Neff et al., 2015; Graham-Rowe et 
al., 2014; Principato et al., 2015; Schanes et al., 2018). 
43 Individuals’ reported likelihood to eat old food items may also be influenced by feelings of shame, but the 
direction of the bias is unclear. Individuals’ social image may be tarnished both by indicating their 
unwillingness or their willingness to eat an old food product: they may feel embarrassed about generating food 
waste in the first case, and about being perceived as a person with disgusting habits in the second case. 
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behavior in the very specific context of an experiment. Our measure of reported behaviors 
should therefore be somewhat reliable.  
Another caveat applies to the interpretation of our results. Firstly, we provide 
correlational and not causal evidence for the relationship between the three individual traits 
we study and food waste practices. Among others, the different measures we use should 
have been collected separately to prevent subjects’ potential artificial consistency across 
their answers. Also, our study does not allow us to rule out a potential problem of reverse 
causality. For instance, participants who reported discarding a high amount of food may 
have convinced themselves that other people also do so (by indicating a high percentage of 
food wasted by European households) in order to reduce eventual feelings of guilt. Second, 
note that our findings are not necessarily extendable to the overall Swiss population as our 
sample consists exclusively of young and educated individuals. At the same time, we study 
exactly the part of the population that is among the highest contributors to food waste (e.g. 
Brook Lyndhurst, 2007; Visschers et al 2016; Quested et al., 2013; WRAP, 2008b; Secondi 
et al., 2015). Our results may be therefore particularly relevant for the elaboration of 
campaigns or initiatives targeting this specific segment of society. 
3.6 Conclusion  
The yearly global amount of food wasted has substantially increased in the last few 
decades and has been shown to play a non-negligible role in climate change, food security, 
and economic development. In fact, this issue has even been recently set as a priority at the 
level of the European Union (European Commission, 2011) and at The United Nations 
(FAO, 2011, 2013). As most of the food discarded takes place at home, the present study 
aimed at providing a clearer understanding of the psychological factors driving individuals 
to waste food. We find that risk preferences, personal attitudes towards food waste 
reduction, and descriptive norms significantly explain variations in people’s food waste 
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practices and show that risk preferences are best at doing so. Considering our findings, we 
believe that future interventions aiming at providing food safety guidance or at informing 
people of the overall percentage of food wasted by consumers may be two effective ways to 
combat food wastage.  
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 Chapter 4 ─ Psychological Opportunity Costs: The Effect of 
Opportunity Costs on Post-Choice Utility 
Joint with Itay Sisso, Reto Odermatt and Benjamin Scheibehenne44 
4.1 Introduction 
In today’s consumer societies, people are constantly making choices and need to trade 
off costs and benefits of different alternatives. This ranges from every day consumer 
decisions, such as what to buy for lunch, to more complicated and impactful life decisions, 
such as what career to pursue or whom to marry. Freedom to choose generally has a very 
positive connotation, as choosing in principle allows to better satisfy one’s needs (Schwartz 
et al., 2006). People even seem to intrinsically value their decision rights beyond the 
instrumental benefits of their choices (Bartling et al., 2014). However, freedom of choice 
might not always lead to beneficial outcomes. In particular, we claim that opportunity costs 
that are, by definition, involved in every choice context (i.e., whenever we trade off different 
alternatives to make a decision), negatively affect consumers’ well-being. We argue that in 
the current consumer research, this aspect has been overlooked, even though it is likely an 
important determinant of consumer satisfaction and reflects a systematic deviation from 
rational behavior. 
In this project, we assess the effect of opportunity costs, that is, the forgone utility of 
the rejected option, on consumers’ well-being. Traditional economics considers opportunity 
costs only to be relevant in the decision-making process; when the decision has been made, 
however, these opportunity costs are considered as “sunk” and people are assumed to 
consume the absolute level of utility of the chosen option. In contrast to this assumption, 
                                       
44Please cite as Sisso, Itay, Brun, Fanny, Odermatt Reto and Benjamin Scheibehenne (2018) “Psychological 
Opportunity Costs: The Effect of Opportunity Costs on Post-Choice Utility,” Working Paper. 
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we consider the possibility that the opportunity costs created by the forgone alternative 
may reduce the utility from consuming the chosen option. Importantly, we argue that this 
effect is present even when the forgone alternative remains less attractive than the selected 
one (i.e., without experiencing regret). We denote the extent to which opportunity costs 
matter for post-choice utility as Psychological Opportunity Costs (POCs) and hypothesize 
that POCs, determined by the utility of the rejected alternative, have a negative impact on 
post-choice utility. 
Based on our theoretical considerations, we derive two main predictions: first, we 
hypothesize that, conditional on obtaining the preferred option, utility resulting from a non-
choice situation is higher compared to a choice situation. Second, we predict that the 
magnitude of the effect is positively related to the forgone utility of the rejected option. The 
most prominent example of a related phenomenon is the feeling of regret after people have 
made a choice (see, e.g., Zeelenberg et al., 2000 for a review). Also, previous literature shows 
that the number and diversity of options might impact consumers’ well-being as moderators 
of regret (e.g., Sagi and Friedland, 2007).  However, such related theories are not able to 
predict our hypotheses or explain our results. First, regret theory is a prospective theory 
about choice making while our hypotheses are retrospective since they exclusively focus on 
the utility experienced after a decision has been made. Also, regret feelings can only emerge 
when uncertainty about the chosen and rejected options is resolved, and one realizes that 
the latter would have made us better off than the former. On the contrary, we argue that 
POCs negatively affect the utility of choice already before consumption has taken place, or 
even in the total absence of uncertainty. 
We conducted a comprehensive experiment to test the extent to which the size of 
opportunity costs matters for post-choice satisfaction and to distinguish POCs from 
established theories documented mainly in the psychological literature (e.g. regret and 
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disappointment). In the experiment, we used hypothetical and experienced subjective well-
being as a proxy measure for utility and randomized the opportunity costs people faced, 
i.e., the availability and desirability of inferior option(s). The experiment had a factorial 
design on discrete choices with five different good categories (Ice Cream, Pen, Dish, Movie 
and Activity). The experiment comprised three stages: in the first stage, we elicited the 
subjects' preferences between six options in each of the five good categories with an on-line 
survey. One week later, participants were then randomly treated with high (low) 
opportunity costs by providing them the choice between two options personally evaluated 
as their best and second (sixth) best option, respectively. Participants in the control group 
simply received their preferred option. In the third stage, we collected data on post-
consumption happiness with the chosen ice cream and movie clip. At the end of the 
laboratory session, participants first watched the selected (or allocated) video and rated it. 
Then, they were offered the chosen/allocated ice cream before leaving and had to indicate 
their derived satisfaction from consuming it in an on-line survey on the same day of the 
experiment. Note that each subject received her allocated/chosen good only for these two 
categories as the consumption of the ice cream and the viewing of the video were possible 
at a clear point in time (i.e., on the same day of the experiment), logistically enabling the 
measurement of subjects’ post-consumption utility. Also, we were financially constrained 
and these goods were the least expensive ones. 
The collected data provides mixed support for our hypotheses. We find that post-
choice satisfaction is significantly reduced when individuals are treated with opportunity 
costs: they express a lower happiness level with the chosen option compared to individuals 
in the control group. However, the size of this effect is independent of the attractiveness of 
the rejected option. Also, when considering the satisfaction after consumption, we do not 
find evidence that POCs matter.  
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Note that our findings for post-choice utility cannot be explained neither by regret nor 
by disappointment since the uncertainty about all alternatives had not been resolved. 
Indeed, subjects’ happiness with their choice was reported directly after they made their 
decision so that they had not yet received any additional information on any good from the 
same category. At the time of the utility measurement, subjects could have therefore not 
felt regretful or disappointed with their choice since they still did not know if another choice 
would have been better or if the chosen option was as good as expected, respectively. Also, 
disappointment theory predicts effects that are orthogonal to our treatment since every 
subject received her favorite option. However, subjects whose outcome was determined by 
their choice may have experienced decision difficulty or may have anticipated the regret 
they might feel later on with their decision. Our design does not allow to confidently exclude 
these two channels and future research is needed to address these caveats. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 4.2 provides theoretical 
considerations and hypotheses, gives an overview over previous literature and shows the 
distinction of our concept from alternative theories. Section 4.3 describes the study design, 
section 4.4 displays the results, section 4.5 offers a discussion of our findings and the last 
section concludes.  
4.2 Theoretical considerations and distinction from alternative 
concepts 
4.2.1 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 
To better understand the concept of psychological opportunity costs and to derive 
testable hypotheses, we present a formal representation of the role of POCs for individual 
utility in the following. Consider an individual in a choice situation between the two options 
A and B. In the standard economic approach, rational individuals would compare the 
relative (expected) utility of options A and B and decide accordingly. In a situation where 
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A is preferred over B (A ≻ B), A would be chosen, and B would represent the opportunity 
costs of choosing A. After the (irreversible) decision would be made, however, the 
opportunity costs from the forgone option B would not matter anymore and the absolute 
level of utility from good A would be consumed:  
Ui = ui(A) (1) 
In contrast to this view, we argue that the opportunity costs from the forgone option 
B leave a psychological trace and, thus, do matter for an individual’s utility derived from 
good A. More formally, we propose a utility model that takes into account the opportunity 
costs induced by the unchosen alternative B in the following way: 
Ui= ui(A) – i  ui(B) (2) 
This formulation indicates that an individual’s utility ui(A) from consuming the 
preferred option A is potentially reduced by the opportunity costs represented by the 
forgone utility ui(B). Psychological opportunity costs are thereby represented by the term 
i  ui(B) that enters negatively in the utility function. In our framework, we restrict 
ourselves to choice situations between two goods, i.e. where ui(A) ??0 and where ui(B) ??0. 
i, ??0 reflects the degree to which an individual i’s utility is affected by the opportunity 
costs even after the decision is made. If i = 0, opportunity costs do not matter for an 
individual’s post-choice utility, as predicted by the standard economic model. Importantly, 
for any values i > 0, opportunity costs reduce post-choice utility. 
We follow Loomes and Sugden (1982) by defining the absolute level utility ui(A) and 
ui(B) as the choiceless utility of option A and B, respectively, i.e. the experienced utility 
from option A or B outside any choice context. However, unlike in regret and 
disappointment theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982), our model does not include 
expectations and does not rely on uncertainty. Our theory suggests that even when all the 
utilities are certain, and even when the chosen option is and remains the strictly preferred 
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one, the forgone option might affect individual utility of the chosen good in a negative way. 
One interpretation of POCs would be that the decision maker would like to choose both 
options but is refrained from doing so by any kind of constraint, such that sacrificing the 
forgone option is construed as a “painful” loss, even if it is less desirable than the chosen 
option. 
In line with this simple model, we formulate two main hypotheses that present the 
predictions regarding the appearance of psychological opportunity costs: 
H1: Psychological opportunity costs negatively affect post-choice utility. 
H1 translates into the fact that POCs enter negatively in the utility function presented 
in equation (2). Importantly, the hypothesis predicts that one would be better off acquiring 
option A in a no-choice scenario than in a choice scenario between options A and B 
(conditional on A being the favorite option). 
H2: The magnitude of the negative effect of psychological opportunity costs is positively 
related to the utility of the forgone option. 
H2 shows up in our formalization of POCs: it is a function of the utility provided by 
the forgone option, and predicts that, in a binary choice scenario, one would be better off 
forgoing an option providing a low (rather than a high) utility. 
To summarize, when taking into account the general effect of POCs on utility (i.e., 
the terms subtracted from the choiceless utility ui(A) in equation (2)), H1 states that POCs 
have a negative impact on the utility, while H2 predicts that the magnitude of this effect 
monotonically increases with ui(B).  
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4.2.2 Distinction from alternative theories 
In this section, we review previous research that investigated how individuals’ 
satisfaction with their choice is potentially negatively affected by the choice set. We explain 
how these theories and this evidence relate to our hypotheses.  
The most prominent example of a similar phenomenon is the feeling of regret after 
people have made a choice (for the theory, see Bell, 1982, 1985, and Loomes and Sugden, 
1987; for a review of the evidence, see Zeelenberg, 1999 and Zeelenberg et al., 2000). 
Regretful feelings arise “[…] when one is or feels responsible for the occurrence of negative 
events, i.e. when a different choice would had led to a better outcome“ (Zeelenberg et al., 
2000). One can thus be regretful because the realized outcome of a forgone option would 
have been better than the obtained outcome. There are two basic requirements to experience 
regret: uncertainty (in the level of utility of the different alternatives) and post-choice 
resolution of that uncertainty (Gilovich and Medvec, 1995).  Regret is positively related to 
the difference between the forgone (B) and chosen (A) goods’ utility. On the other hand, if 
the chosen option turns out to be better than the rejected one, as it is the case in our 
theoretical considerations, the latter difference would be negative, and this negative regret 
is defined by Loomes and Sugden’s (1982, p. 808) as rejoice, i.e., “the extra pleasure 
associated with knowing that, as matters have turned out, [one] has taken the best decision”. 
We argue that our theory is distinct from regret theory, as we predict that POCs exert a 
negative effect on utility even when the forgone alternative is less attractive than the 
selected one, a situation in which regret theory would predict a positive impact on the 
consumer’s satisfaction through rejoicing. In addition, regret and rejoicing accrue once 
uncertainty has been resolved as in order to experience these feelings, one has to undergo 
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some form of surprise.45 Note that disappointment theory also requires the decisional 
environment to be uncertain as feelings of disappointment only arise when the realized 
utility is lower than the expected one (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). In contrast, 
we argue that POCs can well appear in a setting either without uncertainty (i.e. in the 
absence of any surprise), or where uncertainty has not yet been resolved. Thus, although 
regret and POCs share a comparative counterfactual nature, identifying POCs as a separate 
construct from regret or disappointment is crucial to fully understand the impact of choice 
situations on consumers’ well-being. 
However, some other concepts reconcile with our theory and have similar predictions. 
For instance, studies show that an option’s attractiveness decreases through joint evaluation 
(compared to single evaluation) (e.g., Hsee and Leclerc, 1998; Brenner et al., 1999). 
However, they focus on the effect of alternatives on people’s evaluations at the time of 
decision making and do not study how the rejected options may affect post-decision 
satisfaction with the selected item. While making a decision is an event that has a limited 
duration, the time that elapses once the decision has been made extends to infinity. Since 
we argue that POCs matter for post-choice utility, their detrimental effects may stretch 
over a long period of time and therefore have overall possibly worse consequences for 
individuals’ well-being than the short-lived adverse effects of joint evaluation. 
Also, the basic notion of decision difficulty predicts that choice situations entail 
detrimental feelings that might linger after the choice, reducing one’s satisfaction (Griffin 
and Broniarczyk, 2010; Diehl and Poynor, 2010; Goodman et al., 2013; Greifeneder and al., 
2010). While we cannot entirely rule out this channel, we can empirically test whether our 
treatment effect is driven by individuals who have difficulty in making decisions. 
                                       
45 Indeed, in decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1997), which is a more recent model of regret and 
disappointment, the elements representing the effects of regret and disappointment are multiplied by a 
“surprisingness” factor, which takes the value of zero when no uncertainty applies. 
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Another example of a phenomenon which would have similar predictions to our second 
hypothesis is the long-established contrast effect (Brown, 1953), which posits that a bad 
option in the choice set might make the chosen option look much better, while a very good 
option in the choice set might have the reversed effect. However, this theory produces a 
different prediction from our hypothesis 1. While the contrast effect implies that 
participants rejecting an unattractive option would be better off than if they had not been 
offered an alternative at all, our theory stipulates an opposite effect: the opportunity costs 
produced by the rejection of the alternative option hinders utility with the chosen option.  
Some additional phenomena predict effects that contradict ours (i.e., making the 
chosen option more attractive in a choice situation compared to a situation without a 
choice), such as dissonance reduction (e.g., Brehm, 1956 or Festinger, 1957), single option 
aversion (Mochon, 2013), the intrinsic decision value (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014), or simply 
the pleasure of choosing (Botti, 2004).  
Finally, another line of effects called context effects, might include both supporting 
and contradicting predictions. For example, the asymmetric dominance effect (also known 
as the attraction or decoy effect; Huber and al., 1982) suggests that the existence of a 
slightly less attractive version of an option (usually referred to as the decoy) might increase 
the attractiveness of a target option. This contradicts our hypothesis that an alternative 
option can only (potentially) have detrimental effects for the utility of the target option 
through the psychological opportunity costs that it generates. However, an opposite context 
effect is the similarity effect (Tversky, 1972), which posits that the presence of a similar 
option to the chosen one might reduce the attractiveness of the latter. While this 
phenomenon conforms to our prediction, we do not impose any constraints regarding the 
similarity of the options. While we assert that rejecting an option with a similar 
attractiveness level as the chosen one will cause the highest level of POC, these options 
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might very well be quite different from each other (e.g., one may find both a fun and flashy 
sports car and a comfortable and practical one attractive although they are characterized 
by very different attributes). 
4.3 Study design  
4.3.1 Design overview 
Our study consists of three steps: first, participants take part in an on-line survey, in 
which we collect information on participants’ preferences among six options in each of five 
good categories. We then use individuals’ preference orderings to randomly assign three 
different levels of opportunity costs in the laboratory session, taking place roughly one week 
after the on-line survey. We do so by letting participants select an item from a choice set 
consisting of their favorite option and another less appealing one whose attractiveness is 
exogenously varied. Varying the extent to which a person likes the latter option allows us 
to test the extent to which opportunity costs affect individuals’ post-decision utility. After 
the experimental session, subjects complete a 3 min long on-line survey on the same day. 
This third stage allows us to measure post-consumption utility. Following a growing 
literature in happiness economics (for reviews, see, e.g., Kahneman et al. 1999, Frey and 
Stutzer 2002, Kahneman and Krueger 2006, or recently Odermatt and Stutzer 2018), we 
use reported subjective well-being as an empirical approximation of utility. In the next 
paragraphs, we describe the three steps of our study and the different treatments in details. 
4.3.2 Stage 1: on-line survey  
The on-line survey, based on the Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT), had to be 
completed at least seven days before the laboratory session took place.46 The purpose of the 
                                       
46 We chose this seven-day gap between the survey and the laboratory session in order to reduce the salience 
of the different goods. We abstained from using a longer gap to avoid that people’s preferences change too 
much between these two stages. 
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survey was to elicit subjects’ preferences for goods within different good categories. More 
specifically, participants were shown, one at a time, six pictures of different goods belonging 
to the same good category (e.g., six ice creams of different flavors). We asked the following 
question to reveal people’s valuation of the respective good: “Imagine that you would receive 
the following [good]. How happy would [this good]47 make you?”. The scale ranged from 1 
“Not at all happy” to 100 “Very happy”.48 The happiness ratings were then used to 
individually rank the six products in every good category from the preferred (first best) to 
the least preferred one (sixth best). This was done to individualize the treatments in the 
second stage, as explained in section 4.3.3. After having evaluated the six goods from each 
of five different good categories, participants had to rank the six goods from the respective 
good category from the most to the least preferred one. This allowed us to identify the most 
preferred good in cases same happiness ratings were attributed to two different goods within 
a category.49 All these ratings were incentivized as we informed subjects that they would 
receive at least one good as a thank you gift at the end of the study and that evaluating 
each good carefully would increase the probability that they receive a good that they like.  
In the survey, we also asked whether they could not eat one or more of the six dishes 
that they were presented because of food restrictions, we elicited several demographic 
characteristics (age, gender, nationalities, and field(s) of study) and we measured people’s 
difficulty in making decisions using a shorter version of the Decision Difficulty scale by 
Turner et al. (2012) (see Table C3 in Appendix C for a description of this measure). 
Good categories: Participants were presented six distinct goods from the following 
five good categories (see Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C for a detailed description of all 
                                       
47 The term in bracket was replaced by the type of good considered. 
48 See Figure C1 in Appendix C for an overview of how this question looked like in the on-line survey for the 
Ice Cream category. 
49 We could have solely used subjects’ rankings instead of their happiness ratings, however, the latter also 
serve as a measures of each option’s choiceless utility, which we later use in our analyses.  
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thirty items, and for the 30 pictures presented to the subjects, respectively): Moevenpick 
ice creams of six different flavors, Caran d’Ache ball pens of six different colors, vouchers 
for six different meals in restaurants in Geneva, short educative and animated videos (of 
approximately 3 minutes length) on six different topics, and vouchers for six different 
activities in Switzerland. In all the good categories we used, the options differ from one 
another on one attribute (such as the color of the pen) or several ones (such as the many 
ingredients and textures of the dishes).  
4.3.3 Stage 2: laboratory experiment 
In the laboratory experiment, programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007), the 
participants were randomly allocated to two different main conditions (No-Choice and 
Choice). Subjects in the No-Choice group were not exposed to any opportunity costs, while 
those in the Choice condition were treated with low and high opportunity costs (Low POCs 
and High POCS, respectively). In the following, we describe in detail how the design differed 
between the different treatments.  
No-Choice condition: For all five good categories separately, we showed to the 
participants in the No-Choice condition the good that they had indicated in the on-line 
survey to be the most preferred one in the respective good category. We informed them 
that they would receive (or would have the chance to receive) the good under consideration 
and we subsequently measured their expected happiness with the good by asking “How 
happy [would receiving this good] make you?”, 50 measured on a scale from 1: “Not happy 
at all” to 100: “Very happy”. The purpose of this condition was to measure individuals’ 
choiceless utility approximated by expected happiness with their favorite option in an 
                                       
50 The terms in brackets were adapted to each goods’ category, in particular, the future tense was used when 
talking about the ice creams and the movies, as subjects were informed that they would receive the ice cream 
and would watch the video at the end of the session (see Figure C2 in Appendix C for an overview of the 
Ztree interface for individuals in the No-Choice and in the Choice condition for the Ice Cream category).  
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environment in which they did not face any direct opportunity costs. Note that the order 
in which the good categories appeared was randomly determined. 
Choice condition: While subjects in the No-Choice condition did not have to make 
any active decisions, the participants in the Choice condition had to make a choice for every 
good category between two options and were thus treated with opportunity costs. In 
particular, participants were given the choice between the good that they indicated in the 
on-line survey to be the best option (first best) and another option which attractiveness 
was exogenously varied. We had two different treatments in the Choice condition that 
aimed at generating high and low levels of psychological opportunity costs (the High POCs 
and Low POCs treatments, respectively). In the High POCs treatment, the other option in 
the choice set was the one that the participant had evaluated as being the second best in 
the on-line survey, while in the Low POCs treatment, this option was the one that the 
participant liked the least out of the six possibilities (i.e., the sixth best). Each participant 
in the Choice condition made two (or three) decisions in the High POCs treatment, and the 
three (or two) remaining ones in the Low POCs treatment.51 After each choice, we measured 
subjects’ expected happiness with their good in the same manner as for the No-Choice 
group. Once all choices were made, we gave the participants a chance to modify them to make 
sure that they did not regret their decisions. The decisions were incentivized: for the good 
categories Movie and Ice Cream, the participants were able to consume the chosen good at 
the end of the experiment, while for the other goods, a lottery determined three participants 
who received their selected pen, voucher for a meal, and voucher for an activity, respectively.  
At the end of the laboratory session, the individually chosen or assigned video was 
played on the participants’ screen. After watching the video, the participants had to state 
                                       
51 The number of decisions to make in each treatment was balanced across all individuals in the Choice 
condition.  
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their happiness level with viewing it and rated it. Finally, each participant received the ice 
cream that she had selected or was allocated.  
4.3.4 Stage 3: post-experiment on-line survey 
After the laboratory session, subjects had to complete a 3 min long on-line survey on 
the same day of the experiment. In this third stage, we measured post-consumption 
happiness with the ice cream. We asked participants “How happy did the ice cream make 
you?” conditional on having at least tried the ice cream. Again, they were able to reply on 
a scale from 1 (“Not at all happy”), to 100 (“Very happy”). Lastly, we asked if they would 
have preferred another flavor to find out whether they regretted their choice. 
4.4 Results 
Our sample consists of students who had to participate in our study as a requirement 
to pass a bachelor course on consumer behavior at the University of Geneva. We conducted 
25 sessions, with 1 to 6 students per session. A session lasted on average 15 minutes. Overall, 
out of the 132 students who completed the on-line survey, 126 of them participated in the 
laboratory session. Our final main dataset therefore consists of 630 observations from 126 
subjects (5 observations each). Thereof, 35 students were randomly allocated to the No-
Choice condition (i.e., the control group) and 91 to the Choice conditions (i.e., the High 
POCs and Low POCs treatments).52 17 subjects (all in the Choice conditions) reported that 
they had already watched at least one of the two videos from their choice set, 4 individuals 
indicated in the on-line survey that they cannot eat ice creams and 1 individual indicated 
that he accidentally ranked the ice cream flavors in the reverse order. These 22 observed 
                                       
52 The High POCs treatment consists of 42 (Movie), 46 (Ice Cream, Activity), and 47 (Pen, Dish) observations 
for the respective good category, and the Low POCs treatment consists of 44 (Pen, Dish), 45 (Ice Cream, 
Activity) and 49 (Movie) observations for the respective good category, summing up to 91 observations per 
category. 
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choices were therefore qualified as non-eligible and were excluded from the main analysis.53 
The final dataset consists of subjects between 19 and 27 years old, with an average age of 
21.5, and 48% are women. Summary statistics of happiness ratings in stage 1 (Stage 1 
Happ.), right after the allocation or after the choice was made (Post-Choice Happ.) and 
after consumption took place (Post-Consumption Happ.) are available in Table C4, in 
Appendix C. 
To check that our treatments induced the desired difference in desirability between 
the two options (i.e., the size of opportunity costs) in the Choice conditions, we looked at 
the stated happiness (from stage 1) of the second or sixth best option presented to the 
subjects in stage 2. While the average happiness ratings of the less attractive option in the 
Low POCs treatment was only of 28.5 (SD=24.8) points, it was on average of 69.7 
(SD=21.9) points in the High POCs treatment (which is significantly different from the 
Low POCs treatment, t(453) =18.8, p<.001).54 We therefore successfully generated 
decisional environments with either high or low (psychological) opportunity costs.  
4.4.1 Post-choice analysis  
Descriptive statistics: Figure 12 shows descriptively the mean-levels of reported 
post-choice happiness for each good category by condition, as well as the means aggregated 
over all good categories. According to hypotheses H1 and H2, we expect the average 
happiness ratings to be higher in the No-Choice than in the Choice condition, and to be the 
lowest in the High POCs group. While the results for Ice Cream, Dish and Movie 
corroborate our hypotheses, our findings for Pen and Activity do not. When merging all 
good categories together, reported happiness in the No-Choice condition is higher than in 
                                       
53  38 participants indicated that they cannot eat between 1 to 3 dishes out of the 6 presented and a participant, 
who indicated that he cannot eat 5 out of the 6 dishes, was randomly assigned to the No-Choice condition. 
These observations were all kept in our final dataset. 
54 The overall average happiness level with the first best option reported in stage 1 is of 78.0 (SD=21.9) points. 
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the Choice treatments (ܲ݋ݏݐ − ܥℎ݋ଓܿ݁ ܪܽ݌݌.തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതே௢ି஼௛௢௜௖௘ = 74, ܲ݋ݏݐ − ܥℎ݋ଓܿ݁ ܪܽ݌݌.തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത஼௛௢௜௖௘ = 
69.5), however, the difference is small and only weakly significant (the p-value from a two-
sided t-test from a regression with standard errors clustered at the individual level is 0.067).  
Figure 12: Average post-choice happiness levels for each good category 
separately and aggregated together 
 
Notes: For High POCs: NAll=228, NIceCream = NActivity = 46, NPen = NDish = 47, NMovie = 42. For Low 
POCs: NAll=227, NIceCream = NActivity = 45, NPen = NDish = 44, NMovie = 49. For No-Choice: NAll=175, 
NAnyCategory = 35. Mean of reported happiness level with the allocated/chosen option (before consumption) 
in the No-Choice (yellow), Low POCs (orange), and High POCs (red) condition, respectively, for each 
good category separately  and for all good categories together. Post-Choice Happiness is in {1, 2, 3, … 
100} where 1 means “Not at all happy” and 100 means “Very happy”. The error bars represent the 
90% CI around the mean. 
 
We do not find a statistical difference between the average happiness ratings from the Low 
and the High POCs conditions (ܲ݋ݏݐ − ܥℎ݋ଓܿ݁ ܪܽ݌݌.തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௅௢௪ ௉ை஼௦ = 69.93, 
ܲ݋ݏݐ − ܥℎ݋ଓܿ݁ ܪܽ݌݌.തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതு௜௚௛ ௉ை஼௦ = 70.32, p-value of a two-sided t-test=0.85). While Figure 12 
provides descriptive insights regarding the treatment effects, we provide next the results 
from regression analyses to assess in a more precise way the effects of our treatments. First, 
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we look at whether subjects’ post-choice happiness is negatively affected by the opportunity 
costs induced by the simple rejection of an option. In a second step, we investigate whether 
the size of these psychological opportunity costs is positively related to the attractiveness 
level of the rejected alternative.  
Difference between the No-Choice and the Choice conditions (H1):  
To test hypothesis H1, we analyze the difference between the No-Choice condition 
where subjects were allocated their first best option, and the Choice condition, where 
subjects had to choose between their first best and either their second best or their sixth 
best option in a multiple regression framework. The results of linear regression models are 
displayed in Table 11. The dependent variable is the participants’ stated happiness with 
the chosen/allocated good in stage 2 (Post-Choice Happ.) and the explanatory variable is a 
dummy variable (dummyChoice) indicating whether the participant was in any of the 
Choice conditions or not. Importantly, we control for the happiness ratings of the 
chosen/allocated good from each category reported in stage 1 (Stage 1 Happ.). This accounts 
for two key features. First, it controls for possible individual-level differences in the general 
level of happiness with the good that is independent of the treatment. Second, for individuals 
in the Choice condition, the measured post-choice happiness in stage 2 consists of both the 
choiceless utility and the effect of POCs, while the happiness of the preferred good measured 
in stage 1 solely captures the choiceless utility. Controlling for it thus serves to estimate 
the effects of POCs in a more precise and reliable way. Columns 1 and 2 display the results 
when the observations are aggregated across all good categories together, without and with 
good categories’ fixed effects, respectively, while columns 3 to 7 show the coefficients 
estimates when considering the data for each good category separately. In the first two 
columns, standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for the potentially 
correlated happiness ratings within participants.  
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When considering each good category separately (columns 3 to 7), the opportunity costs 
generated in the Choice condition have a negative effect on participants’ satisfaction with 
the chosen ice cream, activity, dish and movie. However, this effect is only significantly 
different from zero for the last two categories (for Dish: ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘=-6.62, p<0.05 and 
for Movie: ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘=-8.33, p<0.05) and marginally significant for Ice Cream 
(ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘=-5.16, p<0.1). While the average effect of the Choice condition for Pen is 
positive, it is small and not statistically significant (ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘=1.64, p>0.1). When 
considering the data pooled over all good categories, the resulting average effect of (low and 
high) POCs on happiness is -4.22 points (p<0.05, column 2).55 Re-including the 22 
observations that we classified as non-eligible does not affect this result significantly (see 
columns 1 and 2 from Table C5, Appendix C). A Tobit model accounting for the 65 cases 
where the dependent variable takes the maximum value of 100, produces an even more 
negative estimated treatment effect (see columns 3 and 4 in Table C5, Appendix C).  
These results cannot be accounted for neither by regret nor by disappointment for two 
reasons. First, the subjects did not collect any additional information regarding the 
chosen/allocated or forgone options when asked to indicate their happiness with their choice 
(pre-consumption), which would be required for feelings of regret or disappointment to arise. 
Furthermore, we made sure that participants do not regret their decision: after they had 
selected an option for each good category, they were given a chance to modify their choices 
(in which case they had to indicate again their happiness with the newly chosen item).56  
 
 
                                       
55 Note that controlling for age and gender does neither influence the significance nor the magnitude of these 
findings significantly. 
56 4 individuals changed their choice (1 in the Low POCs and 3 in the High POCs condition, respectively). 
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Table 11: Relationship between post-choice happiness and the treatment condition Choice versus No-Choice  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. 
Good category: All All Ice Cream Pen Dish Movie Activity 
dummyChoice -3.916** -4.224** -5.163* 1.639 -6.620** -8.332** -2.663 
 (1.614) (1.648) (2.994) (3.900) (2.691) (3.321) (2.467) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.651*** 0.551*** 0.607*** 0.452*** 0.529*** 0.647*** 0.678*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0419) (0.0864) (0.0730) (0.0859) (0.0879) (0.136) 
dummyPen  -6.734***      
  (2.154)      
dummyDish  -0.220      
  (1.561)      
dummyMovie  -6.565***      
  (2.075)      
dummyActivity  7.479***      
  (1.516)      
Constant 23.13*** 32.24*** 28.32*** 27.63*** 35.55*** 21.34*** 26.95*** 
 (3.33) (4.051) (8.177) (5.981) (7.721) (7.920) (13.479) 
Observations 608 608 121 126 126 109 126 
R2 0.403 0.451 0.380 0.249 0.272 0.422 0.254 
SE Clustered Clustered Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. is the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option in the 
laboratory (pre-consumption) and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyChoice=1 if is 
in the Choice condition, and 0 if is in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the 
chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; dummyPen, dummyDish, dummyMovie and dummyActivity are the good categories fixed effects and are in {0,1} (e.g. 
dummyPen=1 if the post-choice happiness is reported for the Pen good category, and 0 otherwise). The Ice Cream good category represents the reference category. 
Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are clustered at the individual level. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12: Relationship between post-choice happiness and the choice conditions Low POCs versus High POCs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. 
Good category: All All Ice Cream Pen Dish Movie Activity 
dummyNoChoice 4.983*** 5.059*** 4.329 3.274 7.020** 5.157 4.859 
 (1.828) (1.873) (3.613) (4.415) (3.036) (3.621) (3.047) 
dummyHighPOCs 2.124 1.669 -1.607 9.507** 0.788 -7.038* 4.346 
 (1.592) (1.541) (3.701) (4.332) (3.568) (3.869) (2.640) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.653*** 0.554*** 0.601*** 0.457*** 0.532*** 0.657*** 0.676*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0418) (0.0882) (0.0704) (0.0876) (0.0841) (0.136) 
dummyPen  -6.686***      
  (2.147)      
dummyDish  -0.205      
  (1.576)      
dummyMovie  -6.460***      
  (2.080)      
dummyActivity  7.479***      
  (1.524)      
Constant 17.97*** 26.98*** 24.54*** 24.03*** 28.28*** 15.34** 22.28* 
 (3.299) (3.921) (7.967) (5.316) (7.317) (6.561) (13.18) 
Observations 608 608 121 126 126 109 126 
R2 0.405 0.452 0.381 0.278 0.272 0.441 0.271 
SE Clustered Clustered Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. is the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option in the 
laboratory and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyNoChoice=1 if is in the 
No-Choice condition, and 0 if is in the Choice condition; dummyHighPOCs=1 if is in the High POCs condition, and 0 if is in the Low POCs or in the No-
Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; 
dummyPen, dummyDish, dummyMovie and dummyActivity are the good categories fixed effects and are in {0,1} (e.g. dummyPen=1 if the post-choice 
happiness is reported for the Pen good category, and 0 otherwise). The Ice Cream good category represents the reference category. Standard errors in columns 
1 and 2 are clustered at the individual level. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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In summary, we find that individuals’ satisfaction with their favorite option is lower 
following a choice situation – i.e., when they had to actively forgo an alternative, than 
following a situation without choice – i.e., when they were allocated their preferred good. 
Opportunity costs therefore seem to matter for utility even after a decision is made.  
Difference between low- and high levels of opportunity costs (H2):  
In the following, we test hypothesis H2 predicting that the magnitude of the POCs is 
positively related to the utility that the forgone option would provide. We test this 
hypothesis by looking specifically at the difference between the Low- and the High POCs 
conditions.57   
We use exactly the same regression specifications as in Table 11 but including two 
separate dummy variables for the No-Choice and the High POCs conditions 
(dummyNoChoice and dummyHighPOCs, respectively) instead of the single dummy for the 
Choice condition (see Table 12). We do not find clear evidence for the more negative effects 
of high compared to low opportunity costs. When analyzing every good category separately 
(columns 3 to 7), the coefficient estimates for dummyHighPOCs are negative for Ice Cream 
and Movie (and marginally significant for the latter ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬ு௜௚௛௉ை஼௦=-7.04, p<0.1), while 
the coefficients are positive for the three remaining good categories (and significant for pens, 
ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬ு௜௚௛௉ை஼௦=9.51, p<0.05). This lack of clear support for hypothesis H2 is confirmed 
when considering the pooled data over all good categories (columns 1 and 2). We find that 
when the forgone option is the second best one, individuals do not report a significantly 
lower happiness level with their choice (ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬ு௜௚௛௉ை஼௦=1.67, p>0.1, column 2) than when 
                                       
57 Preferences were not completely stable over time – Out of the 455 choices made in stage 2, 89% chose their 
best ranked option from stage 1, with 96.5% of the subjects in the Low POCs condition, and 81.6% of the 
individuals in the High POCs condition (a two-sided χ2test shows that this percentage is significantly higher 
in the Low than in the High POCs condition, χ2(1)=25.6, p<.001). Subjects’ preferences were therefore less 
stable when choosing between two attractive options than between an attractive and a less attractive good. 
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rejecting the sixth best option. This finding is confirmed by linear regressions including 
observations that we qualified as non-eligible and Tobit models (see columns 1 to 4 in Table 
C6, Appendix C). Therefore, individuals in the High POCs treatment are not significantly 
worse off than those in the Low POCs group as we had hypothesized. In other words, our 
findings suggest that the size of opportunity costs do not matter for post-choice utility: 
rejecting an attractive or an unattractive option are both equally detrimental for one’s 
utility. 
Overall, we find evidence that decision makers’ post-choice utility is on average higher 
when they are allocated their favorite option (i.e., in an environment without opportunity 
costs), compared to when they have to select it from a set of two items (i.e., in an 
environment with high or low opportunity costs). However, the size of the opportunity costs 
does not matter for individuals’ utility: participants who gave up an attractive item were 
not significantly less happy with their choice than those who rejected a less desirable one. 
In other words, it seems that POCs are significantly detrimental for post-choice utility, but 
that their size does not further amplify this negative effect. 
4.4.2 Post-consumption analysis 
The analysis so far focused on post-choice utility measured before receiving the goods. 
As mentioned in the description of the study, for two goods categories – Ice Cream and 
Movie – all participants were given the opportunity to consume the good that they had 
chosen or were allocated, and then had to report their happiness with it after having 
consumed it. In this section we first describe this additional data collected and then look at 
whether POCs matter for post-consumption utility by testing for our two hypotheses. 
21 subjects reported that they had not yet consumed the ice cream by the time of the 
follow-up survey, and 10 did not complete the survey at all. These observations were 
therefore excluded from the main analysis. As in the post-choice analysis, 19 additional 
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observations were also removed because they were qualified as non-eligible (i.e., 2 individuals 
could not eat ice creams, and 17 had already watched at least one of the two movie clips).   
Unlike the post-choice measure of happiness, post-consumption utility can be affected 
by regretful feelings since some uncertainty has been resolved. This is a concern as they 
could lead to similar findings as predicted by our theory. To address this issue, we asked 
participants whether they would have chosen differently after they had watched the video 
and consumed the ice cream, respectively. This was the case for 6 observations (7.7%) in 
the Low POCs treatment (3 in each the Ice Cream and the Movie categories) and for 14 
observations (21.9%) in the High POCs treatment (7 in each the Ice Cream and the Movie 
categories). In those 20 cases, individuals believed that they would have been better off 
consuming the option that they rejected instead of the one that they selected. They may 
have therefore felt regretful about their choice and enjoyed it less. To rule out regret as an 
alternative explanation to our results, we thus excluded those 20 observations from our 
main analysis as well. As a result, 182 observations remained in the final dataset (83 
observations for the Ice Cream category and 99 for the Movie category). 
To test our two hypotheses, we fit the same linear regression models used for the post-
choice analysis. However, this time our dependent variable is post-consumption happiness 
and we are considering only the two good categories for which we collected this measure 
(Ice Cream and Movie). We systematically perform three robustness checks: we run a Tobit 
model accounting for the 17 censored responses with a post-consumption happiness of 100, 
and we run linear regressions after re-including the observations that were either excluded 
due to non-eligibility or due to expressions of regret.  
In the following, we first look at whether subjects’ experienced utility of consuming 
the ice cream and of watching the short movie clip was significantly affected by the fact of 
forgoing an alternative (Choice condition) or not (No-Choice condition). Table 13 provides 
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results of regressing post-consumption happiness ratings on the treatment dummy, 
dummyChoice, for the Ice Cream (column 3) and the Movie (column 4) categories 
separately, and together without and with good categories fixed effects (columns 1 and 2, 
respectively). The regression results indicate that POCs do not affect subjects’ utility after 
consumption occurred, independently of considering the aggregated sample or both good 
categories separately (ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘ is never significant in columns 1 to 4). This finding is 
supported by our three robustness checks (see Table C7 in Appendix C).58 Thus, we do not 
find evidence that POCs significantly affect post-consumption utility after forgoing any 
option (i.e., attractive or unattractive). 
Table 13: Relationship between post-consumption happiness and the 
treatment condition Choice versus No-Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. 
Good category: All All Ice Cream Movie 
dummyChoice 1.340 -0.203 0.223 -0.536 
 (3.532) (3.548) (3.786) (4.943) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.549*** 0.436*** 0.440*** 0.433*** 
 (0.0884) (0.0897) (0.0939) (0.136) 
dummyMovie  -18.49***   
  (2.464)   
Constant 22.83*** 42.77*** 42.16*** 24.73** 
 (7.962) (8.380) (9.215) (11.55) 
Observations 182 182 83 99 
R2 0.207 0.339 0.233 0.125 
SE Clustered Clustered Robust Robust 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. is 
the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option after consumption occurred and is in {1,2,3…,100} 
where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyChoice=1 
if is in the Choice condition, and 0 if is in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) 
happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; 
dummyMovie=1 if (post-consumption) happiness is reported for the Movie good category, and 0 if is 
reported for the Ice Cream good category. Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are clustered at the 
individual level. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
                                       
58 We also obtain similar effects when controlling for gender and age. 
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Next, we investigate more specifically whether the rejection of an attractive option is 
more detrimental for post-consumption utility than forgoing an unattractive alternative. 
Table 14 displays the results from regressing post-consumption happiness on the treatments’ 
dummies for the No-Choice and High POCs groups. On average, we find no significant effect 
of our treatment, independently of pooling or not the data across the two good categories 
(ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬ு௜௚௛௉ை஼ has a p-value>0.1, see columns 1 to 4), 59 and of using different model 
specifications or samples (see Table C8 in Appendix C).  
Table 14: Relationship between post-consumption happiness and the 
choice conditions Low POCs versus High POCs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. 
Good category: All All Ice Cream Movie 
dummyNoChoice -1.208 0.0783 -2.048 1.950 
 (3.840) (3.752) (4.020) (5.675) 
dummyHighPOC 0.328 -0.311 -4.666 3.433 
 (3.787) (3.211) (4.511) (6.015) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.550*** 0.436*** 0.414*** 0.429*** 
 (0.0888) (0.0903) (0.0994) (0.137) 
dummyMovie  -18.50***   
  (2.461)   
Constant 23.99*** 42.75*** 46.43*** 23.07** 
 (7.025) (7.183) (8.340) (10.36) 
Observations 182 182 83 99 
R2 0.207 0.339 0.244 0.128 
SE Clustered Clustered Robust Robust 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. is the 
happiness level with the chosen/allocated option after consumption occurred and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 
means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyNoChoice=1 if is in 
the No-Choice condition, and 0 if is in the Choice condition; dummyHighPOCs=1 if is in the High POCs 
condition, and 0 if is in the Low POCs or in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) 
happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; 
dummyMovie=1 if (post-consumption) happiness is reported for the Movie good category, and 0 if is reported 
for the Ice Cream good category. Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are clustered at the individual level. 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
                                       
59 Controlling for gender and age also does not affect the results. 
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In summary, we do not find support for hypotheses H1 and H2 when considering post-
consumption utility. POCs therefore do not seem to significantly affect individuals’ utility 
after consumption took place. 
4.5 Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the rejection of an alternative 
option implied by decision making negatively affects post-choice and post-consumption 
utility. We also tested if the size of this effect is positively related to the attractiveness of 
the forgone option. When considering post-choice utility, we found that conditional on 
obtaining the best option, individuals were worse off when this outcome resulted from a 
choice rather than from a situation without any choice. However, contrary to what we 
hypothesized, this effect was not especially stronger when the rejected option was an 
attractive one. When testing our hypotheses using post-consumption utility, we showed that 
rejecting an option, independently of its attractiveness, did not generate lower levels of 
utility after consumption took place.  
In the following, we first discuss our findings in light of competing theories. We then 
mention some policy implications of our results. 
4.5.1 Alternative explanations 
Contrary to traditional economic theory, we find suggestive evidence that opportunity 
costs matter after a choice was made. However, further research is needed to properly rule 
out alternative phenomena that could potentially also explain our results. First, this effect 
may be driven by a spill-over of decision difficulty to the post-choice experience. The main 
idea behind decision difficulty is that making a choice (especially between closely ranked 
options, and among highly attractive options) may involve difficulties which might persist 
even after the choice is made, effectively reducing one’s satisfaction. We cannot entirely 
rule out this possibility using the current paradigm. When controlling for a measure of 
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subjects’ tendency to experience decision difficulty (captured by the variable Choice Diff. 
in Table C9, Appendix C)60, regression results indicate that the subjects in the Choice group 
are still characterized by a lower reported post-choice happiness than those in the No-Choice 
group (see columns 1 and 2 of Table C9). However, our treatment effect becomes only 
weakly significant (ߚመௗ௨௠௠௬஼௛௢௜௖௘. =-3.41, p-value<0.1).  Therefore, further research would 
be needed to find out whether POCs can still explain our findings when the phenomenon of 
decision difficulty has been properly controlled for.   Another phenomenon that could explain our results is anticipated regret. We 
described in section 4.2.2 and in the presentation of the results that the feeling of regret 
cannot serve as an explanation of our findings for post-choice utility since the resolution of 
uncertainty regarding the utility of the chosen option has not yet taken place. However, 
while regret per-se cannot occur in the pre-consumption stage, anticipated regret could serve 
as an alternative explanation. Anticipated regret is basically the fear of experiencing regret 
over one’s choice in the future, and it has been shown to play an important role in decision 
making (Mellers et al., 1997). Anticipated regret can hardly be ruled out as an alternative 
explanation to our pre-consumption stage. Further research would therefore be required to 
confirm the effects of POCs on post-choice utility.  
4.5.2 Relevance 
While additional research is needed to properly rule out alternative explanations to 
our results, we argue that POCs are an important overlooked precursor to satisfaction, and 
as such, a significant contribution to fields such as consumer research and judgement and 
decision-making. POCs might have substantial implications for other prominent phenomena 
such as consumer preference for a no-choice option (Dhar, 1997), the “keeping doors open” 
                                       
60 Choice Diff. is obtained by aggregating subjects’ answers to the Decision Difficulty scale mentioned in 
section 4.3.2. 
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effect (Shin and Ariely, 2004), the choice overload phenomenon (Iyengar and Lepper, 
2000)61, and might perhaps even be a fundamental precursor of regret, along with its 
comparative component and self-blame (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002). 
A deeper understanding of the relevance of POCs might be crucial for alleviating their 
detrimental effects on citizens’ welfare by providing potentially valuable insights for public 
policy. People may be better off when having to respect rules imposed by the government 
than facing freedom of choice. For instance, a fixed duration of yearly holidays imposed by 
the policymakers or Sunday Blue Laws may reduce psychological opportunity costs and 
thus increase people’s well-being. However, whether the benefit of reduced opportunity cost 
can outweigh the potential detrimental effect of less freedom to act upon one’s preferences 
is still a matter of controversy. Refined evidence about the relevance of POCs is therefore 
necessary to further examine the simple standard economic assumption that freedom of 
choice necessarily leads to a higher consumers’ well-being.  
4.6 Conclusion  
While economic theory assumes that opportunity costs only matter in the decision-
making process, we argue that they remain relevant after choices have been made. More 
specifically, we assess the effects of opportunity costs, created by the forgone alternative, 
on the utility of the chosen option. We denote the extent to which opportunity costs matter 
for post-choice utility as Psychological Opportunity Costs (POCs), and argue that POCs are 
distinct from phenomena such as regret or disappointment.  
                                       
61 Choice overload deals with the paradoxical effect of being less satisfied with a choice made from a larger, 
rather than a smaller choice set. POCs could explain this phenomenon: while a bigger set size allows for a 
closer match with one’s preferences, it simultaneously may increase the probability of having an attractive 
alternative in the set of forgone options and therefore of facing high opportunity costs. POCs might thus work 
as a mediator of the choice overload effect. 
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We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment in which we randomize the 
opportunity costs that people face, i.e., the availability and desirability of an inferior option, 
and test their effect on utility, approximated by measures of expected and experienced well-
being. More precisely, participants provide their happiness ratings with the (eventual) 
reception of either their favorite good (No-Choice condition), or with their choice out of 
two options – their favorite good and another one (Choice condition). In the latter case, we 
exogenously vary the attractiveness of the second option to generate either high or low 
opportunity costs: in the High POCs treatment, the alternative option is subjects’ second 
preferred one, while in the Low POCs treatment, the other option is their least preferred 
one from a set of 6 items. 
Overall, we find mixed support for our hypotheses. First, we show that post-choice 
satisfaction is significantly lower in the presence of opportunity costs, i.e., post-choice 
happiness ratings are lower in the Choice condition than in the No-Choice condition. 
However, we find that, on average, subjects in the High POCs condition do not report a 
significantly lower well-being right after the choice, than subjects in the Low POCs group. 
These results suggest that the simple rejection of an alternative option, independently of its 
attractiveness, can negatively affect one’s satisfaction with one’s choice. This finding is 
surprising as we would expect individuals to experience a bigger psychological loss when 
forgoing their 2nd best rather than their 6th best option. A reason may be that the rejected 
alternative in the Low POCs condition was still too desirable, or that its desirability was 
not sufficiently distant from the forgone option in the High POCs treatment. Another 
explanation may be that subjects did not sufficiently care about the outcome of their 
decision and therefore did not pay much attention to the unchosen option.  
When analyzing post-consumption happiness ratings, we find that subjects in the 
Choice condition do not experience a lower utility than those in the No-Choice group. There 
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is also no difference in utility between participants who faced high or low POCs after 
consumption occurred. Therefore, POCs do not seem to matter anymore for post-
consumption utility. The reasoning here may be that opportunity costs are only detrimental 
for people’s well-being when they are salient in people’s mind which may be the case until 
the last moment of consumption but not afterwards. However, this hypothetical explanation 
would need to be tested empirically.  
Given the increasing amount of possibilities and decisions daily encountered by 
individuals, it is fundamental to better understand the factors influencing people’s 
satisfaction with their choices. This is what we intended to do with the current study. We 
argue that POCs is a potentially relevant overlooked phenomenon that may negatively 
affect decision makers’ happiness and encourage any future research that would further 
study this new concept and disentangle our findings from potentially alternative 
explanations. 
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 Chapter 5 ─ Immoral Labor Markets 
Joint with Florian Schneider and Roberto A. Weber62 
5.1 Introduction 
Corporate scandals regularly bring to light immoral work practices. For example, 
recent scandals in the financial industry reveal bankers’ intentional sale of toxic assets to 
unsuspecting clients (US Department of Justice, 2016), manipulation of the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) and aiding of tax evasion 
(Hill, 2012). Immoral practices also extend to other sectors. Tobacco company employees 
have long been accused of regularly engaging in unethical tactics such as misleading the 
public about the harmful effects of smoking (Heath, 2016) and developing marketing 
strategies to attract smokers as young as 13 (Bates and Rowell, 1998). Concerns about the 
potential immoral nature of professional activities are often discussed with respect to other 
sectors, such as the manufacture of weapons, the provision of high-interest credit to 
unsophisticated consumers and the “off-label” marketing of opioids. 
While such immoral behaviors may sometimes result from the actions of a few rogue 
employees, there nevertheless exists a widespread impression that some jobs—e.g., 
marketing tobacco products, manufacturing weapons, engaging in predatory lending—likely 
involve inherently immoral acts by their nature. Conventional wisdom further posits that 
workers performing these kinds of jobs are compensated for their unethical conduct—a form 
of compensating differential for the aversive nature of acting immorally—and that such jobs 
attract those individuals who experience the least displeasure from committing immoral 
acts. Under this view, immoral work may represent an instance of standard arguments 
                                       
62 Please cite as Brun, Fanny, Schneider, Florian and Roberto A. Weber (2018) “Immoral Labor Markets,” 
Working Paper. 
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regarding sorting and compensating differentials—in the same way as for other aspects of 
work that people may find heterogeneously unpleasant, such as risk of physical harm 
(Rosen, 1986).  
However, despite the intuitive appeal of such a connection, there exists little empirical 
evidence that links heterogeneity in the willingness to perform immoral jobs to resulting 
differential labor market outcomes. Perhaps the closest evidence comes from studies 
documenting positive relationships between the immorality of work and the wages obtained 
by workers in those firms or industries (Frank, 1996; Moffatt and Peters, 2004; Benedict, 
McClough and McClough, 2006). For example, Frank (1996) used data from a Cornell 
University employment survey that included graduates’ occupations, reported salaries and 
employers. He then asked students in a business ethics class to rate the “social 
responsibility” of the most common occupations and employers of Cornell graduates. A 
regression controlling for other observable characteristics—such as a student’s major, grades 
and gender—reveals a premium for occupations and employers that are rated as socially 
irresponsible. Frank complements this evidence with other examples of cases in which 
professions that are otherwise similar but differ in their morality appear to produce different 
wages, such as anecdotal accounts that expert testimony on behalf of tobacco companies is 
“compensated handsomely.” 
Frank’s evidence is consistent with the notion that heterogeneous concerns for morality 
and sorting result in differential wages across occupations and industries. However, there 
remain important gaps in documenting that the relationships observed by Frank are really 
the result of sorting, heterogeneous moral preferences and compensating differentials. Most 
obviously, correlational evidence between wages and the perceived immorality of work might 
result from other unobserved characteristics of workers and the work activities. For instance, 
Moffatt and Peters (2004) document a wage premium for prostitution, which they attribute 
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to a compensating differential; but it is unclear whether the compensation is for the 
perceived immorality of the work or other aversive aspects of the job (Edlund and Korn, 
2002).63 Moreover, such studies fail to measure a critical element—the identification of 
heterogeneous concerns for morality as a key driver of the relationship. While there is some 
evidence that people in some industries and professions exhibit lower concerns for morality 
(Sjöberg and Engelberg, 2009), no study identifies that these concerns for morality drive 
differential selection into different kinds of work rather than the relationship being, perhaps, 
the other way around (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993; Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal, 2014). 
In this paper, we provide novel evidence supporting the above relationships between 
the immorality of some kinds of work, worker’s concerns for morality and the kinds of 
outcomes observed in “immoral labor markets.” We do so with a combination of laboratory 
experiments, surveys and labor-market data, in which we obtain measures of individuals’ 
concerns for morality and relate these to variation in the morality of work. The control 
provided by laboratory experiments allows us to observe the kinds of outcomes that arise 
as the nature of work changes only in the extent to which it is immoral. Complementary 
evidence from surveys and labor market outcomes allows us to obtain insights into 
relationships between individuals’ concerns for morality and the morality of different firms 
and industries in real markets. 
Our work is focused on two specific hypotheses that arise from a simple theoretical 
analysis of how individuals’ heterogeneous aversion to acting immorally will interact with 
jobs that vary in the immorality of the work they require. We do not attempt to provide a 
novel theoretical contribution, but rather use simple economic analysis as a framework for 
formalizing intuitions and guiding our empirical research. The two main hypotheses simply 
                                       
63 Related work in finance (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Colonnello, Curatola and Gioffré, 2017) 
demonstrates that investing in firms that engage in immoral activities (“sin stocks”) yields higher returns. 
However, other aspects, such as risk, may also differ between these types of investments. 
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reflect the widely held perceptions that we note above: first, that more immoral work should 
yield higher wages (and lower quantities) than work that is not immoral and, second, that 
immoral work should attract those workers who care the least about morality. We then use 
our laboratory experiments, survey evidence and labor-market data to provide tests of these 
hypotheses. A critical novel contribution of our work is to directly relate differences in labor 
market outcomes to heterogeneity in individual concerns for morality. 
Our results provide support for the above two hypotheses in both laboratory and field 
settings. First, we show that immoral work commands a wage premium over comparable 
work that is not immoral. We show this using Swiss labor market data, where we attempt 
to control for observable worker and industry characteristics and find that industries that 
are perceived to be immoral yield higher average wages. Moreover, in our laboratory labor 
markets—which vary by treatment only whether being employed requires doing something 
immoral, while holding other aspects of the job constant—we find that wages are 
persistently higher for immoral work. This wage premium is large and does not decrease 
with experience in the market. 
Second, we provide evidence of sorting by immoral types into immoral work, both in 
the laboratory and in the field. We obtain two measures of individuals’ aversion to acting 
immorally, one from a survey and one from a behavioral task. In our laboratory labor 
markets, immoral types are hired much more often only when work involves doing 
something immoral—i.e., there is no difference when the labor market does not involve 
immoral work. In our survey data, immoral types report a significantly greater willingness 
to work in firms and industries that are perceived to be immoral. While this result does not 
necessarily imply that they will actually end up working in these industries—though, 
importantly, Wiswall and Zafar (2018) provide evidence that such stated preferences are 
predictive of ultimate employment—it demonstrates that stated work preferences are 
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consistent with the sorting process in our second hypothesis. Moreover, our finding indicates 
that the (perceived) immorality of industries and firms might be identifiable by a revealed 
(or stated) preference approach—that is, immoral firms or industries are those that are 
relatively more attractive for immoral types as opportunities for employment.  
Our work provides the first evidence documenting a differential willingness of 
heterogeneous moral types to work in jobs and industries that vary in their immorality. 
Importantly, this sorting persists with experience in our laboratory experiment and extends 
to stated preferences regarding real labor-market outcomes. We also connect this sorting to 
wage premiums for immoral work. In our field data this connection is correlational and thus 
subject to caution in drawing interpretations from the relationship, but in our laboratory 
we demonstrate a causal relationship by using a design that varies by treatment only 
whether the work is immoral. 
Our study also relates to research on effort and sorting across different kinds of work 
by “mission-oriented” types (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009;  
Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2014; Carpenter and Gong, 2016; Cassar, forthcoming; Cassar and 
Armouti-Hanse, 2018). There are similarities between this literature and our work and one 
interpretation of our research is that we study the opposite type of preferences—anti-social 
rather than pro-social. However, we believe that there is something inherently different, and 
more general, about a desire not to do immoral things than a positive attitude toward a 
particular kind of mission. Moreover, the connections between carefully identified 
preferences, outcomes in laboratory labor markets, and real-world labor market outcomes 
in our work are novel even with respect to this literature. 
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents evidence from 
Swiss labor market data that demonstrates a positive correlation between the immorality 
of work and wages. While similar results have been observed previously (e.g., Frank, 1996; 
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Benedict et al., 2006), our analysis involves a larger sample representative of a more diverse 
set of workers and jobs. We then present a simple theoretical framework that we use to 
motivate this and other relationships that one would expect to see in data under 
heterogeneity in moral concerns and work characteristics. Section 5.4 presents the design of 
our laboratory experiment and survey studies, while section 5.5 presents the results. We 
conclude in section 5.6 by discussing implications of our findings. 
5.2 Suggestive correlational evidence from the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey 
As an initial step, we first explore whether individuals working in “immoral” industries 
receive a wage premium. For this, we use data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLSF)—
a representative sample of the Swiss labor force compiled by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office—to explore the relationship between the perceived immorality of work and the 
portion of wages that cannot be easily explained by observable worker characteristics.  
In this exercise, we first identified industries that we jointly perceived as involving 
high degrees of immoral work activities; we did so before looking at any data, including 
wages, from these industries.64 This yielded six “immoral” industries: gambling and betting 
activities, monetary intermediations, credit granting, manufacture of tobacco products, 
wholesale of tobacco products and manufacture of weapons and ammunitions. We then 
chose comparison industries from within the same industrial branch with similar 
distributions of education levels, as well as a few additional industries representing large 
shares of employment in Switzerland. We did not look at wages when we were selecting the 
comparison industries. To independently validate our judgments that these sets of industries 
                                       
64 Specifically, we started with the complete list of industries listed in the dataset. Each of the three authors 
went through the list and indicated any industries that he or she thought had a significant immoral component. 
We selected those industries for which all three authors agreed.  
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differed in the extent to which they are moral, or at least perceived as such, we asked an 
independent sample of 177 students to rate each industry on a scale ranging from “very 
moral” (1) to “very immoral” (9) and re-scaled the responses to lie on the -1 to 1 interval. 
(These data were collected as part of our survey studies, which we describe in more detail  
Figure 13: Correlation between wages and perceived industry immorality 
 
Source: Weighted data from the SLFS, years: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (wage) and our own survey (perceived 
immorality). Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Real gross hourly wage in 2010 CHF. Cross-section with N = 18,514. Number of 
observations per industry: Credit granting=44, Monetary intermediations=4146, Gambling and betting 
activities=91, Manufacture of tobacco products=88, Manufacture of weapons and ammunitions=57, Wholesale 
of tobacco products=51, Non-life insurance=1484, Organization and operation of sport facilities=288, 
Processing of tea and coffee=75, Manufacture of electronic components=656, Wholesale of perfume and 
cosmetics=200, Wholesale of clothing and footwear=166, Wholesale of watches and jewelry =91, Manufacture 
of paper and paperboard=54, Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles=1508, Construction of 
buildings=2022, Restaurant and mobile food activities=3137, Hotels and similar accommodation=1514, 
Fitness facilities=227, General public administration activities=2615. For credit granting: extrapolation based 
on less than 50 observations; this result must be interpreted with great caution. 
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Table 15: Relationship between wages and perceived industry immorality 
Dependent variable: ln of real gross hourly wage (in 2010 CHF)  
(1) (2) (3) 
Perceived industry immorality 
0.936*** 
(37.60) 
0.681*** 
(29.73) 
0.372*** 
(11.13) 
Age  
0.006*** 
(11.76) 
0.005*** 
(11.03) 
Male  
0.200*** 
(16.19) 
0.181*** 
(15.30) 
Married  
0.037*** 
(3.83) 
0.027** 
(2.89) 
Education high  
0.510*** 
(28.39) 
0.390*** 
(19.25) 
Education middle  
0.187*** 
(11.14) 
0.132*** 
(7.45) 
Swiss  
0.063*** 
(6.16) 
-0.022* 
(-2.18) 
Tenure  
0.005*** 
(7.92) 
0.003*** 
(5.52) 
Full-time equivalent  
-0.031 
(-1.13) 
-0.054* 
(-1.99) 
Board member  
0.031* 
(2.08) 
0.091*** 
(6.68) 
Constant 
3.767*** 
(594.96) 
2.990*** 
(90.89) 
3.128*** 
(86.59) 
N 18514 18514 18514 
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.330 0.394 
Industrial branch FE No No Yes 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (wage) and our own survey 
(Perceived immorality). Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means 
neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education 
high: higher vocational education and training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, 
full-time vocational school, matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): 
compulsory schooling or pre-vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Tenure = number of years in the 
firm, Full-time equivalent = (working hours /42), set to 1 for working hours >= 42, Board member in 
{0, 1}. Model (3) controls for industrial branch fixed effects (manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicle and motorcycles; financial and insurance activities; accommodation and food 
service activities; construction; public administration, defense and compulsory social security; arts, 
entertainment and recreation). Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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in section 5.4.) The mean ratings for each industry are shown on the horizontal axis of 
Figure 13. They confirm that our initial judgments with respect to the perceived immorality 
of certain industries are shared by the student sample.  
The vertical axis of Figure 13 plots the mean real gross hourly wage (in 2010 Swiss 
Francs) in each industry. These data are the reported hourly wage of employees surveyed 
as part of a national representative panel. We use cross-sectional data from the 2010, 2012, 
2014 and 2016 waves. The strong positive relationship supports the hypothesis that work 
in less moral industries yields a wage premium. The size of the differences is also substantial. 
Of course, the relationship in Figure 13 ignores the potential role of individual worker 
characteristics, which may vary across industries and may explain some of the differences 
in wages. To partially address this concern, Table 15 reports regressions of the hourly wage 
reported by individuals in different industries on the perceived immorality of each industry, 
along with several additional control variables (Appendix Figure D1 provides a scatter plot 
of the regression residuals with respect to perceived immorality). Model 1 displays the 
results of a simple regression of the natural logarithm of real gross hourly wages on the 
perceived industry’s immorality, supporting the positive relationship in Figure 13. Model 2 
adds observable worker characteristics, while Model 3 additionally includes indicator 
variables for the industrial branch to which an industry belongs. While the addition of these 
controls lowers the magnitude of the industry immorality coefficient, the immorality 
premium remains substantively large and statistically significant: according to Model 3, 
individuals working in a totally immoral industry (i.e. Perceived immorality = 1) have 
(geometric) mean hourly earnings approximately 45 percent higher than people working in 
a neutral industry (i.e. Perceived immorality = 0).65 
                                       
65 We obtain this number by doing the following calculation: e0.372 – 1   0.45. Summary statistics of all 
variables used in the regressions and all of the industries are provided in Appendix Table B.10.  
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The above analysis is consistent with the notion that workers are being compensated 
for the immoral nature of some kinds of work. However, the correlational aspect of the 
relationship leaves open the question of whether unobserved characteristics of the industries 
may explain the relationship in Figure 13. Moreover, the above analysis does not tell us 
whether the workers employed in these industries differ in their concerns for morality. To 
explore this question much more carefully—controlling for unobservable aspects of the work 
and making a clearer connection to individual workers’ heterogeneous concerns for 
morality—we turn to the theoretical framework guiding our survey and laboratory studies. 
5.3 Model 
In this section, we introduce a simple stylized model of labor markets with varying 
degrees of immorality of jobs and heterogeneity in concern for morality among workers. The 
purpose of the model is to formalize the intuition about how varying immorality of jobs 
interacts with workers’ heterogeneous concerns for morality. We use the theoretical results 
to guide our investigation of immoral labor markets, in particular for designing the 
experiment and analyzing the data. Our framework is a simplification of the theoretical 
literature on compensating wage differential (see e.g. Rosen, 1986).66 We do not seek to 
expand this literature, but rather to apply it to a context in which the relevant characteristic 
is morality.  
Workers are hired by firms to do a job ݆ ∈ ܬ. The job might involve doing immoral 
work. The immorality of the job is measured by a function ܫ: ܬ → ℝஹ଴, where ܫ(݆ᇱ) >
                                       
66 Unlike most models of compensating wage differentials, we do not have multiple labor markets, but only 
one, along with a fixed outside option. In the experiment, we also assign subjects to one labor market. This 
abstraction simplifies both the theory and the experiment. However, we show in Appendix D that our model 
allows for an interpretation with two jobs, an immoral job and a neutral job. Our results therefore also apply 
to such a context. 
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ܫ(݆) means that job ݆ ′ is more immoral than job ݆ , and ܫ(݆) = 0  means that the job ݆  involves 
no immoral acts. The set of immoral jobs is ܬூெ = {݆ ∈ ܬ: ܫ(݆) > 0}. 
Labor demand is represented by an interval of firms, ݇ ∈ [0,1]. Each firm hires workers 
for the same job ݆. Firms’ behavior is given by the labor demand function, ܦ:ℝ ×  ܬ →[0,1], where ܦ is continuous in ݓ, strictly decreasing in ݓ on [0,∞), with ݈ ݅݉௪→ஶ ܦ(ݓ, ݆) =0 and ܦ(ݓ, ݆) = 1 for ݓ ≤ 0. In addition, we assume that an increase in immorality of the 
job does not decrease profitability of labor, that is, ܫ(݆′) > ܫ(݆) implies ܦ(ݓ, ݆′) ≥ ܦ(ݓ, ݆) 
for all ݓ ∈ ℝ.67 
Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, ݅ ∈ [0,1]. Each worker has 
reservation utility ݑ ∈ ℝஹ଴, and the utility of accepting job ݆ of a worker of type ݅ is given 
by: 
௜ܷ(ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐ|݆,ݓ) = ݓ − ܿ − ܫ(݆) ∗ ߠ௜, 
where ܿ ∈ ℝஹ଴ is the worker’s cost of effort. The parameter ߠ௜ ∈ ℝஹ଴ measures how much 
the worker cares about the immorality of the job and is distributed according to a 
cumulative density function ܨ ∈ ℱఏ . For all ܨ ∈ ℱఏ , ܨ is continuous, strictly increasing on [0,∞), and with ܨ(0) = 0.68 The utility of a worker of type ݅ is then given by ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ) =
݉ܽݔ{ݑ, ௜ܷ(ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐ|݆,ݓ)}. Workers’ behavior determines the labor supply, ܵ:ℝ ×  ܬ → [0,1]. 
If ݆ ∈ ܬூெ, every worker with ߠ௜ ≤
௪ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝)  accepts the job. Labor supply is therefore ܵ (ݓ, ݆) =
ܨ(௪ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝)  ).69 
                                       
67 If an increase in immorality would decrease profitability, there would be no incentives for firms to operate 
in  immoral industries. Heidhues, et al., (2017) provide a basis for why deceptively marketed socially harmful 
products may be more profitable in the presence of naïve consumers. In Appendix D, we provide a behavioral 
foundation for labor demand. In our experiment, we vary the immorality of the job, but fix labor demand, 
that is, ܦ(ݓ, ݆′) = ܦ(ݓ, ݆) for all ݓ and all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬ.  
68 Note that ܨ(0) = 0 implies that no worker likes to do immoral jobs (see also Rosen (1986, p. 645). 
69 The assumptions on ܨ (together with the properties of a cdf) imply that ܵ is continuous and strictly 
increasing in ݓ on [ݑ + ܿ,∞), ݈݅݉
௪→ஶ
ܵ(ݓ, ݆) = 1, and ܵ(ݓ, ݆) = 0  for all ݓ ≤ ݑ + ܿ. 
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Using this framework, we can now consider the equilibrium properties of this type of 
market. The equilibrium wage, ݓ∗(݆), is implicitly defined by ܵ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) − ܦ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) =0.70 The following Lemma states that for every ݆ ∈ ܬ, ݓ∗(݆) exists and is unique (all proofs 
are in Appendix D). 
Lemma. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ, ݓ∗(݆) exists, is unique and is in (ݑ + ܿ,∞). For all ݆ ∈ ܬ ∖ ܬூெ, 
ݓ∗(݆) = ݑ + ܿ. 
In the following, we derive four properties of labor markets with immoral jobs. While 
straightforward, these results yield predictions for our empirical work. In particular, the 
first two propositions provide the primary hypotheses that we test across all of our analysis. 
The third and fourth results are testable in our laboratory experiment.  
Proposition 1. For all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬ with ܫ(݆) < ܫ(݆ᇱ), ݓ∗(݆) < ݓ∗(݆′). 
Proposition 1 shows that there is an immorality premium for immoral jobs: an increase in 
the immorality of a job decreases supply and therefore increases the equilibrium wage. 
Indeed, we have already demonstrated evidence supporting the wage relationship in this 
hypothesis in Figure 13, where variation on the horizontal axis corresponds to variation in 
ܫ(݆).  
Second, the immoral types, or to be precise, the types that care least about the 
immorality of a job (ߠ௜ ≤
௪∗(௝)ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝) ), sort into accepting immoral jobs, while those workers 
                                       
70 Note that for ݆ ∈ ܬ ∖ ܬூெ, ܵ is a correspondence. For this case, ݓ∗(݆) is defined by ܦ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) ∈ ܵ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆). 
Moreover, ݓ∗(݆) depends on ܨ. When necessary (Proposition 4) we will make this explicit by writing ݓ∗(݆,ܨ) 
instead of ݓ∗(݆). 
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more concerned with morality (ߠ௜ > ௪∗(௝)ି௨ି௖ூ(௝) ), refuse to do the job for the equilibrium 
wage.71 This is formally shown in Proposition 2.72 
Proposition 2. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ, worker ݅ is hired iff ߠ௜ ≤
௪∗(௝)ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝) ≡ ߠ(݆) ∈ ℝவ଴.  
Proposition 2 is critical to the notion that immorality wage premiums like those in Figure 
13 are driven by those who find immoral work most distasteful opting out of jobs that 
require immoral behavior. This important relationship has, to our knowledge, not been 
previously tested. 
 Our next two predictions are less central to our purposes, but nevertheless provide 
some useful and testable insights into behavior in immoral labor markets.  
Proposition 3. For all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬ with ܫ(݆) < ܫ(݆ᇱ), there exists ߠ෨(݆, ݆′) ∈ ℝவ଴ such that 
௜ܷ(݆′,ݓ∗(݆′)) > ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆)) iff ߠ௜ < ߠ෨(݆, ݆′).  
Proposition 3 shows that immoral types profit from an increase in the immorality of work.  
More precisely, there are some types who are sufficiently unconcerned with morality who 
are hired in an immoral market and are overcompensated by the immorality premium.  
Finally, Proposition 4 shows that moral behavior (refusing to do the immoral job) 
can have positive externalities for immoral types. If the distribution of types shifts towards 
more concern for morality—in the sense of stochastic dominance—then the supply at any 
given wage decreases, thereby increasing the equilibrium wage and the utility of those least 
                                       
71 Note that this perfect sorting according to ߠ is an extreme, and admittedly unrealistic, case. If there is 
heterogeneity in the costs of effort, reservation utility or productivity, there is only partial sorting by ߠ. We 
do not incorporate more than one dimension of heterogeneity in our model to keep it simple. Heterogeneity 
in both productivity (earnings capacity) and risk preferences is investigated in Garen (1988) and Hwang, Reed 
and Hubbard (1992). 
72 Note that for any ܽ ∈ ℝவ଴, ܨ(ܽ) > 0 because ܨ(0) = 0 and ܨ is strictly increasing on [0,∞). Therefore 
ܨ(θ(j)) > 0, implying that some workers are hired. This is also important for most of the other propositions. 
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concerned with morality. For instance, any completely immoral types (i.e., ߠ௜ = 0) will 
always benefit from a higher wage produced by increased moral concerns.  
Definition. For all ܨ,ܩ ∈ ℱఏ , ܨ strong first-order stochastically dominates ܩ iff F(ݔ) <
ܩ(ݔ) for all ݔ ∈ ℝவ଴. 
Proposition 4. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ and ܨ,ܩ ∈ ℱఏ with ܨ strong first-order stochastically 
dominating ܩ, there exists ߠ෠(݆,ܨ) ∈ ℝவ଴ such that ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆, ܨ)) > ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܩ))  iff ߠ௜ <
ߠ෠(݆, ܨ). 
5.4 Study design 
Our study uses a combination of surveys and a laboratory experiment to measure 
heterogeneity in concerns for morality (ߠ௜) and to relate this heterogeneity to outcomes as 
labor markets vary in the immoral nature of work (ܫ(݆)). Table 16 provides an overview of 
our design and how we obtain these measures.  
Table 16: Overview of study design and measures 
Workers 
(n = 240) 
Independent raters / 
“Clients” (n = 177) 
On-line survey 
Laboratory experiment 
(4-7 days later) 
Survey study 
Concern for morality  
(survey-based: ߠௌ௨௥) 
Concern for morality 
(behavioral task: ߠா௫௣) 
Rated the immorality of 
firms and industries (ܫ(݆)) 
Labor market expectations 
(industries, firms, wages) 
Repeated labor market; 
subjects can be hired to 
give advice to “clients;” 
treatment varies job 
immorality (ܫ(݆)) 
Role of passive “clients” for 
laboratory experiment Personal characteristics (e.g., 
age, field of study, Big 5) 
 
The study uses two different samples. Our main focus is on the sample of Workers, 
who participate in our laboratory sessions. These subjects initially complete an on-line 
questionnaire that includes several questions designed to measure their concern for morality. 
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From these items, we construct an individual measure of concern for morality (ߠௌ௨௥). At 
this point, we also attempt to measure the subjects’ expectations of their own future labor 
market outcomes, including the willingness to work for different firms and industries and 
expected future wages.  
These same subjects then participate in a laboratory session roughly one week later. 
In this session, they perform two choice tasks. First, we elicit concern for morality using an 
incentivized behavioral task, adapted from Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia (2013), 
that creates a tradeoff between personal monetary gain and moral conduct. Workers then 
participate in a laboratory labor market for 15 periods, in which they submit reservation 
wages for being hired to perform work. Labor demand is simulated according to a fixed 
demand schedule.  
The key feature of our laboratory labor market is that our treatment varies only the 
degree to which work is immoral, while holding constant all other job characteristics, 
including the specific actions workers take when employed. More precisely, subjects in our 
experiment are hired to provide written advice to a “client.” We simply vary whether the 
recommendation is honest (in which case a choice is recommended that the client very likely 
would have made anyway, which earns the client some money and produces a donation to 
a UNICEF fund that provides malaria treatment for children) or dishonest and recommends 
the only choice that eliminates the above benefits.73 The degree of immorality of jobs 
exogenously varies: workers are either assigned to a market with neutral jobs or a market 
with immoral jobs. 
                                       
73 There are several ways to design an immoral task in the laboratory. We build our task on bad advice giving 
and honesty. This has two advantages: first, misleading consumers is a realistic feature of many existing 
“immoral” jobs. Second, there is an extensive psychological and economic literature on the measurement of 
honesty and lying aversion (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy et al., 2013) and having a reliable measure of concern 
for morality in the context of our market is important to test the predictions of our model. 
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Finally, we recruit a separate sample of individuals at public locations. These 
participants serve two functions. First, they act in the role of clients: they receive written 
recommendations from laboratory subjects and decide whether to follow them. From these 
choices, the clients accumulate money and influence the size of a donation to UNICEF. 
Second, these participants complete a survey in which they evaluate the extent to which 
various industries and firms are “moral” or “immoral.” These are the ratings that we already 
used in Figure 13 and Table 15. 
5.4.1 The on-line survey 
Students who were recruited for laboratory sessions were asked to complete an on-line 
survey about 4-7 days before coming to the lab. For our purposes, there were two main 
components to the survey. 
First, we included several multi-item scales intended to measure a broad concern for 
morality and moral acts. These were: 
1) Charity attitude index. We used a 9-item scale developed by Brashear et al. 
(2000) in which participants rate statements regarding how positive and useful they 
perceive work done by charities and how important they perceive it is to help others 
in society. 
2) HEXACO-PI. We administered 10 items from the short version of the HEXACO 
Personal Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009) related to the factor “Honesty-
Humility”—consisting of the four traits, sincerity (3 items), fairness (3 items), greed 
avoidance (2 items) and modesty (2 items). Every item describes a thought that a 
moral or immoral person might have and participants indicate the extent to which 
each thought reflects their own opinions.  
3) Protected Values. The Protected Values scale (Tanner et al., 2009; Gibson et al., 
2013) measures an individual’s position regarding values that can be seen as 
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inviolable, and not substitutable against money, and that are usually central to the 
person’s identity. In our case, and following Gibson et al. (2013), we adapted the 
Protected Values to a situation where a financial adviser can give bad investment 
advice to a client for personal benefit. First, 5 items assess the morality of this 
behavior (Protected value 1); second, 4 items examine how truthfulness matters in 
such a situation (Protected value 2). 
4) Integrity and Work Ethics Test. We used two items from a test designed to 
allow firms to measure the integrity of job applicants (Work ethics 1, Work ethics 
2). In each item, participants read two fictitious dialogues between two characters 
with different opinions about a situation (e.g. calling in sick at work to enjoy a sunny 
day outside). Participants then rate with which character they agree more. 
In each case, subjects expressed agreement or disagreement with statements on either 
a 5-point or 7-point Likert scale. The description of these survey scales are provided in 
Table D6 in the Appendix. 
Second, we asked subjects several questions about their future labor-market 
expectations. Subjects were shown a list of 26 well-known companies in Switzerland and 
another list consisting of the industries in Figure 13. Both lists are available in Tables D12 
and D13 in the Appendix. Participants rated their willingness to work for each firm and 
industry (1: not at all willing; 5: very much willing).74 For firms, participant also had the 
option to chose “I don’t know this organization” instead of rating the willingness to work. 
In addition, we asked subjects to provide estimates of their career plans; specifically, what 
work they expected to do after their studies and how much they expected to earn at the 
age of 40. 
                                       
74 Incidentally, the list of industries missed five industries for the five participants that participated in the 
first lab session. So we miss their data on willingness to work in these industries for these participants. Other 
than this, they completed the full questionnaire. 
IMMORAL LABOR MARKETS 
118 
 
Finally, we asked subjects whether several non-profit organizations (including 
UNICEF) are worth supporting and collected several additional personal characteristics, 
including a short version of the Big Five questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), which identifies 
individuals’ extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness, but 
is largely orthogonal to morality. We also elicited several demographic characteristics, such 
as age, gender and field of study.  
5.4.2 The laboratory experiment 
In the laboratory experiment, sessions consisted of 24 participants. During the 
experiment, subjects accumulated earnings in “points,” which were converted to money at 
the rate of 20 points = 1 CHF ≈ 1 US Dollar. 
We initially took a portrait photograph of each subject. Participants were asked to 
hold a neutral face while the picture was taken. We did so because our labor market made 
outcomes public—to reflect the fact that individuals’ choices of whether to work in immoral 
industries are typically visible to their friends and neighbors in real life. Thus, we allowed 
each subject in a labor market to observe the employment and earnings outcomes of each 
of the other participants in their labor market. Importantly, this means that our behavioral 
measure of “immorality” confounds both internally-driven concerns for acting immorally 
and concerns for being perceived as immoral by others. Since real-world labor markets 
typically also confound both motives, we decided to include them in our study. Moreover, 
for the purposes of this experiment, we attempted to design an “immoral” act that is strong 
in the extent to which many individuals likely find it aversive. Thus, many of our design 
features are intended to strengthen the degree of immorality, real or perceived, in the 
underlying acts. 
 Another important feature of our experiment is that subjects had the ability to 
influence the amount of a donation to UNICEF; specifically, to a fund that provides 
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treatment to children with malaria. This donation allowed us to strengthen the moral 
component of behavior in the experiment and to extend the impact of subjects’ choices 
beyond the experimenter and other participants in the study. At the beginning of the study, 
participants read an information sheet about the consequences of malaria and the need for 
treatments—we adapted this material from public materials available from UNICEF. Each 
session started with an amount of donations sufficient to provide several children with anti-
malarial treatment, per UNICEF’s estimate.75 However, the actual final donation was 
determined by the behavior of participants in the session (and the choices of the clients). 
To make the moral component strong, we further framed choices as helping to “save 
children” from malaria.76 
Once all participants entered the laboratory, we first measured their concern for 
morality in an incentivized decision task used to elicit general willingness to lie and to harm 
others for monetary gain. Next, participants played 15 periods of an experimental labor 
market. After the final period, we collected some additional individual-level measures, which 
we describe below. Finally, some subjects were randomly selected to perform the role of 
second-movers in the behavioral task that we conducted at the beginning of the session. 
Participants were then paid, in private. We now describe each of these steps in detail. 
Behavioral measure of concern for morality (ࣂࡱ࢞࢖) 
Participants first played an incentivized game that measures their willingness to lie 
for personal gain while causing harm to others. The task builds on a game by Gneezy et al. 
                                       
75 To further strengthen the moral component, we framed the donation as having been generated by a third 
party’s blood donation. Specifically, prior to the laboratory session, we approached individuals who had just 
donated their blood as part of a donation campaign. We asked them whether they would agree that the 
University of Zurich make a donation to UNICEF as a complement to their blood donation. We used these 
donations to frame the origin of the initial endowment. 
76 We borrowed terminology from UNICEF’s website, which states that the anti-malaria treatment saves 
children from the deadly effect of malaria. 
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(2013), and modifies it such that it mimics the consequences of a lie in the immoral 
treatment in our experimental labor market.  
In the game, Participant A privately observes a computerized die roll and sends a 
message claiming the observed number to Participant B. Participant A may claim that the 
assigned number r is either “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5” or “6” regardless of the actual number 
assigned. Participant A receives 100 + 20 * r points, which means that she has an incentive 
to lie if r is less than 6. Participant B then decides whether “to follow” or “not to follow” 
the message sent by Participant A. If he does not follow the message, he receives 30 points 
and the donations to UNICEF are unaffected. If he follows the message and Participant A 
truthfully reported the observed number, Participant B earns 100 points and the initial 
donation to UNICEF is increased by one additional anti-malarial treatment. However, if 
Participant B follows and Participant A lied, Participant B does not earn any points and 
the donation to UNICEF is reduced by one additional anti-malaria treatment.  
Every participant initially plays the role of Participant A. We use the strategy method 
to elicit Participant A’s message for every possible die roll. This allows us to classify all 
Participant A’s by their strategies in the game. At the end of the experiment, 5 of the 24 
participants in the session have their role changed from Participant A to Participant B. 
These Participants B are then matched with five of the remaining Participants A and decide 
whether or not to follow the corresponding message. All participants whose role is not 
switched—who remain as Participant A—are paid based solely on their choice as 
Participant A, independently of whether or not they are matched with a Participant B.77 
Participants were informed that, at the very end of the session and after all choices 
had been made, their decisions as Participant A would be publicly displayed to 5 other 
                                       
77 This implies that Participant As (whose role was not switched) received their own payment with certainty, 
their decision, however, only had consequences for Participant Bs (and UNICEF) with a probability of 26.3 
percent. This reflects a feature of our experimental labor market. 
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individuals, along with their portrait photograph. This was all explained clearly and publicly 
at the beginning of the experiment. 
Market experiment 
In the labor market, participants play the role of workers competing to be hired by 
automated firms. Before interacting in the market, instructions about the labor market are 
distributed to participants and read aloud using a voice recording. Then, the participants 
answer a list of understanding questions about the market, including how prices and 
quantities are determined. Only after the above instruction about market procedures, 
subjects receive information about the nature of the job. This ensures that subjects in both 
treatments interpret the market instructions in the same manner. Their understanding of 
these new instructions is again tested and corrected.  
The job. In both markets, workers have the opportunity to be hired as an “advisor” 
whose job is to give advice to another uninvolved participant outside the laboratory, the 
“client.” Specifically, the advisor has to write a recommendation to a client to choose one 
among ten choice options (labeled by the letters A through J). The client receives this 
recommendation, and has to choose one of the ten options. The client only knows that the 
option he selects determines his financial reward for completing a survey and influences an 
initial amount of money donated to UNICEF, but does not know the consequences of any 
specific option. Importantly, however, the client knows that the advisor had complete payoff 
information at the time of writing the recommendation. The client is free to choose the 
option that he is recommended or to choose any other option.  
The payoffs associated with each option are indicated in Table 17. Nine options 
increase the reward of the client by 1 CHF (≈ 1 US Dollar) and increase the donation to 
UNICEF by an amount estimated to correspond to the anti-malarial treatment of one child. 
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However, one of the 10 options—in this case, option D—gives 0 CHF to the client, and 
reduces the donation to UNICEF. 
Table 17: Options available to the “client” 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
Additional number of children 
who receive the anti-malarial 
treatment 
1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Financial reward for client 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 0 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 1 CHF 
 
Our two treatments vary only in the recommendation that the advisor is hired to 
make to the client. In the neutral treatment, the job of the advisor is to recommend one of 
the options that is beneficial to the client and to UNICEF (e.g., option G in Table 17). 
Note that a client is very likely to make such a choice independently of any advice. In the 
immoral treatment, the job is to recommend the single option with negative consequences 
(option D). In both cases, the advisor makes a recommendation by completing a form stating 
that, “option [G] will save the highest number of children” and “will give you the highest 
financial reward.”78 By recommending option D, the advisor increases the chance that the 
client selects the single option that will not increase his earnings and that will reduce the 
donation to UNICEF.79 We vary the letter of the bad (neutral) option across immoral 
(neutral) laboratory sessions. 
The market. Participants are randomly allocated to markets consisting of 6 workers 
who compete to be hired by 6 automated firms. Each worker can provide up to two units 
of labor—one at a low cost (50 points = CHF 2.50) and one at a high cost (110 points = 
                                       
78 Specifically, the advisor has to complete the following recommendation with the option’s name (G) and his 
initials: „I, [advisor’s initials], have reviewed your possible choices and I recommend that you select the option 
[G]. Following my advice will save the highest number of children and will give you the highest financial 
reward. Your advisor: [advisor’s initials]“ 
79 Subsequently, 84% of all recommendations produced in the laboratory were followed by clients. 
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CHF 5.50). The induced costs are the same for all participants, which the instructions 
clearly explain.  
Each worker decides whether or not to participate in the labor market. In the former 
case, she (privately) provides two wage requests for each of the possible units of labor she 
can provide. Workers may only submit wage requests that are at least as high as the 
corresponding cost of providing that job. Each firm can hire up to one unit of labor per 
period. Firms are identical except for the wage that they offer to the workers. Figure 14 
displays the automated demand for labor as well as the induced costs of labor supply. The 
workers have no information about the shape of the automated demand. 
Figure 14: The automated demand and the induced costs 
of the labor supply 
 
We use a uniform-price sealed-offer auction as the market mechanism, as this provides 
several advantages. First, Smith et al. (1982) show that this market converges to the 
equilibrium prediction. Second, and more importantly, this mechanism allows us to 
automate the labor demand (see also Sausgruber and Tyran, 2011) and therefore to keep 
the demand constant between the neutral and the immoral treatments. Once all six workers 
have submitted their wage requests, the computer ranks them from lowest to highest and 
compares the workers’ wage requests to the firms’ wage offers, ranked from highest to 
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lowest. The market wage is then the lowest number between two potential candidates: (i) 
the last wage offer that is higher than the wage request with the same rank, and (ii) the 
first wage request that is higher than the wage offer with the same rank. This mechanism 
clears the market in the sense that, for the market wage, labor supply equals labor demand 
and all workers with wage requests below the market wage are hired. If the firm hired no 
worker, the client receives no recommendation. This implies that in the immoral treatment, 
if a participant is not willing to do the job for the market wage, the number of clients who 
receive bad advices (weakly) decreases. 
The market is repeated for a total of 15 market periods. The composition as well as 
the type (immoral or neutral) of each market is fixed over all periods. At the end of each 
period, the computer reports the market wage, displays the picture of every worker in the 
market and summarizes information regarding each workers’ behavior and financial status 
across all periods (see Figure 15). Specifically, subjects observe employment outcomes, 
wages and cumulative earnings for themselves and for all other workers in their market over 
periods, and can connect these to the other workers’ identities through the photograph. 
After observing outcomes, those participants who where hired in a period completed the 
paper forms with the recommendations—they wrote their own initials and the appropriate 
letter (e.g., “G” or “D” in the earlier example).80 
                                       
80 Subjects were informed that each firm had a 0.25 probability of actually having a client in each period, 
which was independent of whether or not the firm hired a worker. If the firm did not have a client, then the 
worker’s recommendation would be unused, although the worker would still complete the recommendation 
and receive the market wage in that period. However, subjects did not know at the time of submitting wage 
requests or completing the forms at the end of a period whether or not there would actually be a client for 
this period. They were informed, at the end of the experiment, for which periods any recommendations they 
wrote would actually be distributed. We did this to lower the number of clients we would have to recruit as 
part of the follow-up survey. This represents, for instance, a case in which a worker is hired to prepare 
promotional materials for a harmful product, which may or may not ultimately be used in a marketing 
campaign. This procedure implies that writing a recommendation has only consequences with a probability of 
25 percent.  
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Figure 15: Example of feedback provided after every period 
 
Additional measures. At the conclusion of the laboratory session, we collected 
several additional individual-level measures. First, we measured participants’ affect levels—
i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance—using the self-assessment manikin (Bradley and 
Lang, 1994). Next, we asked participants whether they thought the clients would or would 
not follow recommendations; this belief was not incentivized. The participants were then 
prompted to answer several questions about the reasons underlying their market behavior. 
Finally, we measured subjects’ concerns for social image using the public self-consciousness 
scale by Leary et al. (2015), in which participants rate seven short descriptions of behaviors 
by people who care or do not care about their self-image, on a scale from 1 (not like me at 
all) to 4 (a lot like me). 
Procedural details. All sessions took place at the Decision Sciences Laboratory 
(DeSciL) at the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH) in February, April and 
May 2017. We recruited participants using hroot (Bock et al., 2014) from the joint subject 
pool of the University of Zurich and the ETH. Every session consisted of 24 participants, 
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who are only accepted at the session if they had completed the on-line survey.81 We 
conducted ten sessions, resulting in a total of 240 participants, allocated to 28 immoral 
markets and 12 neutral markets. The on-line questionnaire was implemented with the 
Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) and the laboratory experiment with zTree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
 All instructions were delivered both on paper and with pre-recorded audio files. 
Instructions and materials are available in the Online-Appendix.82 
5.4.3 Survey study 
We subsequently recruited a different sample of students on the campus of the 
University of Zurich and the ETH (N=177). We invited student passersby to participate in 
a brief choice experiment in which they could earn money and generate a donation for 
UNICEF aimed at providing treatments for children infected by malaria. They were told 
that they would earn CHF 2 plus possibly some additional money for a 5-minute study. 
These subjects performed two functions.  
First, they served the role of “clients” for the recommendations from the laboratory 
labor market. Each participant made up to six decisions by choosing one of the ten letters 
between A and J. They knew that these decisions influenced their own earnings and also 
possibly the amount of donations to UNICEF. Each decision had the payoff structure in 
Table 17, but we varied which letter corresponded to the bad option. Clients received a 
mixture of recommendations with good advice, bad advice or no advice (corresponding to 
the case in which a firm was not able to hire a worker). Clients were only informed of the 
                                       
81 We made an exception if less than 24 subjects who completed the survey showed up to the experiment. In 
total, three subjects were allowed to participate despite not completing the online-survey. 
82 We follow the use of voice recordings to deliver instructions, as in Bartling, Engl and Weber (2015). This, 
combined with standardized instructions and computerized interfaces, ensures highly replicable environments 
across sessions.  
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total payoffs at the end of their decisions and never knew the precise payoffs for their 
choices. 
Second, while their payment was determined and prepared, participants completed a 
survey in which they rated various firms and industries on a scale from 1 (very immoral) to 
5 (very moral). For firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this 
organization.” The set of firms and industries were the same as the ones for which we 
elicited laboratory participants’ willingness to work. The complete list of firms and 
industries is available in Appendix Tables D12 and D13. 
5.5 Results 
In presenting our results, we focus our attention on our first two hypotheses. We first 
study outcomes in the laboratory experiment, particularly outcomes in the labor market 
and their connection to the behavioral measure of concern for morality (ߠா௫௣). We then 
extend our measures to the survey data, to study the relationship between both of our 
measures of theta (ߠா௫௣ and ߠௌ௨௥) and subjects’ stated job market preferences. While 
choices in our experiment were conducted with respect to points, we present the results in 
terms of Swiss francs (CHF) to provide a clearer indication of the economic relevance. 
5.5.1 Behavior in the laboratory 
We first construct ߠா௫௣ based on behavior in the behavioral task that subjects 
completed at the beginning of the laboratory session (Appendix Table D1 shows the 
distribution of choices in the behavioral task). Let ݉௜௥ be the number that individual ݅ 
reports if the actual die roll is ݎ. We classify an individual as low-theta if ݉௜௥ ≥ ݎ for all 
ݎ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,6} and ݉௜௥ > ݎ for at least one ݎ; that is, participant ݅ is classified as having a 
low concern for morality if he or she lies at least once for personal gain and never in self-
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harmful manner. We classify the remaining participants as high-theta.83 Based on this 
classification, we have 66 (27.5 percent) low-theta types and 174 (72.5 percent) high-theta 
types.84  Given our interpretation of ߠ, we will often refer to low-theta types as immoral 
and high-theta types as moral types. We next explore the differential behavior of these types 
in the labor markets and the consequences of this behavior. 
Differential market behavior of moral and immoral types 
Assuming that ߠா௫௣ measures a stable concern for morality that translates into labor-
market choices, then we should observe differential behavior in the laboratory labor markets 
between high-theta and low-theta types, but only when employment requires immoral work. 
This is confirmed in the data. In the immoral treatment, low-theta workers opted to submit 
wage requests more frequently than high-theta workers (90.6 percent vs. 61.6 percent). 
Moreover, 21.5 percent of the high-theta workers never participated in the market (i.e., 
refused to submit a wage request in any of the 15 periods), but this is true of only 4.3 
percent of low-theta workers. By declining to submit a wage request, a subject indicates an 
unwillingness to do the work even at a wage of up to 50 CHF (1000 points), the highest 
possible wage request in our experiment. Conditional on submitting a wage request, low-
theta types requested lower compensations (on average, CHF 3.56 vs. CHF 4.14).85 In 
                                       
83 A total of 13 subjects (5.4 percent) harmed themselves with a lie (݉௜௥ < ݎ, e.g., reporting ݉௜௥ = 1 when 
ݎ = 2). Since these subjects do not appear to be motivated by egoism, we classify them as high-theta. The 
remaining 161 subjects classified as high-theta always report the true number. Classifying subjects that lied 
in a self-harmful manner as high-theta types is conservative in that they act less morally than the honest 
subjects (see Table D3 in the Appendix). Results do not change if we drop these subjects or if we classify 
them instead as low-theta types.  
84 In principle, we could classify subjects into more than two categories, e.g. conditional on the number of lies. 
Due to the low number of subjects with different lying-patterns (see Appendix Table D1), we opt for a binary 
classification. Moreover, as Appendix Table D3 indicates, employment in the immoral treatment is generally 
higher for subjects who tell more lies.  
85 If we first calculate the average wage request by each individual (excluding observations in which the subject 
did not participate in the market), and then take the average of these averages, we obtain a mean wage 
request of CHF 4.36 for high-theta types and CHF 3.81 for low-theta types (t=-1.68, p-value = 0.104). 
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Appendix Table D2, we report the results of a two-stage hurdle regression of the decision 
of whether to submit a wage request and, conditionally, the actual wage request. The key 
independent variable is a subject’s type from the behavioral task at the beginning of the 
experiment. In the immoral treatment, the model reveals a strong effect of a participant’s 
type on the decision to participate (p-value<0.001). Furthermore, according to the model, 
low-theta types submit conditional reservation wage requests that are approximately 0.50 
CHF lower (p<0.1). Moreover, these effects do not become weaker over time—if anything 
the coefficients indicate that the greater willingness of low-theta types to participate in the 
immoral labor market becomes stronger over time, though the magnitudes are small and 
statistically insignificant.86 Hence, a subject’s moral type seems to predict their willingness 
to seek employment in an immoral job. 
However, in the neutral treatment, non-participation is virtually non-existent—there 
were only 3 cases in total in which participants chose not to participate, representing 0.28 
percent of all observations. That is, there is nearly universal participation when the job 
does not involve immoral behavior. Moreover, the wage requests of high-theta (CHF 2.91) 
and low-theta (CHF 2.89) types do not differ in magnitude or in statistical significance (p-
value from hurdle model = 0.827).  
Thus, there seems to be differential participation in the market between moral and 
immoral types when working involves immoral acts. In particular, high-theta types 
withdraw their participation and make higher wage requests when the market is immoral. 
However, when the work activity is neutral both types participate highly frequently. As a 
direct consequence of these observations, labor supply differs substantially between the two 
                                       
86 Specifically, if we add a linear time trend to the hurdle model and its interaction with theta (see Appendix 
Table D2), we find that low-theta types become slightly more likely to participate over time and provide 
lower reservation wages, relative to high-theta types. However, both coefficients are small and statistically 
insignificant.  
IMMORAL LABOR MARKETS 
130 
 
kinds of markets, as shown in Figure 16.87 In the neutral treatment, labor supply is fairly 
close to the theoretical prediction. However, for any given wage, there is a substantially 
lower supply of labor in the immoral treatment.  
Figure 16: Labor supply for neutral and immoral work in 
the laboratory 
 
Outcomes in immoral labor markets 
In this section, we explore the implications of the above heterogeneous behavior for 
labor market outcomes. As predicted by Proposition 1, we find a substantial immorality 
premium. This follows from the differential labor supply in Figure 16 and is shown in Figure 
17a. While market wages in the neutral treatment converge toward the equilibrium 
prediction of CHF 2.90, the average market wage is persistently higher in the immoral 
treatment (t-test from a regression with standard errors clustered at the market-level, p-
value<0.001). Hence, our laboratory labor market yields a substantial and persistent wage 
premium for immoral work in a setting in which only the morality of work varies. This 
                                       
87 Wage requests are censored at the maximal wage request that subjects could make (50 CHF). For this 
figure, we set the wage requests of subjects who are not willing to participate to CHF 50. Therefore, the 
supply curve for the immoral treatment should be interpreted as a lower bound. Figure D2 in the Appendix 
shows the labor supply if we only consider the last 5 periods. 
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laboratory evidence corroborates the field evidence in support of Proposition 1 shown in 
Figure 13 and Table 15.  
 
Figure 17: Immorality premium in laboratory labor markets 
(a) Market wage (b) Market quantities 
 
 
Figure 18: Employment rate by the two types in the 
immoral treatment 
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Of course, one concern might be that the immorality premium is the result of the 
specific labor demand structure that we employ in our design. However, as evident from the 
differences in labor supply that we identify in Figure 16, we would very likely obtain wage 
premiums under a wide variety of demand specifications. 
We also find persistent differences in the employment levels in the two markets (Figure 
17b). While the neutral market converges to the equilibrium prediction of 6, the average 
market quantity remains below 4 in the immoral markets. This difference is highly 
significant (t-test, p-value<0.001). Figure 17 provides further evidence that the 
manifestation of participants’ morality does not erode over the course of the experiment. 
We next turn to Proposition 2, which predicts that low-theta types will be hired in 
the immoral markets. Figure 18 shows that, indeed, high-theta types are consistently 
employed less frequently in the immoral treatment. Table 18 shows that, on average, low-
theta types are 26.8 - 0.2 = 26.6 percentage points more likely to be employed than high-
theta types (column 1). This difference is highly significant (p < 0.001) and robust to adding 
market fixed effects (column 2). Moreover, this observation is robust to other ways of 
constructing Өா௫௣ from behavior in the behavioral task (see Table D3 in the Appendix). 
The results are similar if we use, as a dependent variable, the number of work units provided 
(0, 1 or 2) rather than a binary measure of employment (column 3 and 4).  In the neutral 
treatment, we do not find a significant difference in employment rates between the two 
types (columns 1 to 4; see also Appendix Figure D3). This again suggests that the difference 
in hiring rates in the immoral treatment is driven by differences in concerns for morality 
and not some other difference between high- and low-theta types. 
Propositions 3 and 4 predict heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of market 
income. To measure income, we use the sum of all earnings accumulated by a worker over 
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the 15 market periods. The propositions predict that these differences can be explained by 
the subjects’ types and by the types of the other workers in their markets.  
Table 18: Relationship between ӨExp and outcomes in the experimental labor 
markets 
Dependent 
variable: Employment rate Number of jobs Market income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low-theta (ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖) -0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.034 
(-0.90) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.034 
(-0.90) 
-1.33** 
(-2.40) 
-0.56 
(-1.39) 
Immoral market  
-0.331***  -0.272***  12.15*** 
(9.96) 
 
(-7.70)  (-7.11)  
ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ * Immoral 
market 
0.268*** 0.249*** 0.256*** 0.264*** 8.42*** 
(2.71) 
11.37*** 
(3.64) (4.54) (3.58) (4.10) (3.57) 
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R2 0.179 0.319 0.103 0.174 0.138 0.243 
p-value: ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ + 
ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖*Im = 0 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0009 0.026 0.001 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Immoral 
market in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 
0.05; *** - p < 0.01.  
 
Specifically, Proposition 3 predicts that the immoral types benefit from an increase in 
the job’s immorality. Figure 19 and results from linear regressions (see Table 18, Columns 
5 and 6) show that the low-theta types earn more market income than the high-theta types 
in the immoral treatment, but not in the neutral treatment. The difference of CHF 7.09 
(column 5) is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.026). Note that the 
potential market income is constrained by the market wage. If we control for the market 
wage by adding market fixed effects (column 6), the immoral types are estimated to earn 
CHF 10.81 more than the moral types (p-value = 0.001). However, we find a different 
pattern in the neutral market: low-theta types earn slightly less (CHF 1.33) than the high-
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theta types (p-value = 0.021) and this difference is not significant if we control for the 
market wage. 
Figure 19: Market income by moral type 
 
According to our theoretical analysis, doing an immoral job comes with a psychological 
cost—for example, from guilt or shame. Proposition 3 predicts that the market wage exceeds 
these psychological costs for the immoral types, resulting in a net benefit from an increase 
in immorality. Our design allows us to look at this type of welfare: in the experimental 
market, subjects submit their reservation wages.88 The difference between the induced cost 
and the reservation wage is therefore an individual measure of the psychological cost for 
doing the immoral job in a specific period. For every job for which a subject is hired, we 
subtract her psychological cost for doing this job from her earnings. This provides a measure 
of the aggregated welfare, or utility, from market participation. We find a similar pattern 
as for income: In the immoral treatment, the low-theta types have a CHF 7.05 higher 
                                       
88 Note that this is an advantage of the uniform-price sealed-offer auction over the double auction. We also 
have a second welfare measure: subjects reported their happiness after the final market period. We do not 
find a statistically significant difference in happiness between types in both treatments (see Appendix Table 
D4). 
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corrected market income than the high-theta types (p-value = 0.007). In the neutral 
treatment, the difference between types is very small, and in the opposite direction (see 
Appendix Table D4). 
Figure 20: Externalities of moral behavior for immoral 
types 
 
Finally, Proposition 4 predicts that, in the immoral treatment, immoral types have 
higher utility in the presence of more moral types. To test this prediction, for each subject 
we count the number of other workers of low-theta type in her market. We then split the 
sample based on the median of this measure: we classify a subject as being in a few low-
theta types market if the number of (other) low-theta type workers is lower than 2, and as 
being in a many low-theta types market if the number of (other) low-theta type workers is 
2 or more. This results in 70 subjects in the first category, and 98 subjects in the second 
category. The mean earnings of subjects in the immoral treatment, based on their own type 
and the median type of others in their market is shown in Figure 20. The income of high-
theta types is CHF 4.33 higher in a market with few low-theta types than in a many low-
theta types market (p-value = 0.051). However, for low-theta types, being in a few low-
theta types market increases the income by an additional CHF 16.35 (p-value = 0.002), 
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resulting in a total difference of CHF 20.68 (p-value<0.001).89 In Appendix Table D5 we 
confirm these observations in regression analysis or using our measure of welfare. 
Figure 21: Income inequalities across treatments 
 
Our findings confirm all four predictions from our simple model of heterogeneity in 
the morality of work and concerns for morality. We find evidence that people with high 
concern for morality consistently refuse to do immoral jobs (or require a high wage), thereby 
decreasing labor supply and increasing the equilibrium wage to produce an immorality 
premium. As a consequence, subjects with a low concern for morality are better off in 
immoral markets, in particular if they are in a market with many moral subjects.  
One additional consequence of heterogeneous concerns for morality is that the income 
distribution differs substantially between the two treatments. While in the neutral 
treatment, income is almost equally distributed (Gini coefficient=0.15), we find substantial 
                                       
89 If we use the number of (other) low-theta types in the market instead of doing a median split, we find 
similar results. For high-theta types, the income is estimated to increase by CHF 2.45 per additional high-
theta type in the market (p-value = 0.045). For low-theta types, the income increases by CHF 8.21 for every 
additional high-theta type (p-value = 0.014). 
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income inequality in the immoral treatment (Gini coefficient=0.38). Figure 21 shows the 
Lorenz curves for both treatments.  
5.5.2 Survey evidence on moral concerns and labor market preferences 
Our laboratory experiment provides support for all four of our predictions. This 
evidence indicates that heterogeneity in moral concerns, in combination with varying 
degrees of immorality in the nature of work, can produce stable wage premiums. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which heterogeneous concerns for morality affect labor-market 
outcomes outside the laboratory requires further evidence. Some of this evidence is evident 
in our analysis in section 5.5.2—and in related prior work by others—that provides support 
for Proposition 1. However, to our knowledge there remains a gap in showing the kind of 
sorting process underlying Proposition 2, that less moral people are more likely to go into 
work in immoral jobs. In this section, we attempt to reduce this gap using survey evidence. 
First, we use the responses provided by our laboratory participants to the on-line 
survey that they completed roughly one week before the laboratory sessions. 90 This allows 
us to construct a second individual measure of concern for morality, Өௌ௨௥. Unlike the 
measure that is based on laboratory behavior (Өா௫௣), Өௌ௨௥ is not tailored to measure ߠ in 
the specific context of our experiment. Moreover, as it is based solely on survey questions, 
it is easier to collect for future research and perhaps also represents a more general notion 
of morality than the behavioral task in our laboratory experiment. Moreover, a comparison 
of Өா௫௣ and Өௌ௨௥ provides some evidence on the stability of moral concerns across time and 
contexts, which is necessary for heterogeneous moral concerns to persistently influence labor 
market outcomes.  
                                       
90 Three subjects did not complete the online-survey. We exclude these subjects from the analysis. 
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Constructing Өࡿ࢛࢘ 
Table 19 lists 9 subscales from the morality measures we collected as part of our 
survey. The definition and summary statistics for each of these is provided in the Appendix 
Table D6. Column 1 in Table 19 shows the coefficients from independent simple regressions 
of a subject’s type measured by Өா௫௣ on that particular subscale. The dependent variable 
is binary, indicating that a subject is a high-theta type. The results reported show a 
significant positive correlation between Өா௫௣ and all personality measures, except for Work 
ethics 1 and Work ethics 2. These positive relationships suggest that Өா௫௣ and our measures 
of psychological traits capture similar individual characteristics. 
Table 19: Items comprising ӨSur their relationship to ӨExp 
 
Regression coefficient 
of Өࡱ࢞࢖  
(1) 
Factor loadings 
 (weights for Өࡿ࢛࢘)  
(2) 
Protected value 1 
0.540*** 
(3.66) 
0.664 
Protected value 2 
0.352** 
(2.22) 
0.708 
Work ethics 1 
-0.039 
(-0.39) 
0.213 
Work ethics 2 
0.042 
(0.52) 
0.252 
HEXACO sincerity 
0.362** 
(2.53) 
0.482 
HEXACO fairness 
0.353*** 
(2.61) 
0.611 
HEXACO greed 
avoidance 
0.225* 
(1.73) 
0.477 
HEXACO modesty 
0.236* 
(1.79) 
0.508 
Charity attitude 
index 
0.711*** 
(3.11) 
0.545 
Notes: (1): Coefficient estimates of linear probability models. N = 237 for each regression (3 subjects did 
not complete the online-survey and are excluded). Dependent variable: being a high-theta type according to 
Өா௫௣. Independent variables: survey measures in [0,1], higher numbers indicate more morality. Robust 
standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. (2): Factor loadings 
of survey measures on Өௌ௨௥. 
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Next, we aggregate these nine psychological measures by performing a principal-
component factor analysis. We selected the factor with the highest eigenvalue (eigenvalue 
= 2.44) to represent our psychological measure of concern for morality, i.e., Өௌ௨௥. Column 
2 in Table 19 presents the corresponding factor loadings. We normalized Өௌ௨௥ such that it 
lies between 0 and 1; the resulting variable has a mean of 0.5 and a median of 0.50. Low 
values represent a low concern for morality.91 The distribution of Өௌ௨௥ is presented in 
Appendix Figure D4.  
Does Өࡿ࢛࢘predict behavior in the laboratory? 
We first consider whether the survey-based measure of concern for morality (Өௌ௨௥) has 
any relationship to the one constructed from the behavioral task in the laboratory 
experiment (Өா௫௣). Consistent with the positive relationship of the individual items shown 
in Table 19, a regression of Өா௫௣ on Өௌ௨௥ shows positive and significant relationships 
(coefficient = 0.723, p < 0.001), i.e., a person who is characterized by a low concern for 
morality according to our psychological measures is more likely to lie self-servingly in the 
behavioral measure in the experiment. With a series of simple psychological questions, we 
are therefore able to partially predict people’s tendency to act immorally in an incentivized 
context.  
We next consider the extent to which Өௌ௨௥  also predicts participants’ behavior in 
immoral labor markets. Results from a linear regression of the employment rate on Өୗ୳୰ 
indicate that participants with very low concern for morality (Өௌ௨௥ = 0) are 43.9 percentage 
points more likely to be hired in immoral labor markets than participants with a very high 
concern for morality (Өௌ௨௥ = 1). However, this difference is only marginally significant (p-
value = 0.057, see Appendix Table D7, column 1). A less noisy measure of subjects’ 
                                       
91 In the appendix, we demonstrate that our results robust to different aggregation mechanisms. Specifically, 
we look at two alternative aggregation mechanisms: i) each of the nine survey measures is given equal weight 
and ii) weight of the measures is determined by a regression of Өா௫௣ on the survey measures.  
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behaviors in the market are their actual choices. Results from a hurdle model indicate that 
low-theta survey types (Өௌ௨௥ = 0) are 52.1 percentage points more likely to participate in 
immoral labor markets than individuals classified as very moral (p-value = 0.015, see 
Appendix Table D8). However, they do not have significantly lower reservation wages than 
the moral types in those markets (p-value = 0.548). In the neutral treatment, we do not 
find a significant difference in employment rates between the two types (see Appendix Table 
D7, columns 1 and 2). 
Do Өࡿ࢛࢘ and Өࡱ࢞࢖predict real-world labor market preferences? 
Our study collects two measures of participants’ concern for morality (Өௌ௨௥ and Өா௫௣). 
Furthermore, the initial on-line survey elicits participants’ willingness to work for several 
firms and industries. In addition, we obtained independent ratings of the perceived 
immorality of these firms and industries. In this section, we use all of this information to 
analyze how our measures of concern for morality connect to expectations about real labor 
market outcomes. 
We create a measure of perceived industry immorality and of perceived firm immorality 
by averaging the ratings from subjects who also served in the role of clients and scaling 
them such that they lie between -1 (very moral) and +1 (very immoral), where 0 means 
neutral.92 These variables are used as noisy measures of the immorality of work, ܫ(݆), a key 
component of our theoretical model, where ݆  represents an industry or a firm. The horizontal 
axis of Figures 22a and 22b plot the resulting normalized ratings for industries in our sample, 
the horizontal axis of Figures 22c and 22d plot the normalized ratings for firms. In Appendix 
                                       
92 Regarding firms, clients also had the option to choose “I don’t know this organization” instead of rating the 
firm. To calculate the perceived firm immorality, we exclude these observations. Alternatively, we could code 
these as neutral ratings. These two measures are highly correlated (corr=0.9854). Our results do not change 
substantially if we use the alternative measure (see Table D10). 
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Tables D12 and D13, we provide a list of all the industries and firms listed in the survey, 
and the average perceived immorality. 
These ratings on the perceived immorality of industries and firms allow us to study 
how our measures of concerns for morality (Өௌ௨௥ and Өா௫௣) correlate with the expected 
future labor market outcomes of subjects with varying degrees of concern for morality, 
measured by Өୗ୳୰ and Ө୉୶୮. We normalized participants’ stated willingness to work for 
firms and industries, such that they take values between 0 (not at all willing) and 1 (very 
much willing).93  
The vertical axes of Figures 22a and 22b plot the difference in willingness to work for 
the industries between participants who were classified as moral or immoral, according to 
Өா௫௣ (Figure 22a) or Өௌ௨௥ (Figure 22b). The strong negative relationship indicates that 
participants classified as immoral are, on average, more willing to work for industries 
perceived as immoral. This tendency is robust to controlling for participants’ gender, age, 
Swiss nationality and subject of study (see Appendix Figure D5). 
More generally, Table 20, columns (1) to (4), shows that while there is little evidence 
for a systematic difference in willingness to work for neutral industries between moral and 
immoral types, participants classified as immoral are significantly more willing to work in 
industries that are classified as immoral. This pattern is significant at least at the 5%-level 
and holds for both of our measures of individual moral concerns, Өௌ௨௥ and Өா௫௣.  
                                       
93 We miss information on willingness to work for the three participants who did not fill out the online survey. 
For the first session, we also miss willingness to work in five industries for five subjects that filled out the 
survey. We exclude all these missing observations from the analysis. Regarding willingness to work for firms, 
participants also had the option to choose “I don’t know this organization.” This option was chosen in 17.8 
percent of all answers. We also exclude these observations. We obtain similar results if we classify such 
observations as “indifferent” or if we restrict our analysis to subjects that know all firms (N=52), see Table 
D11.  
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Figure 22: Correlation between the difference in willingness to work between 
moral and immoral types and perceived immorality of industries/firms  
(a) Firms, Өா௫௣ (b) Firms, Өௌ௨௥ 
(c) Industries, Өா௫௣ (d) Industries, Өௌ௨௥ 
 
Source: Survey study (Perceived immorality), on-line survey (Willingness to work, Өௌ௨௥), Laboratory 
experiment (Өா௫௣). Notes: Differences in willingness to work: Coefficient estimates of linear regression 
models of the participants’ willingness to work for different industries (a and b) or firms (b and c) on Өு
ா௫௣ 
(a and c) or Өுௌ௨௥ (b and d). Dependent variable: Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 
means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations 
where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire 
are excluded. Independent variables: a and c use Өா௫௣ to classify participants, where Өா௫௣=0 for low- theta 
types and Өா௫௣=1 for high-theta types, while b and d use Өௌ௨௥ in [0,1] instead. Perceived immorality is in 
[-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Standard errors clustered 
at individual level.   
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Table 20: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types 
Dependent 
variable: 
Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived 
immorality (I(j)) 
-0.232*** 
(-7.05) 
-0.232*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.050 
(-1.01) 
-0.050 
(-1.00) 
-0.140*** 
(-4.30) 
-0.139*** 
(-4.32) 
0.114** 
(2.51) 
0.110** 
(2.43) 
Type experiment 
(Өࡱ࢞࢖) 
-0.027 
(-1.28) 
-0.028 
(-1.40)   
-0.043 
(-1.54) 
-0.0508* 
(-1.91)   
Ө۳ܠܘ  ∗  ۷(ܒ) -0.078** 
(-2.11) 
-0.078** 
(-2.10)   
-0.154*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.154*** 
(-4.11)   
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
  -0.101* 
(-1.74) 
-0.107* 
(-1.72) 
  -0.173** 
(-2.23) 
-0.211*** 
(-2.78) 
Ө܁ܝܚ  ∗  ۷(ܒ)   -0.479*** 
 (-5.12) 
-0.479*** 
(-5.11) 
  -0.731*** 
(-8.37) 
-0.722*** 
(-8.27) 
N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
R2 0.098 0.119 0.105 0.127 0.110 0.141 0.128 0.160 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations 
where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. 
Independent variables: (1), (2), (5) and (6) use Өா௫௣ to classify participants, where Өா௫௣=0 for low- theta types and Өா௫௣=1 
for high-theta types, while (3), (4), (7) and (8) use  Өௌ௨௥ (in [0,1]) instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 
means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of 
study. Standard errors clustered at individual level; t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
We repeat the same analysis using data on individuals’ willingness to work for our 
selection of well-known firms in Switzerland. The vertical axis of Figures 22c and 22d plot 
the difference in willingness to work for the firms between participants who were classified 
as moral and immoral according to Өா௫௣ (Figure 22c) or Өௌ௨௥ (Figure 22d). Again, 
participants that are classified as immoral types are on average more willing to work for 
firms perceived as immoral. This relationship is confirmed by Table 20, columns (5) to (8): 
immoral participants are more willing to work for firms that other people rate as more 
immoral (p < 0.01), which is again true for both measures of concern for morality (Өௌ௨௥ 
and Өா௫௣). This finding indicates that firms that are perceived as immoral differentially 
attract applicants with a lower concern for morality. As we show in Appendix, the 
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differential willingness to work for immoral firms and industries of moral and immoral types 
does not depend on how we construct Өௌ௨௥ (Table D9), and are also consistent to using an 
ordered logit specification that better accounts for the nature of our dependent variable 
(Table D14). 
The above analysis provides evidence consistent with Proposition 2 in real labor 
markets. Those who are least concerned with morality—low-theta types—are significantly 
more willing to work in firms that are perceived as less moral. Moreover, this provides us 
with a revealed (or stated) preference method for classifying the immorality of firms or 
industires: by immoral individuals’ willingness to be employed there. 
Finally, in the on-line survey, we also asked participants to rate how much they expect 
to earn when they reach the age of 40. We do not find any statistically significant correlation 
between participants’ type and their earnings’ expectations, although a regression of 
expected future wages on Өௌ௨௥ reveals a positive relationship such that the lowest types 
(Өௌ௨௥ = 0) report expected income that is 30,272 CHF higher on average than the expected 
income of the most moral type (Өௌ௨௥ = 1, p = 0.125). This relationship is consistent with 
Proposition 1. However, the earnings expectations measures for such a long time horizon—
on average 18 years—are perhaps less reliable than the more contemporaneous statements 
of willingness to work for different firms. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We investigate how individual heterogeneity in concerns for morality affects outcomes 
in “immoral” labor markets. Our study employs a combination of laboratory and survey 
measures to identify heterogeneity in concerns for morality and to measure or create 
variation in the immorality of jobs. We use these different kinds of data to test two main 
hypotheses—first, that an immoral labor market will yield immorality wage premiums (and 
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reduced quantities) and, second, that immoral types will be more likely to be hired in 
immoral labor markets. 
In a laboratory setting, we use a simple behavioral task to classify individuals into 
“moral” and “immoral” types (Өா௫௣). We then show that this characteristic predicts the 
outcomes that individuals obtain as we experimentally vary only the immorality (ܫ(݆)) of a 
labor market. We find confirmation of both our hypotheses. Immoral labor markets yield 
significantly higher wages and reduced quantities. Moreover, immoral workers are 
significantly more likely to be hired in an immoral labor market than moral workers, but 
this difference disappears in a neutral labor market. We also find that a market for immoral 
work overcompensates the immoral types who are hired, particularly when there are many 
moral types in their market. 
We separately use survey responses to classify the immorality of real-world firms and 
industries (ܫ(݆)) and demonstrate that industries classified as immoral produce higher 
wages. We also use surveys to obtain a separate measure of workers’ moral types (Өௌ௨௥). 
This individual characteristic is correlated with Өா௫௣ and predicts subjects’ behaviors in the 
laboratory labor market. Moreover, the survey-based measure also predicts labor-market 
preferences regarding working in jobs and industries that vary in their morality (ܫ(݆)). 
Workers who are less concerned with morality—in either the behavioral or survey-based 
measures—are more willing to work for firms that others regard as less moral. 
Despite widespread intuition, we know of no other evidence that makes the above 
connections. Given the significance of many social ills produced by immoral work practices, 
our study sheds important new light on the interaction between individual’s types, their 
willingness to do immoral work and the resulting labor-market outcomes. Our work has 
potentially important policy implications. For instance, in those jobs and industries with 
the greatest potential to do societal harm, we should want to see those people inclined to 
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act most socially responsibly. However, our evidence suggests that it is the least moral types 
who will sort into these industries. 
Our findings also contribute to recent studies on how income relates to moral behavior. 
There is evidence that rich people behave less morally than others (Auten et al., 2002; Piff 
et al., 2010; Piff et al., 2012; Wang and Murnighan, 2014).94 It remains unclear whether a 
rise in income makes people less moral, or if less moral people obtain higher incomes (see 
also Bartling et al., 2018). Our evidence is in line with the latter interpretation.  
Our results also add to the literature on the erosion of morality in markets. On the 
aggregate level, erosion of morality in the context of experimental consumption markets 
with externalities has been investigated before (e.g. Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling, Weber 
and Yao, 2015; Kirchler, Huber, Stefan and Sutter, 2016) with mixed findings. In our 
experiment, we find little evidence of erosion of morality over periods both on aggregate 
and at the individual level. Instead we observe that subjects persistently behave consistently 
with their moral type. This is particularly surprising, given that moral workers forgo very 
large sums of money, relative to the typical earnings in a laboratory experiment and directly 
observe others making relatively large amounts of money. This suggests that our measure 
of concern for morality captures a stable personality trait and the results indicate a stable 
concern of some individuals for moral behavior. 
                                       
94 However, there are some limitations in the existing evidence, see Andreoni, Nikiforakis and Stoop (2017). 
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 Appendix A ─ Psychological Depreciation and Food Waste 
Tables 
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Description 
Taste 259 5.35 1.52 2 9 
Is 1 if evaluates the taste of the 
sandwich as extremely bad, and 9 if 
evaluates it as extremely good, in {1, 
2, 3, … 9} 
WTP 222 0.77 0.5 0 2 
Willingness-to-pay for the second 
half of the sandwich, in [0; 2.2] CHF 
Weight 259 12.68 24.47 0 78 
Weight (in grams) of the unfinished 
first sandwich half, in [0; 82] 
First half 
is  entirely 
eaten 
259 0.77 0.42 0 1 Is 1 if has entirely eaten the first half of the sandwich, and 0 otherwise 
Eager 258 5.31 1.91 1 9 
Is 1 if is not at all eager to eat the 
sandwich, and 9 if is extremely eager 
to eat it, in {1, 2, 3, … 9} 
Appear 259 4.67 1.49 1 9 
Is 1 if finds that the sandwich looks 
not at all appetizing, and 9 if finds it 
extremely appetizing, in {1, 2, 3, … 
9} 
Smell 259 5.93 1.33 2 9 
Is 1 if finds that the sandwich smells 
really bad, and 9 if finds that it 
smells really good, , in {1, 2, 3, … 9} 
Guess 128 4.12 2.05 1 9 
Is 1 if thinks that the sandwich was 
definitely made 1 day ago, is 5 if 
can’t really tell,  and is 9 if thinks 
that it was definitely made 7 days 
ago, in {1, 2, 3, … 9} 
Hungry 259 5.39 1.93 1 9 Is 1 if is not at all hungry, is 9 if extremely hungry, in {1, 2, 3, … 9} 
See next page for the rest of the table. 
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Already 
eat. 
259 0.63 0.48 0 1 Is 1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise 
Female 259 0.52 0.5 0 1 Is 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise 
Age 259 22.49 3.09 18 35 Age 
Food pois. 259 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Is 1 if has already experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning in the 
past, 0 otherwise 
Swiss 259 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Is 1 if the person has the Swiss 
nationality, 0 if the person is a 
foreigner 
Educ 259 1.44 0.7 1 4 
Highest level of education achieved 
(1: Matura/Secondary, 2: Bachelor, 
3: Master, 4: PhD) 
Heard 259 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Is 1 if had heard of the study before 
participating, 0 otherwise 
 
 
Table A-2: Tests of the difference in means and 
distributions of appearance and smell ratings between old 
and fresh sandwiches in the Blind conditions 
 Appearance Smell 
Old Fresh Old Fresh 
N 63 65 63 65 
Mean 4.714 4.877 5.857 5.831 
Difference: Fresh - 
Old 
0.163 -0.026 
p-values:  
Two-sided t-test 0.518 0.911 
Two-sided rank-sum test 0.448 0.988 
Notes: Only observations from the Blind conditions.  
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Table A-3: Relationship between the categorized taste ratings and the 
treatments 
Dependent 
variable: 
Taste cat. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Old 0.0237 0.0570 0.0628 0.0425 0.0856 0.102 
 (0.15) (0.37) (0.41) (0.20) (0.40) (0.48) 
Salient -0.0923 -0.0880 -0.0950 -0.121 -0.122 -0.140 
 (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.68) 
Salient*Old -0.0412 -0.0959 -0.0855 -0.0627 -0.136 -0.137 
 (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.38) (-0.21) (-0.46) (-0.45) 
Already eat.  0.203* 0.189  0.276* 0.257* 
  (1.77) (1.62)  (1.81) (1.66) 
Hungry  0.0468 0.0570*  0.0634 0.0785* 
  (1.51) (1.81)  (1.51) (1.83) 
Food pois.  -0.0318 -0.00476  -0.0404 -0.00487 
  (-0.27) (-0.04)  (-0.26) (-0.03) 
Female  -0.0617 -0.0643  -0.0764 -0.0768 
  (-0.56) (-0.58)  (-0.52) (-0.51) 
Age  -0.0320* -0.0270  -0.0417* -0.0341 
  (-1.79) (-1.44)  (-1.80) (-1.39) 
Constant 2.246*** 2.622*** 2.574***    
 (20.90) (5.76) (5.21)    
N 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R2 0.00418 0.0394 0.0664 0.00214 0.0196 0.0336 
Session FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Columns 4 to 6: Estimated marginal 
effects of ordered Probit models. Dependent variable: Taste cat.=1 if taste ratings<5, =2 if taste ratings=5, =3 
if taste ratings>5. Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already 
eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food 
poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. Estimated cuts for ordered Probit 
models are omitted from the table, McFadden pseudo R2 are provided in columns 4 to 6, robust standard errors, 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A-4: Relationship between the willingness-to-pay for the second 
sandwich half and the treatments 
  
Dependent 
variable: 
Willingness-to-pay for the second half 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Old -0.128 -0.114 -0.105 -0.159 -0.141 -0.132 
 (-1.41) (-1.26) (-1.16) (-1.52) (-1.37) (-1.31) 
Salient -0.130 -0.143 -0.135 -0.182* -0.198* -0.189* 
 (-1.44) (-1.57) (-1.53) (-1.68) (-1.83) (-1.84) 
Salient*Old 0.143 0.119 0.124 0.187 0.160 0.165 
 (1.07) (0.90) (0.95) (1.17) (1.02) (1.08) 
Already eat.  0.0793 0.0852  0.0771 0.0854 
  (1.17) (1.30)  (0.96) (1.12) 
Hungry  0.0419** 0.0437**  0.0517** 0.0528** 
  (2.36) (2.41)  (2.33) (2.38) 
Food pois.  0.0161 0.0444  0.00571 0.0407 
  (0.22) (0.61)  (0.06) (0.47) 
Female  -0.0637 -0.0646  -0.0710 -0.0761 
  (-0.96) (-0.94)  (-0.89) (-0.95) 
Age  -0.00299 -0.00936  -0.00298 -0.0103 
  (-0.26) (-0.81)  (-0.22) (-0.77) 
Constant 0.863*** 0.679** 0.622** 0.844*** 0.614* 0.515 
 (14.02) (2.42) (2.01) (12.48) (1.78) (1.34) 
Sigma    0.583*** 0.572*** 0.553*** 
    (17.13) (16.95) (16.62) 
N 222 222 222 222 222 222 
R2 0.0118 0.0451 0.108 0.00792 0.0257 0.0621 
Session FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Columns 4 to 6: Estimated marginal 
effects of Tobit models. Dependent variable: WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF (the 37 observations with a negative WTP 
are excluded from the analysis).  Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already 
eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever 
experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely 
hungry. McFadden pseudo R2 are provided in columns 4 to 6, robust standard errors, t-statistics in 
parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A-5: Relationship between the categorized willingness-to-pay and the 
treatments  
Dependent 
variable: 
WTP cat. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Old 0.0508 0.106 0.0914 0.0460 0.165 0.136 
 (0.40) (0.88) (0.76) (0.19) (0.68) (0.55) 
Salient -0.0615 -0.0677 -0.0750 -0.167 -0.164 -0.185 
 (-0.48) (-0.54) (-0.61) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.77) 
Salient*Old -0.120 -0.191 -0.176 -0.137 -0.310 -0.294 
 (-0.66) (-1.10) (-1.01) (-0.43) (-0.97) (-0.89) 
Already eat.  0.145 0.174*  0.249 0.294* 
  (1.54) (1.88)  (1.47) (1.73) 
Hungry  0.0839*** 0.0772***  0.149*** 0.141*** 
  (3.46) (3.15)  (3.58) (3.34) 
Food pois.  -0.0306 0.0148  -0.0384 0.0499 
  (-0.33) (0.15)  (-0.23) (0.29) 
Female  -0.164* -0.200**  -0.296* -0.385** 
  (-1.91) (-2.27)  (-1.86) (-2.37) 
Age  -0.0151 -0.0151  -0.0261 -0.0319 
  (-1.03) (-1.00)  (-1.06) (-1.21) 
Constant 2.600*** 2.483*** 2.263***    
 (27.35) (6.76) (5.48)    
N 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R2 0.00863 0.0853 0.121 0.00580 0.0524 0.0777 
Session FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Columns 4 to 6: Estimated marginal 
effects of ordered Probit models. Dependent variable: WTP cat.=1 if WTP<0, =2 if WTP=0, =3 if WTP>0. 
Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of 
sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 
otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. Estimated cuts for ordered Probit models are 
omitted from the table, McFadden pseudo R2 are provided in columns 4 to 6, robust standard errors, t-statistics 
in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A-6: Relationship between the decision to 
finish the first half of the sandwich entirely and 
the treatments 
Dependent 
variable: First half entirely eaten 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Old 0.118 0.164** 0.163** 
 (1.58) (2.39) (2.37) 
Salient 0.0769 0.0733 0.0732 
 (1.00) (1.05) (1.05) 
Salient*Old -0.145 -0.200** -0.203** 
 (-1.38) (-2.09) (-2.11) 
Already eat.  0.149*** 0.158*** 
  (2.91) (3.10) 
Hungry  0.0632*** 0.0613*** 
  (4.52) (4.30) 
Food pois.  -0.0109 -0.00350 
  (-0.20) (-0.06) 
Female  -0.233*** -0.246*** 
  (-4.89) (-4.94) 
Age  -0.00714 -0.00754 
  (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Constant 0.708*** 0.551** 0.456* 
 (12.45) (2.50) (1.73) 
N 259 259 259 
R2 0.0102 0.205 0.221 
Session FE No No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear probability models. Dependent 
variable: First half is entirely eaten in {0;1}. Independent variables: 
Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already eat.=1 if has already 
eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if 
has ever experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; 
Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely hungry. Robust 
standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Table A-7: Relationship between individuals’ eagerness to eat the sandwich 
and the treatments 
Dependent 
variable: 
Eager  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Old -0.0397 0.000542 -0.0430 -0.0246 -0.00466 -0.0319 
 (-0.13) (0.00) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.18) 
Salient 0.303 0.341 0.351 0.210 0.235 0.250 
 (0.99) (1.11) (1.19) (1.14) (1.24) (1.35) 
Salient*Old -0.609 -0.694* -0.639 -0.405 -0.464* -0.447* 
 (-1.44) (-1.66) (-1.54) (-1.63) (-1.85) (-1.77) 
Hungry 0.438*** 0.431*** 0.413*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.258*** 
 (7.71) (7.73) (7.23) (6.87) (6.95) (6.64) 
Already eat. 
 
0.666*** 0.731***  0.406*** 0.459*** 
 
 
(2.98) (3.40)  (2.95) (3.34) 
Food pois. 
 
-0.381 -0.335  -0.219 -0.194 
 
 
(-1.64) (-1.38)  (-1.55) (-1.29) 
Female 
 
-0.314 -0.327  -0.175 -0.191 
 
 
(-1.47) (-1.51)  (-1.34) (-1.42) 
Age 
 
-0.00634 -0.0113  -0.00430 -0.00792 
 
 
(-0.18) (-0.32)  (-0.20) (-0.35) 
Constant 2.965*** 2.980*** 3.212***    
 (7.91) (3.25) (3.16)    
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R2 0.206 0.248 0.300 0.0571 0.0696 0.0859 
Session FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Columns 4 to 6: Estimated marginal 
effects of ordered Probit models. Dependent variable: Eager=1: Not at all eager to eat the sandwich, =9: 
Extremely eager to eat the sandwich. Independent variables: Old, Salient, and Female are in {0, 1}; Already 
eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Food pois.=1 if has ever 
experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Hungry=1: Not at all hungry, =9: Extremely 
hungry. Estimated cuts for ordered Probit models are omitted from the table, McFadden pseudo R2 are 
provided in columns 4 to 6, robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** 
p < 0.01. 
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Figures 
Figure A-1: Picture of the sandwich half distributed to 
participants 
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Figure A-2: Distribution of (a) taste ratings, of (b) willingness-to-pay for the 
second half and of (c) the weight of unfinished first halves 
(a) (b) 
  
(c) 
Notes: Taste=1: Extremely bad taste, =9: Extremely good taste; WTP in [-0.1; 2.2] CHF, where WTP=-
0.1 if a person does not even want the second half for free. N=259 with ஻ܰை=65, ஻ܰி=63, ௌܰை=65 and 
ௌܰி=66. 
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Figure A-3: Average willingness-to-pay in each of 
the four conditions 
 
Notes: WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF. N=222 (the 37 observations with a negative 
WTP have been excluded from the sample) with ஻ܰை=57, ஻ܰி=54, 
ௌܰை=54 and ௌܰி=57. 
 
Figure A-4 : Probability to finish the first sandwich 
half per condition 
 
Notes: N=259 with ஻ܰை=65, ܰ஻ி=63, ௌܰை=65 and ௌܰி=66. 
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Instructions 
Overview: 
Instructions for the Salient-Old treatment are presented below. The Part’s number (I, 
II or III) is indicated in the top-right corner of every page of instructions (e.g. Part I 
corresponds to “1/3”). Instructions for the Salient-Fresh condition differed only in the 
production date indicated in Part I. Instructions for the two Blind conditions did not display 
any information on the production date in Part I, and question 7 looked as follows:  
 
In this study, half of the participants receive a sandwich that was made 1 day ago, and 
the other half of the participants receive a sandwich that was made 7 days ago.  
 
7. How many days ago do you think that the sandwich that you received was made?  
Definitely 
1 day ago 
1 
2 3 4 
I really 
can’t 
tell  
5 
6 7 8 
Definitely 
7 days 
ago 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
 
Instructions for the Salient-Old condition: 
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 1/3 
Instructions      
You will receive one half of a pre-packaged sandwich purchased in a supermarket. We will open the package containing 
the sandwich right before giving it to you. The half of a sandwich that you will receive: 
- was made on the 14th of March, 7 days ago, 
- weighs 80 grams, and 
- contains the following main ingredients: wheat, rye, barley, eggs, mayonnaise, mustard, and yoghurt. 
Once you receive the sandwich, please do not start eating it yet. Take a few seconds to observe it and to answer the 
following questions by writing an “x” in the appropriate circle. 
 
1. How would you rate the appearance of the sandwich that you have just received?  
Not at all 
appetizing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
appetizing 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
2. How well does the sandwich smell? 
Smells very 
bad 
1 2 3 4 
Does not   
smell 
5 6 7 8 
Smells very 
good 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
3. How eager are you to eat the sandwich that you received?  
Not at all 
eager 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
eager 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
To confirm that you read the text at the beginning of this page, please answer the following questions: 
Circle the ingredient that the sandwich does not contain:   wheat     eggs      cucumber 
Indicate the weight of the half of a sandwich that you received: …………….. grams 
Indicate how many days ago was your sandwich made: ………….. day(s) ago 
 
You may now start eating your sandwich. After you have taken at least 3 regular-sized bites, please raise your hand 
to receive the next page of the questionnaire. At that point, you may continue eating as much of your sandwich as you 
want while completing the rest of the study. 
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Questionnaire – Part I 2/3 
4. Please rate the taste of your sandwich. 
5. As we told you earlier, you will receive 10 CHF for your participation in this study. With this money, you will also have 
the possibility to buy the 2nd half of the same sandwich (i.e., an additional 80 gr.) at a randomly-drawn price. For every 
possible price listed below, please indicate with an “x” whether or not you would like to buy the 2nd half of the same 
sandwich. At the end of the experiment, you will roll a die that will determine the actual price. Your answer for this 
actual price in the table below will determine whether or not you will pay this price out of your 10 CHF to receive the 
2nd half of the sandwich. 
If the die 
roll is… 
…then the price of the 
2nd half of the sandwich 
will be… 
I want to buy the 2nd 
half of the sandwich at 
this price 
I do not want to buy 
the 2nd half of the 
sandwich at this price 
1 0.00 CHF O O 
2 0.20 CHF O O 
3 0.40 CHF O O 
4 0.60 CHF O O 
5 0.80 CHF O O 
6 1.00 CHF O O 
7 1.20 CHF O O 
8 1.40 CHF O O 
9 1.60 CHF O O 
10 1.80 CHF O O 
11 2.00 CHF O O 
12 2.20 CHF O O 
6. Please rate the extent to which you consider your sandwich healthy and nutritious (vitamins, minerals, etc.)?  
Not at all 
healthy & 
nutritious 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
healthy & 
nutritious 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
Once you have answered all the questions of “Questionnaire – Part I,” please raise your hand and wait for a staff 
member to provide you with the last part of the questionnaire. 
Extremely 
bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
good 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
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Questionnaire – Part II 3/3 
In this study, half of the participants receive a sandwich that was made 1 day ago, and the other half of the 
participants receive a sandwich that was made 7 days ago. At the beginning of the instructions, we told you how 
many days ago the sandwich that you received was made.  
7. Do you remember how many days ago your sandwich was made? The sandwich that I received was made… 
1 day ago: O 
7 days ago: O 
 
8. Have you eaten this specific type of pre-packaged sandwich in the past?  Yes: O  No: O  
9. How frequently do you eat sandwiches? 
Never 
Rarely  
(1 time per month 
or less) 
Regularly  
(2 or 3 times per 
month) 
Often  
(about 1 to 2 times 
per week) 
Very often  
(more than 2 times 
per week) 
O O O O O 
10. What type(s) of sandwiches do you usually eat? (You may select multiple answers.) 
O Home-made 
O Freshly prepared (by a bakery, at a deli counter…) 
O Packaged sandwiches 
11. When you eat a sandwich, how much do you care about how healthy and nutritious it is?  
I do not 
care at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I care a lot 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
12. How frequently do you prepare meals using raw ingredients? (Heating a frozen or prepackaged meal does not 
count.)  
Never 
Rarely  
(up to 3 times per 
month) 
Regularly  
(about 1 to 2 times 
per week) 
Often  
(more than 2 times 
per week) 
Daily  
or almost daily 
O O O O O 
13. Imagine that you want to eat a piece of hard cheese. You take it out of your refrigerator and notice that there is 
some mold on it. What do you do? (Please select the answer that you think would best represent your behavior.) 
I eat it. O 
I remove only the moldy part (i.e., as little as possible) to 
maximize the quantity of cheese left to eat. O 
I cut out any part that is at all close to the mold and eat the 
rest. O 
ID: A1  
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I throw the piece of cheese away. O 
 
14. Below is a list of food items. Imagine that you bought these items fresh and stored them in an appropriate 
environment (e.g., in the refrigerator). Please indicate by an “x” in the corresponding cell (a) how safe you think it is to 
eat this item and (b) how likely you would be to eat it (assuming that you generally eat this kind of food even if you 
usually do not). Assume that each item smells and looks fine when you inspect or open it.  
 How safe do you think it is to 
eat this item? 
How likely would you be to 
eat this item? 
Food item description: 
N
ot
 a
t a
ll 
sa
fe
 
M
od
er
at
el
y 
sa
fe
 
Co
m
pl
et
el
y 
sa
fe
 
N
ot
 a
t a
ll 
lik
el
y 
M
od
er
at
el
y 
lik
el
y 
Ve
ry
 li
ke
ly
 
A delivered (reheated) pizza with vegetables and 
meat that has been sitting in your fridge for 3 days 
      
An unopened plain (i.e., unflavored) yoghurt that 
expired 10 days ago 
      
Hard boiled eggs that you cooked 1 week ago       
An unopened UHT milk carton that expired 2 months 
ago 
      
A raw broccoli that you bought 1 week ago        
Pre-packaged hummus opened 5 days ago       
An unopened pack of dry spaghetti that expired 1 
year ago  
      
3-day-old leftovers of a home-made chicken-curry       
An unopened can of tuna that expired 1 week ago       
A jar of green pesto that you opened 2 weeks ago       
(Reheated) leftovers of a pre-prepared veggie 
lasagna that you baked 4 days ago 
      
15. For each of the following product categories, what percentage of the edible part of what you buy or cook usually 
ends up being thrown away, on average?  
 ca 0% < 10% < 20% < 30% < 40% < 50% > 50% I never have this kind of food 
Fresh fruit & vegetables: O O O O O O O O 
Milk & dairy products: O O O O O O O O 
Self-prepared meals & leftovers: O O O O O O O O 
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16. In terms of behavior, how important is it for you to minimize the amount of food that you throw away? 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Extremely 
important 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
17. Please provide your best guess of the following number: how much of the food in households in Europe is wasted 
(as a percentage of the total food bought)?  
_________% 
18. Do you have any food intolerances, allergies or diet restrictions for medical or non-medical reasons?  
   Intolerance or allergy to nuts O Diabetes O 
No: O  Gluten intolerance or allergy O Vegan/vegetarian O 
Yes: O  if yes, which one(s)?  Lactose intolerance or allergy O Other: 
   Intolerance or allergy to eggs O 
19. Have you ever experienced a serious case of food poisoning? 
No: O If yes, did it occur in 
the last 12 months? 
No: O If yes, indicate the type of food that made you sick:  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Yes: O Yes: O 
20. Please tell us, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks.  
Completely 
unwilling to 
take risks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Very willing 
to take 
risks 
9 
O O O O O O O O O 
 
21. For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood of engaging in each activity. Provide a rating 
from 1 to 5, using the scale: 1: Extremely unlikely to 5: Extremely likely. 
 
Ex
tr
em
el
y 
un
lik
el
y 
   E
xt
re
m
el
y 
lik
el
y 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Engaging in unprotected sex. O O O O O 
Not wearing a seatbelt when riding as a front-seat passenger. O O O O O 
Not wearing a helmet when riding a bicycle. O O O O O 
Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. O O O O O 
Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area. O O O O O 
Regularly eating high sugar foods. O O O O O 
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Eating expired food products that still ‘look okay.’ O O O O O 
Buying an illegal drug for your own use. O O O O O 
Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. O O O O O 
22. Please indicate your gender: O Male  O Female 
23. Please indicate your age: ……………….. years old 
24. Please indicate all your nationalities:  O Swiss  O Other: ………………………………………………………………...... 
25. Please indicate the highest educational degree that you have obtained: 
Matura/ Secondary  O Bachelor  O Master  O PhD  O Other: ………………………………………………. 
26. What is (are) your field(s) of study? (You can select multiple answers.) 
O Architecture & Civil engineering 
O Business & Economics 
O Engineering sciences (Computer sciences, Mechanical/Electrical engineering etc.) 
O Environmental sciences 
O Other Natural sciences (Physics, Biology, Health sciences, Earth sciences…) 
O Law 
O Math 
O Medicine & Veterinary medicine 
O Political Science 
O Psychology 
O Other Arts & Humanities (Linguistics, Literature, History…) 
O Theology  
O Other: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 
27. Had you heard of this study from someone who previously participated? (This will not affect your payment.) 
No: O Yes: O     If yes, please explain: ……………………………….…………………….………………………………        
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Please, remain seated until you have finished eating the sandwich. Once you 
have finished it, or if you do not want to finish it, please raise your hand and wait for a staff member to come to 
you.  
 
If you have any comments or questions about this study, please write them here: 
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 Appendix B ─ Exploring Attitudes Towards Food Waste  
Tables 
Table B-1: Summary statistics of relevant variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Description 
Food Waste 
(15 items) 
258 0.38 0.17 0.02 0.91 
Is 0 if wastes very little food, 
1 if wastes a lot of food, in 
[0;1] 
FW Guess 258 0.37 0.13 0.15 0.88 
Belief about the percentage of 
the food bought in households 
in Europe that is wasted, in 
[0; 1] 
Min Waste 258 0.85 0.17 0 1 
Is 1 if it is very important for 
the person to minimize the 
amount of food that she 
throws away, 0 otherwise, in 
{0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, … 1} 
Risk General 258 0.54 0.24 0 1 
Is 1 if is very willing to take 
risks in general, 0 otherwise, 
in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, … 1} 
Risk Food 
(11 items) 
258 0.64 0.17 0.13 1 
Is 1 if thinks that old food is 
always completely safe to eat, 
0 otherwise, in [0; 1] 
Risk Health 
(9 items) 
258 0.47 0.15 0.08 0.83 
Is 1 if takes a lot of risks in 
the health/safety domain, 0 
otherwise, in [0; 1] 
WTP 221* 0.77 0.49 0 2 
Willingness-to-pay for the 
second half of the sandwich, 
in [0; 2.2] CHF 
Weight 258 12.72 24.51 0 78 
Weight (in grams) of the 
unfinished first sandwich half, 
in [0; 82] 
See next page for the rest of the table. 
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Hungry 258 5.38 1.93 1 9 
Is 1 if is not at all hungry, is 
9 if extremely hungry, in {1, 
2, 3, … 9} 
Already Eat. 258 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Is 1 if has already eaten this 
type of sandwich in the past, 
0 otherwise 
Food Pois. 258 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Is 1 if has already experienced 
a serious case of food 
poisoning in the past, 0 
otherwise 
Prep. Meals 258 4.02 1.03 1 5 
Frequency of meal 
preparation with raw 
ingredients (1: Never, 2: <= 
3x/month, 3: 1x or 2x/week, 
4: >2x/week, 5: daily or 
almost daily) 
Female 258 0.52 0.50 0 1 Is 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise 
Age 258 22.47 3.07 18 35 Age 
Swiss 258 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Is 1 if the person has the 
Swiss nationality, 0 if the 
person is a foreigner 
Notes: Summary statistics of Food Waste, Min Waste, Risk General, Risk Food and Risk Health after 
having normalized them so that they lie between 0 and 1. *37 individuals were not even willing to receive 
the second sandwich half for free. 
 
Table B-2: List of items to assess risk preferences in the health/safety domain 
1. Engaging in unprotected sex. 
2. Not wearing a seatbelt when riding as a front-seat passenger. 
3. Not wearing a helmet when riding a bicycle. 
4. Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. 
5. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area. 
6. Regularly eating high sugar foods. 
7. Eating expired food products that still ‘look okay.’ 
8. Buying an illegal drug for your own use. 
9. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. 
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Table B-3: Average of Food Waste across individual 
characteristics 
 
Men Women 
p-value of 
two-sided t-
tests 
ࡲ࢕࢕ࢊ ࢃࢇ࢙࢚ࢋതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.36 0.40 0.08 
Number of obs. 123 135 - 
 Swiss* Not Swiss  
ࡲ࢕࢕ࢊ ࢃࢇ࢙࢚ࢋതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.36 0.45 0.001 
Number of obs. 204 54 - 
 Studies 
natural 
sciences** 
Does not study 
natural 
sciences 
 
ࡲ࢕࢕ࢊ ࢃࢇ࢙࢚ࢋതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.36 0.40 0.05 
Number of obs. 123 135 - 
 
Food poisoned 
in the past 
Not food 
poisoned in the 
past 
 
ࡲ࢕࢕ࢊ ࢃࢇ࢙࢚ࢋതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.39 0.38 0.67 
Number of obs. 72 186 - 
 Prepare meals 
> 2x/week 
Prepare meals 
<= 2x/week 
 
ࡲ࢕࢕ࢊ ࢃࢇ࢙࢚ࢋതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 0.36 0.44 0.001 
Number of obs. 186 72 - 
Notes: N=258. . Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of 
food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food *This consists of all Swiss participants 
who also eventually have an (some) additional nationality(ies). **Natural sciences typically 
include: environmental sciences, physics, biology, chemistry, health sciences, earth 
sciences… 
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Table B-4: Average value of individual traits across treatment 
groups 
 Treatment group  
Individual 
characteristics  
Salient-
Old 
Salient-
Fresh 
Blind-
Old 
Blind-
Fresh 
p-value of 
Kruska-
Wallis H 
test 
Food Waste 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.31 
Risk General 0.5 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.27 
Risk Health 0.44 0.49 0.5 0.45 0.08 
Risk Food 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.61 0.13 
FW Guess 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.33 
Min Waste 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.91 
Notes: N=258; Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk 
Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk 
taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety domain, respectively; FW Guess is in 
[0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in Europe 
is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 
... 1} where 1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 
otherwise. 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
169 
 
Table B-5: Relationship between the reported amount of food trashed and 
several individual traits 
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Trashed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk General -0.0230 -0.0128     
 (-0.64) (-0.34)     
Risk Food   -0.176*** -0.171***   
   (-3.25) (-3.16)   
Risk Health     -0.0288 0.00514 
     (-0.49) (0.08) 
FW Guess 0.265*** 0.243*** 0.229*** 0.207** 0.268*** 0.246*** 
 (3.13) (2.90) (2.74) (2.47) (3.14) (2.92) 
Min Waste -0.230*** -0.235*** -0.230*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.237*** 
 (-4.36) (-4.51) (-4.73) (-4.83) (-4.51) (-4.65) 
Hungry  0.000812  0.00133  0.000650 
  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.14) 
Food Pois.  0.00714  0.00655  0.00658 
  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.35) 
Female  0.0277*  0.0252  0.0295* 
  (1.76)  (1.61)  (1.81) 
Age  0.00138  0.000742  0.00138 
  (0.53)  (0.28)  (0.54) 
Constant 0.355*** 0.313*** 0.462*** 0.434*** 0.357*** 0.304*** 
 (5.98) (3.40) (7.65) (4.58) (5.41) (3.19) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.153 0.163 0.196 0.204 0.153 0.163 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Food Trashed is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person throws a lot of food away, and 0 means that she throws very little food away. Independent 
variables: Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 
indicates aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety 
domain, respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in 
households in Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 
... 1} where 1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in 
{1;2;…;9} where 1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever 
experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models 
control for the treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, 
and =0 if received a 1-day-old sandwich, and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did 
not know it. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-6: Relationship between reported behaviors towards old food and 
several individual traits 
Dependent 
variable: 
Dislikes Old Food 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk General -0.242*** -0.243***     
 (-4.63) (-4.59)     
Risk Food   -0.919*** -0.917***   
   (-19.72) (-19.69)   
Risk Health     -0.314*** -0.325*** 
     (-4.06) (-3.86) 
FW Guess 0.282*** 0.293*** 0.140** 0.147** 0.317*** 0.338*** 
 (2.97) (3.00) (2.20) (2.21) (3.18) (3.28) 
Min Waste -0.115 -0.118 -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.153* -0.155* 
 (-1.50) (-1.55) (-3.04) (-3.07) (-1.89) (-1.94) 
Hungry  -0.00465  -0.00375  -0.00570 
  (-0.68)  (-0.95)  (-0.83) 
Food Pois.  0.0223  0.0125  0.0176 
  (0.84)  (0.74)  (0.64) 
Female  -0.00332  -0.000184  -0.0145 
  (-0.14)  (-0.01)  (-0.55) 
Age  0.00259  -0.00113  0.00154 
  (0.68)  (-0.49)  (0.39) 
Constant 0.569*** 0.533*** 1.066*** 1.107*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 
 (6.86) (4.29) (19.47) (14.94) (6.34) (4.46) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.162 0.169 0.646 0.648 0.136 0.143 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Dislikes Old Food is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person is very unlikely to eat old food, and 0 means that she is very likely to eat old food. Independent 
variables: Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 
indicates aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety 
domain, respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households 
in Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 
1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} where 
1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case 
of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the treatment 
conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, and =0 if received a 1-
day-old sandwich, and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know it. Robust standard 
errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table  B-7: Relationship between reported food waste behaviors and several 
individual traits  
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Waste A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk General -0.173*** -0.170***     
 (-5.13) (-4.99)     
Risk Food   -0.512*** -0.506***   
   (-13.10) (-12.62)   
Risk Health     -0.171*** -0.153*** 
     (-3.17) (-2.65) 
FW Guess 0.237*** 0.228*** 0.172*** 0.158*** 0.271*** 0.265*** 
 (3.51) (3.37) (3.00) (2.74) (3.75) (3.66) 
Min Waste -0.132** -0.136** -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.162*** 
 (-2.36) (-2.41) (-3.44) (-3.48) (-2.74) (-2.81) 
Hungry  -0.000102  0.00000384  -0.00120 
  (-0.02)  (0.00)  (-0.27) 
Food Pois.  0.0151  0.00839  0.0108 
  (0.83)  (0.59)  (0.58) 
Female  0.0131  0.0184  0.0132 
  (0.78)  (1.33)  (0.73) 
Age  0.00420*  0.00209  0.00362 
  (1.65)  (0.92)  (1.38) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.486*** 0.839*** 0.787*** 0.580*** 0.495*** 
 (9.52) (5.75) (16.78) (10.88) (8.52) (5.33) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.202 0.213 0.464 0.470 0.154 0.163 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Food Waste A is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food. Independent variables: 
Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates 
aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety domain, 
respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in 
Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 
1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} 
where 1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the 
treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, and =0 if 
received a 1-day-old sandwich, and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know it. 
Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-8: Relationship between reported food waste behaviors and several 
individual traits  
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Waste B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk General -0.132*** -0.128***     
 (-3.81) (-3.68)     
Risk Food   -0.547*** -0.544***   
   (-15.93) (-15.92)   
Risk Health     -0.171*** -0.160*** 
     (-3.28) (-2.85) 
FW Guess 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.185*** 0.177*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
 (4.02) (3.96) (3.31) (3.16) (4.11) (4.14) 
Min Waste -0.172*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.183*** -0.193*** -0.196*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.28) (-5.27) (-5.39) (-3.48) (-3.59) 
Hungry  -0.00192  -0.00121  -0.00252 
  (-0.44)  (-0.41)  (-0.56) 
Food Pois.  0.0147  0.00955  0.0121 
  (0.81)  (0.76)  (0.66) 
Female  0.0122  0.0125  0.00751 
  (0.79)  (1.09)  (0.45) 
Age  0.00199  -0.000196  0.00146 
  (0.85)  (-0.12)  (0.62) 
Constant 0.462*** 0.423*** 0.764*** 0.770*** 0.481*** 0.454*** 
 (7.42) (4.80) (18.28) (12.96) (6.83) (4.72) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.205 0.212 0.586 0.589 0.188 0.193 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Food Waste B is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food. Independent variables: 
Risk General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, and  Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0,1], where 0 indicates 
aversion to risk taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food or in the health/safety domain, 
respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in 
Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 
1 means that it is very important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} 
where 1 means “Not at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the 
treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, and =0 if 
received a 1-day-old sandwich, and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know 
it. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-9: Coefficients of partial determination based on the regressions of Food 
Trashed and Dislikes Old Food, respectively, on individual traits 
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Trashed Dislikes Old Food 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk Food 0.054*** - - 0.62*** - - 
Risk General - 0.002 - - 0.092*** - 
Risk Health - - 0.001 - - 0.066*** 
FW Guess 0.05*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.02** 0.032*** 0.04*** 
Min Waste 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.034*** 0.011* 0.02** 
Notes: N=258. Coefficients of partial determination of regressing Food Trashed and Dislikes Old Food on FW Guess 
and Min Waste, as well as on Risk Food (col. 1 and 4), Risk General (col. 2 and 5) or Risk Health (col. 3 and 6).  
Dependent variable: col. 1 to 3: Food Trashed is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person throw a lot of food away, 
and 0 means that she throws very little food away; col. 4 to 6: Dislikes Old Food is in [0,1], where 1 means that the 
person is very unlikely to eat old food, and 0 means that she is very likely to eat old food. Independent variables: Risk 
General is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0.1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk 
taking and 1 indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food- or in the health/safety domain, respectively; FW 
Guess is in [0,1] and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in Europe is wasted (as a 
percentage of the total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 1 means that it is very 
important for the person to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise.* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
174 
 
Table B-10: Coefficients of partial determination based on the regressions of 
alternative measures of food waste behaviors on individual traits 
Dependent 
variable: 
Food Waste A Food Waste B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk Food 0.401*** - - 0.518*** - - 
Risk General - 0.10*** - - 0.065*** - 
Risk Health - - 0.042*** - - 0.047*** 
FW Guess 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.077*** 
Min Waste 0.055*** 0.03*** 0.041*** 0.114*** 0.057*** 0.07*** 
Notes: N=258. Coefficients of partial determination of regressing Food Waste A (col. 1 to 3) and Food Waste B (col. 
4 to 6) on FW Guess and Min Waste, as well as on Risk Food (col. 1 and 4), Risk General (col. 2 and 5) or Risk 
Health (col. 3 and 6).  Dependent variable: Food Waste A and Food Waste B are in [0,1], where 1 means that the 
person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food. Independent variables: Risk General is in {0, 
0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1}, Risk Food and Risk Health are in [0.1], where 0 indicates aversion to risk taking and 1 
indicates love for risk taking in general, in the food- or in the health/safety domain, respectively; FW Guess is in [0,1] 
and represents a person's belief about how much of the food in households in Europe is wasted (as a percentage of the 
total food bought); Min Waste is in {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, ... 1} where 1 means that it is very important for the person 
to minimize food waste, 0 otherwise.* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-11: Relationship between individuals’ 
willingness-to-pay and reported food waste behaviors 
(Tobit model)  
Dependent 
variable: Willingness-to-pay for the 2
nd half 
 (1) (2) 
Food Waste -0.0728 -0.00403 
 (-0.34) (-0.02) 
Already Eat.  0.0826 
  (1.03) 
Hungry  0.0535** 
  (2.42) 
Food Pois.  0.0254 
  (0.29) 
Female  -0.0804 
  (-0.99) 
Age  0.0000627 
  (0.00) 
Constant 0.874*** 0.535 
 (7.65) (1.58) 
N 221 221 
Pseu. R-sq. 0.008 0.028 
Notes: Estimated marginal effects of Tobit models. Dependent variables: WTP 
is in [0; 2.2] CHF (the 37 observations with a negative WTP are excluded 
from the analysis). Independent variables: Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 
means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very 
little food; Already Eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the 
past, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} where 1 means “Not at all hungry” 
and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a 
serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female =1 if is a woman, 0 
otherwise. All models control for the treatment conditions (Old, Salient and 
Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, =0 if received a 
1-day-old sandwich and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date 
and 0 if did not know it. McFadden Pseudo R2 are provided. Robust standard 
errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
APPENDIX B 
176 
 
 Table B-12: Relationship between individuals’ willingness-to-pay for the second sandwich half and alternative 
measures of reported food waste behaviors (Hurdle model) 
Dependent variable: 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
WTP 
weakly 
pos. (1/0) 
WTP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Food Waste A -0.219 -0.175 0.0848 -0.125     
 (-0.32) (-1.02) (0.12) (-0.72)     
Food Waste B     -0.261 -0.0908 0.0728 -0.0292 
     (-0.39) (-0.51) (0.10) (-0.16) 
Already Eat.   0.417** 0.110*   0.417** 0.113* 
   (2.01) (1.77)   (2.01) (1.81) 
Hungry   0.151*** 0.0211   0.151*** 0.0209 
   (3.04) (1.40)   (3.04) (1.39) 
Food Pois.   -0.0106 0.0682   -0.0109 0.0662 
   (-0.05) (1.14)   (-0.05) (1.10) 
Female   -0.426** -0.0492   -0.425** -0.0560 
   (-2.07) (-0.81)   (-2.06) (-0.93) 
Age   -0.0449 -0.00213   -0.0446 -0.00249 
   (-1.49) (-0.23)   (-1.49) (-0.27) 
Constant 1.059*** 1.006*** 1.135 0.854*** 1.047*** 0.955*** 1.141 0.817*** 
 (2.82) (10.04) (1.47) (3.64) (3.41) (10.95) (1.51) (3.56) 
N 258 183 258 183 258 183 258 183 
Pseu. R-sq. 0.013  0.101  0.014  0.101  
Notes: Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7: Estimated marginal effects of Probit models. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8: Estimated marginal effects of truncated regressions at 0. 
Columns 1 to 8 represent four hurdle models. Dependent variable: Col. 1, 3, 5 and 7: WTP weakly pos.=1 if WTP>=0, and WTP weakly pos.=0 if WTP<0; 
Col. 2, 4, 6 and 8: WTP in [0; 2.2] CHF.  Independent variables: Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that 
she wastes very little food; Already Eat.=1 if has already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} where 1 means “Not at 
all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female =1 if is a woman, 0 
otherwise. All models control for the treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, =0 if received a 1-
day-old sandwich and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did not know it. McFadden Pseudo R2 are provided in col. 1, 3, 5, and 7. 
Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-13: Relationship between the decision to eat entirely the first 
sandwich half and measures of reported food waste behaviors 
Dependent 
variable: 
First half entirely eaten (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Food Waste -0.517*** -0.384*** 
  
  
 (-3.35) (-2.64) 
  
  
Food Waste A 
  
-0.517*** -0.346**   
 
  
(-2.89) (-2.21)   
Food Waste B     -0.519*** -0.336** 
     (-2.82) (-2.11) 
Already Eat. 
 
0.137*** 
 
0.138***  0.138*** 
 
 
(2.69) 
 
(3.09)  (3.09) 
Hungry 
 
0.0624*** 
 
0.0551***  0.0549*** 
 
 
(4.45) 
 
(4.98)  (4.96) 
Food Pois. 
 
-0.00618 
 
-0.0120  -0.00891 
 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-0.24)  (-0.18) 
Female 
 
-0.218*** 
 
-0.209***  -0.210*** 
 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-4.62)  (-4.64) 
Age 
 
-0.00624 
 
-0.00644  -0.00760 
 
 
(-0.71) 
 
(-0.82)  (-0.99) 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 
R-sq. 0.053 0.227 0.038 0.220 0.037 0.218 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models, Columns 3 to 6: Estimated 
marginal effects of Probit models. Dependent variables: First half entirely eaten =1 if the subject finished 
to eat his first sandwich half, 0 otherwise. Independent variables: Food Waste is in [0,1], where 1 means 
that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little food; Already Eat.=1 if has 
already eaten this type of sandwich in the past, 0 otherwise; Hungry is in {1;2;…;9} where 1 means “Not 
at all hungry” and 9 means “Extremely hungry”; Food Pois.=1 if has ever experienced a serious case 
of food poisoning, 0 otherwise; Female =1 if is a woman, 0 otherwise. All models control for the 
treatment conditions (Old, Salient and Salient*Old), where Old=1 if received a 7-day-old sandwich, =0 
if received a 1-day-old sandwich and Salient=1 if was informed about the production date and 0 if did 
not know it. McFadden Pseudo R2 are provided in col. 3 to 6. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in 
parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B-14: Comparison of the perceived and actual safety of old food items  
  How safe do you 
think it is to eat this 
item? 
 
nr Food item description 
N
ot
 a
t 
al
l 
sa
fe
 
M
od
er
at
el
y 
sa
fe
 
C
om
pl
et
el
y 
sa
fe
 
Actual safety* 
1 
A delivered (reheated) pizza with vegetables 
and meat that has been sitting in your fridge 
for 3 days 
0.1 0.64 0.26 
Microbiological 
analyses required 
2 
3-day-old leftovers of a home-made chicken-
curry 0.09 0.54 0.37 
Microbiological 
analyses required 
3 
(Reheated) leftovers of a pre-prepared veggie 
lasagna that you baked 4 days ago 0.11 0.58 0.31 
Microbiological 
analyses required 
4 An unopened plain (i.e., unflavored) yoghurt 
that expired 10 days ago 
0.19 0.47 0.34 
Completely safe 
(SL1-2, ND, SCA, 
FS) 
5 An unopened UHT milk carton that expired 2 months ago 0.38 0.41 0.22 
Completely safe 
(SL1-2, ND, SCA, 
FS) 
6 An unopened pack of dry spaghetti that 
expired 1 year ago  
0.05 0.26 0.69 
Completely safe  
(SL1, ND, FS) 
7 
An unopened can of tuna that expired 1 week 
ago 0.14 0.27 0.59 
Completely safe 
(SL1-2, ND, FS) 
8 A raw broccoli that you bought 1 week ago  0.02 0.27 0.71 
Completely safe 
(SL195, FS) 
9 Hard boiled eggs that you cooked 1 week ago 0.24 0.36 0.4 
Moderately safe 
(SL1, ND, SCA, FS) 
See next page for the rest of the table. 
                                       
95 The Swiss law does not require any date label on fresh vegetables and fruits, as their edibility can be easily evaluated 
by a sensory evaluation. As we specify in the question’s statement that every item is assumed to look and smell fine, 
this raw broccoli is perfectly safe to eat.  
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10 Pre-packaged hummus opened 5 days ago 0.07 0.58 0.35 
Microbiological 
analyses required 
11 A jar of green pesto that you opened 2 weeks 
ago 
0.16 0.51 0.33 
Microbiological 
analyses required 
Notes: Nnr=258, where nr represents the item number. However, participants missed reporting their likelihood 
to eat some food items (implying: N3= N10=257, N6=256), and their perception of their safety (implying: 
N3=N9= N10=257, N6=256). Subjects were asked to assume that these items had been stored in ideal conditions 
since the purchase date, and that their smell and appearance was fine when opening or inspecting them. 
*The actual safety of these items is evaluated based on what the Swiss law (SL) prescribes (SL1 refers to the 
Hygiene ordinance (2016), SL2 refers to the Ordinance on the labeling and advertising of food stuff (2005)), 
the report from a Swiss consumer association (FRC, 2012) and the emails exchanged with its author (SCA), 
the opinion of a food scientist working for one of the biggest Swiss supermarket (FS), as well as an article 
published by a nutritionist dietician (ND) in a recognized French journal specialized in nutrition and health 
(Rivet-Bonjean, 2018).  
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Figures 
Figure B-1: Cumulative distributions of subjects’ willingness-to-pay for the 
second sandwich half  with respect to their reported food waste behaviors, 
by treatment group 
 
Notes: N=258 with ௌܰ௔௟௜௘௡௧ିை௟ௗ=65, ௌܰ௔௟௜௘௡௧ିி௥௘௦௛=65, ஻ܰ௟௜௡ௗିை௟ௗ=65 and ܰ஻௟௜௡ௗିி௥௘௦௛=63. Food Waste 
is in [0,1], where 1 means that the person wastes a lot of food, and 0 means that she wastes very little 
food. 
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 Appendix C ─ Psychological Opportunity Costs: The Effect 
of Opportunity Costs on Post-Choice Utility 
Tables 
Table C-1: Description of the goods in each good category 
Good category Description of the six goods in each category 
Individual portion (175ml) 
of a Mövenpick ice cream 
Stracciatella, Swiss chocolate, Vanilla dream, 
Caramelita, Pistachio, Maple walnut. 
Voucher for an activity Bungee jumping in the Swiss mountains (30 min), 
Round flight in the Swiss mountains (30 min), 
Chocolate workshop (around 4 hours), Sushi lesson 
(around 2.5 hours), Thai massage (1 hour), Rafting 
tour in Switzerland (around 4 hours). 
Caran d’Ache ball pen (blue 
ink) 
Black, dark blue, dark green, light blue, red, white. 
Short educative animations 
(ca 3min)* 
7 tips to wake up without coffee, How is your phone 
changing you, How to increase your productivity, How 
much sleep do you actually need, 5 ways social media 
is changing your brain, The 9 best scientific study 
tips. 
Voucher for a dish in a local 
restaurant 
Beef with thai basil leaves, Veggie dumplings with 
salad, Gnocchi with tomato sauce, basil, grana 
Padano cheese and fior di latte, Lamb with vegetables 
tajine, Spaghetti with tomatoes, basil, garlic and olive 
oil, Braised tofu with vegetables in clay pot. 
* These animations are free of access on www.youtube.com. We downloaded them and cut them such 
as to remove the advertisement usually located towards the end. 
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Table C-2: Pictures of the 30 goods presented to the subjects 
Ice Cream Pen Dish Movie Activity 
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Table C-3: Measure of decisional difficulty in the on-line survey 
The ten sentences below describe behaviors and thoughts that one typically 
experiences when having difficulty making up ones’ mind. Subjects had to evaluate to what 
extent each sentence apply to their case on a scale from 1: Doesn’t apply at all to 7: Does 
perfectly apply. 
Decision Difficulty scale 
1 When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check other stations to see if 
something better is playing, even if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening 
to. 
2 I often change my mind several times before making a decision.  
3 Even if I see a choice I really like, I have a hard time making the decision if I do 
not have a chance to check out other possible options.  
4 Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine what all the other possibilities 
are, even ones that aren’t present at the moment.  
5 No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the 
lookout for better opportunities.  
6 I always keep my options open so I will not miss the next best choice available in 
life.  
7 I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite different from my actual life.  
8 Whenever I made a choice, I’m curious about what would have happened if I had 
chosen differently.  
9 I often wonder why decisions can’t be easier.  
10 I am usually worried about making a wrong decision.  
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Table C-4: Summary statistics of relevant variables  
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Description 
Stage 1 Happ. 630 78 21.9 1 100 
Hypothetical happiness level 
reported in the on-line survey 
with the good that was 
chosen/allocated in the 
laboratory. 1 means Not at all 
happy and 100 means Very happy, 
in {1,2,3,…,100} 
Post-Choice 
Happ. 
630 70.7 22.6 1 100 
Effective happiness level with the 
chosen/allocated good in the 
laboratory after the 
decision/allocation occurred. 1 
means Not at all happy and 100 
means Very happy, in 
{1,2,3,…,100} 
Post-
Consumption 
Happ. 
182 66.8 24.6 1 100 
Effective happiness level with the 
chosen/allocated good in the 
laboratory after consumption 
occurred. 1 means Not at all 
happy and 100 means Very happy, 
in {1,2,3,…,100} 
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Table C-5: Relationship between post-choice happiness and the 
treatment condition Choice versus No-Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. 
Model: OLS OLS  Tobit Tobit 
dummyChoice -4.111*** -4.164*** -4.574** -4.960*** 
 (1.566) (1.589) (1.775) (1.822) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.663*** 0.576*** 0.699*** 0.584*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0392) (0.0387) (0.0434) 
dummyPen  -5.564**  -7.095*** 
  (2.219)  (2.241) 
dummyDish  0.581  -0.625 
  (1.561)  (1.744) 
dummyMovie  -6.237***  -7.193*** 
  (1.966)  (2.212) 
dummyActivity  7.961***  9.633*** 
  (1.545)  (1.927) 
Constant 21.99*** 29.45*** 21.03*** 31.20*** 
 (3.046) (3.694) (3.416) (4.132) 
Observations 630 630 608 608 
R2 0.419 0.463   
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models (columns 1 and 2) and of Tobit 
models (columns 3 and 4). The observations are aggregated across all good categories 
together. Observations qualified as “non-eligible” (i.e., cases where individuals had already 
watched at least one of the two movie clips, could not eat ice creams or who misreported 
their happiness level) are added back to the data set in columns 1 and 2. Dependent variable: 
Post-Choice Happ. is the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory 
(pre-consumption) and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means 
“Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyChoice=1 if is in the Choice condition, and 0 
if is in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness level (reported 
in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; dummyPen, 
dummyDish, dummyMovie and dummyActivity are the good categories fixed effects and are 
in {0,1} (e.g. dummyPen=1 if the post-choice happiness is reported for the Pen good 
category, and 0 otherwise). The Ice Cream good category represents the reference category. 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** 
p < 0.01. 
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Table C-6: Relationship between post-choice happiness and the 
choice conditions Low POCs versus High POCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. 
Model: OLS OLS Tobit Tobit 
dummyNoChoice 5.185*** 5.076*** 5.593*** 5.730*** 
 (1.770) (1.809) (2.004) (2.063) 
dummyHighPOCs 2.146 1.823 2.021 1.535 
 (1.608) (1.550) (1.704) (1.633) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.664*** 0.578*** 0.700*** 0.586*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0389) (0.0385) (0.0433) 
dummyPen  -5.554**  -7.047*** 
  (2.207)  (2.235) 
dummyDish  0.568  -0.604 
  (1.575)  (1.757) 
dummyMovie  -6.171***  -7.091*** 
  (1.967)  (2.215) 
dummyActivity  7.942***  9.638*** 
  (1.554)  (1.932) 
Constant 16.69*** 24.25*** 15.29*** 25.29*** 
 (3.027) (3.635) (3.469) (4.104) 
Observations 630 630 608 608 
R2 0.420 0.464   
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models (columns 1 and 2) and of Tobit 
models (columns 3 and 4). The observations are aggregated across all good categories 
together. Observations qualified as “non-eligible” (i.e., cases where individuals had already 
watched at least one of the two movie clips, could not eat ice creams or who misreported 
their happiness level) are added back to the data set in columns 1 and 2. Dependent variable: 
Post-Choice Happ. is the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory 
and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. 
Independent variables: dummyNoChoice=1 if is in the No-Choice condition, and 0 if is in 
the Choice condition; dummyHighPOCs=1 if is in the High POCs condition, and 0 if is in 
the Low POCs or in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness 
level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; 
dummyPen, dummyDish, dummyMovie and dummyActivity are the good categories fixed 
effects and are in {0,1} (e.g. dummyPen=1 if the post-choice happiness is reported for the 
Pen good category, and 0 otherwise). The Ice Cream good category represents the reference 
category. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, * p < 0.1; ** p 
< 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table C-7: Relationship between post-consumption happiness and the treatment 
conditions Choice versus No-Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Post-Consumption Happ.  
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit 
dummyChoice 0.116 -0.647 -0.213 -1.713 2.157 0.402 
 (3.436) (3.462) (3.387) (3.403) (3.751) (3.742) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.542*** 0.427*** 0.533*** 0.420*** 0.607*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0835) (0.0855) (0.0866) (0.0876) (0.0944) (0.0928) 
dummyMovie  -19.07***  -18.99***  -20.51*** 
  (2.463)  (2.400)  (2.695) 
Constant 23.43*** 43.89*** 24.15*** 44.36*** 18.95** 41.08*** 
 (7.597) (8.118) (7.836) (8.308) (8.263) (8.444) 
Observations 197 197 202 202 182 182 
R2 0.197 0.332 0.190 0.331   
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models (columns 1 to 4) and of Tobit models (columns 5 and 6). The 
observations are aggregated across all good categories together. Observations qualified as “non-eligible” (i.e., cases where 
individuals had already watched at least one of the two movie clips, or could not eat ice creams) are added back to the 
data set in columns 1 and 2. Individuals who were qualified as “non-eligible” or/and who expressed regret with their choice 
are added back to the data set in columns 3 and 4. Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. is the happiness level 
with the chosen/allocated option after consumption occurred and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, 
and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyChoice=1 if is in the Choice condition, and 0 if is in the No-
Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated 
option in the laboratory; dummyMovie=1 if (post-consumption) happiness is reported for the Movie good category, and 0 
if is reported for the Ice Cream good category. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, * p < 0.1; 
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table C-8: Relationship between post-consumption happiness and the choice conditions 
Low POCs versus High POCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Post-Consumption Happ.  
Model: OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit 
dummyNoChoice -1.242 -0.421 0.0312 1.317 -2.185 -0.764 
 (3.761) (3.690) (3.825) (3.713) (4.076) (3.952) 
dummyHighPOCs -2.701 -2.561 -0.406 -0.888 -0.0675 -0.895 
 (3.742) (3.182) (3.521) (2.930) (4.054) (3.389) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.538*** 0.423*** 0.532*** 0.419*** 0.607*** 0.481*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0861) (0.0864) (0.0875) (0.0944) (0.0932) 
dummyMovie  -19.06***  -19.00***  -20.54*** 
  (2.470)  (2.399)  (2.686) 
Constant 25.00*** 44.61*** 24.16*** 43.15*** 21.14*** 41.99*** 
 (6.619) (6.887) (6.842) (7.074) (7.145) (7.132) 
Observations 197 197 202 202 182 182 
R2 0.199 0.334 0.190 0.331   
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models (columns 1 to 4) and of Tobit models (columns 5 and 6). The 
observations are aggregated across all good categories together. Observations qualified as “non-eligible” (i.e., cases where 
individuals had already watched at least one of the two movie clips, or could not eat ice creams) are added back to the 
data set in columns 1 and 2. Individuals who were qualified as “non-eligible” or/and who expressed regret with their choice 
are added back to the data set in columns 3 and 4. Dependent variable: Post-Consumption Happ. is the happiness level 
with the chosen/allocated option after consumption occurred and is in {1,2,3…,100} where 1 means “Not at all happy”, 
and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyNoChoice=1 if is in the No-Choice condition, and 0 if is in 
the Choice condition; dummyHighPOCs=1 if is in the High POCs condition, and 0 if is in the Low POCs or in the No-
Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated 
option in the laboratory; dummyMovie=1 if (post-consumption) happiness is reported for the Movie good category, and 0 
if is reported for the Ice Cream good category. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, * p < 0.1; 
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table C-9: Relationship between post-choice happiness and the treatment condition Choice versus No-Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. 
Good category: All All Ice Cream Pen Dish Movie Activity 
dummyChoice -3.109* -3.413* -4.795 2.215 -5.484* -7.859** -1.267 
 (1.676) (1.777) (2.993) (3.657) (2.838) (3.592) (2.709) 
Stage 1 Happ. 0.652*** 0.552*** 0.603*** 0.453*** 0.529*** 0.651*** 0.665*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0410) (0.0885) (0.0738) (0.0852) (0.0900) (0.121) 
Choice Diff. 0.132 0.136 0.0597 0.109 0.167 0.0311 0.282 
 (0.0878) (0.0923) (0.150) (0.266) (0.155) (0.149) (0.180) 
Choice Diff. x 
dummyChoice 
-0.0484 -0.0627 -0.0113 -0.0894 0.0186 0.0712 -0.293 
(0.122) (0.124) (0.196) (0.316) (0.195) (0.203) (0.203) 
dummyPen  -6.765***      
  (2.157)      
dummyDish  -0.257      
  (1.564)      
dummyMovie  -6.534***      
  (2.085)      
dummyActivity  7.437***      
  (1.501)      
Constant 22.45*** 31.56*** 28.38*** 26.99*** 34.71*** 20.87** 26.77** 
 (3.261) (4.010) (8.271) (5.569) (7.781) (8.198) (12.04) 
Observations 608 608 121 126 126 109 126 
R2 0.407 0.454 0.381 0.250 0.292 0.425 0.274 
SE Clustered Clustered Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable: Post-Choice Happ. is the happiness level with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory (pre-consumption) and is in {1,2,3…,100} 
where 1 means “Not at all happy”, and 100 means “Very happy”. Independent variables: dummyChoice=1 if is in the Choice condition, and 0 if is in the No-Choice condition; Stage 1 Happ. is the (choiceless) 
happiness level (reported in the on-line survey) with the chosen/allocated option in the laboratory; Choice Diff. is mean-centered and is in [-38.45, 35.55] where higher values represent a higher tendency to 
experience choice difficulty;  dummyPen, dummyDish, dummyMovie and dummyActivity are the good categories fixed effects and are in {0,1} (e.g. dummyPen=1 if the post-choice happiness is reported for the 
Pen good category, and 0 otherwise). The Ice Cream good category represents the reference category. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level in columns 1 and 2. Standard errors in parentheses, * 
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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 Appendix D ─ Immoral Labor Markets 
Proofs 
Lemma. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ, ݓ∗(݆) exists, is unique and is in (ݑ + ܿ,∞). For all ݆ ∈ ܬ ∖ ܬூெ, 
ݓ∗(݆) = ݑ + ܿ. 
Proof. Suppose ݆ ∈ ܬூெ. Existence: Define ݂(ݓ, ݆) = ܵ(ݓ, ݆) −ܦ(ݓ, ݆). Note that 
݂൫ݑ + ܿ, ݆൯ = 0 − (+) < 0, ݈݅݉௪→ஶ ݂(ݓ, ݆) = 1 − 0 = 1 and ݂(ݓ, ݆) is continuous in ݓ. By 
the intermediate value theorem there exists ݓ∗(݆) ∈ (ݑ + ܿ,∞) such that ݂(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) = 0. 
Uniqueness: Follows from ݂(ݓ, ݆) being strictly increasing in ݓ on [0,∞).  
Suppose ݆ ∈ ܬ ∖ ܬூெ .  Then, ܵ(ݓ, ݆) = ቐ 0, ݓ < ݑ + ܿ[0,1], ݓ = ݑ + ܿ1, ݓ > ݑ + ܿ. Note that for any < ݑ + ܿ , we 
have ܦ(ݓ, ݆) > 0 but ܵ (ݓ, ݆) = 0, and for any ݓ > ݑ + ܿ we have ܦ(ݓ, ݆) < 1, but ܵ (ݓ, ݆) =1. For ݓ = ݑ + ܿ, ܵ(ݓ, ݆) = [0,1] and ܦ(ݓ, ݆) ∈ [0,1], so ܦ(ݓ, ݆) ∈ ܵ(ݓ, ݆).  
Proposition 1. For all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬ with ܫ(݆) < ܫ(݆ᇱ), ݓ∗(݆) < ݓ∗(݆′). 
Proof. ݓ∗(݆) < ݓ∗(݆′): Suppose ܫ(݆) = 0. Then, ݓ∗(݆) = ݑ + ܿ and ݓ∗(݆ᇱ) > ݑ + ܿ 
(see Lemma). Suppose ܫ(݆) > 0. Suppose that ݓ∗(݆) ≥ ݓ∗(݆′). Then ܵ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) >
ܵ(ݓ∗(݆′), ݆′) and ܦ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) ≤ ܦ(ݓ∗(݆ᇱ), ݆) because ܨ and −ܦ are strictly increasing in ݓ 
on [0,∞), I(݆) < ܫ(݆ᇱ) and therefore ܦ(ݓ, ݆ᇱ) ≥ ܦ(ݓ, ݆) for all ݓ. So ܵ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) −
ܵ(ݓ∗(݆ᇱ), ݆ᇱ) + ܦ(ݓ∗(݆ᇱ), ݆′) − ܦ(ݓ∗(݆), ݆) > 0, a contradiction to the definition of ݓ∗(݆) and 
ݓ∗(݆′).  
Proposition 2. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ, worker ݅ is hired iff ߠ௜ ≤
௪∗(௝)ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝) ≡ ߠ(݆) ∈ ℝவ଴. 
Proof. ߠ(݆) ∈ ℝவ଴: Follows directly from ݓ∗(݆) > ݑ + ܿ (see Lemma). 
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Proposition 3. For all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬ with ܫ(݆) < ܫ(݆ᇱ), there exists ߠ෨(݆, ݆′) ∈ ℝவ଴ such that 
௜ܷ(݆′,ݓ∗(݆′)) > ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆)) iff ߠ௜ < ߠ෨(݆, ݆′).  
Proof. Suppose ܫ(݆) = 0. Then ܷ ௜(݆,ݓ∗(݆)) = ܷ ௜(݆,ݑ + ܿ) = ݑ (see Lemma). Note that 
௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆′,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ > ݑ iff ߠ௜ < ௪∗൫௝ᇲ൯ି௨ି௖ூ(௝ᇲ) = ߠ(݆′), so ௜ܷ൫݆ᇱ,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ =
௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆′,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ > ݑ = ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆)) iff  ߠ௜ < ߠ(݆′) ≡ ߠ෨(݆, ݆′). Note that ߠ෨(݆, ݆ᇱ) > 0 by 
Proposition 2.  
Suppose ܫ(݆) > 0. Note that ܷ௜൫݆ᇱ,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ > ௜ܷ൫݆,ݓ∗(݆)൯ =
݉ܽݔ ൛ ௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆,ݓ∗(݆)൯,ݑൟ if and only if: 
i) ௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆′,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ > ௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆,ݓ∗(݆)൯  
ii) ௜ܷ൫ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐห݆′,ݓ∗(݆ᇱ)൯ > ݑ 
Inequality i) holds iff ߠ௜ < ௪∗൫௝ᇲ൯ି௪∗(௝)ூ(௝ᇲ)ିூ(௝)  and inequality ii) holds iif ߠ௜ < ߠ(݆′). Therefore, 
we have ߠ෨(݆, ݆ᇱ) = ݉݅݊ ቄ௪∗൫௝ᇲ൯ି௪∗(௝)
ூ(௝ᇲ)ିூ(௝) ,ߠ(݆′)ቅ. Note that ߠ෨(݆, ݆ᇱ) > 0 (see Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2).  
Proposition 4. For all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ and ܨ,ܩ ∈ ℱఏ with ܨ strong first-order stochastically 
dominating ܩ, there exists ߠ෠(݆,ܨ) ∈ ℝவ଴ such that ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆, ܨ)) > ௜ܷ(݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܩ))  iff ߠ௜ <
ߠ෠(݆, ܨ). 
Proof. First, we will proof that ݓ∗(݆,ܩ) ≤ ݓ∗(݆,ܨ). Suppose not, then ݓ∗(݆,ܩ) >
ݓ∗(݆,ܨ). But then ܵ(ݓ∗(݆,ܩ), ݆,ܩ) > ܵ(ݓ∗(݆,ܨ), ݆,ܨ) and ܦ(ݓ∗(݆,ܩ), ݆) < ܦ(ݓ∗(݆,ܨ), ݆) 
because ܨ, ܩ and −ܦ are strictly increasing in ݓ on [0,∞), and ܨ first-order stochastically 
dominates ܩ. But then ܵ(ݓ∗(݆,ܩ), ݆,ܩ) − ܵ(ݓ∗(݆, ܨ), ݆,ܨ) + ܦ(ݓ∗(݆,ܨ), ݆) −
ܦ(ݓ∗(݆,ܩ), ݆) > 0, a contradiction to the definition of ݓ∗.  
Second, define ߠ෠(݆,ܨ) = ௪∗(௝,ி)ି௨ି௖
ூ(௝) ≡ ߠ(݆,ܨ), and note that under this definition 
ݓ∗(݆,ܨ) − ܿ − ܵ(݆) ∗ ߠ௜ > ݑ iff ߠ௜ < ߠ෠(݆,ܨ).  (ߠ෠(݆,ܨ) > 0 follows from Proposition 2.) 
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To finish the proof, note that ௜ܷ൫݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܨ)൯ = ݓ∗(݆,ܨ) − ܿ − ܫ(݆) ∗ ߠ௜ >max൛ݑ,ݓ∗(݆,ܩ) − ܿ − ܫ(݆) ∗ ߠ௜ൟ = ௜ܷ൫݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܩ)൯ for all ߠ௜ < ߠ෠(݆, ܨ), and ܷ௜൫݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܨ)൯ =
ݑ = ܷ௜൫݆,ݓ∗(݆,ܩ)൯  for all ߠ௜ ≥ ߠ෠(݆, ܨ).  
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Alternative interpretation model 
The results in section 5.3 also apply for a context with 2 jobs, a neutral job ݆ே 
(ܫ(݆ே) = 0) and an immoral job ݆ூெ ∈ ܬூெ (ܫ(݆ூெ) > 0). In the following, we show that, 
under some assumptions, labor demand and labor supply in this setting correspond to their 
counterparts in section 5.3. Therefore, all results derived in section 5.3 also hold in this 
context.  
Labor supply: Labor supply consists of an interval of workers, ݅ ∈ [0,1]. As in section 
5.3, we assume that the utility of accepting job ݆ of a worker of type ݅ is given by: 
௜ܷ(݆,ݓ(݆)) = ݓ(݆) − ܿ − ܫ(݆) ∗ ߠ௜ , 
where the parameter ߠ௜ is distributed according to a distribution with cdf ܨ ∈ ℱఏ. For all 
ܨ ∈ ℱఏ , ܨ is continuous, strictly increasing on [0,1), and with ܨ(0) = 0. Every worker with 
ߠ௜ ≤
௪(௝಺ಾ)ି௪(௝ಿ)
ூ(௝಺ಾ)  accepts the immoral job. Define ݓ = ݓ(݆ூெ)−ݓ(݆ே), the labor supply for 
the immoral job is then given by ܵ(ݓ, ݆ூெ) = ܨ( ௪
ூ(௝಺ಾ) ). Note that the labor supply 
corresponds to the labor supply in section 5.3 with ݑ = ܿ = 0. The only difference lies in 
the interpretation: ݓ now measures the immorality premium (ݓ(݆ூெ) − ݓ(݆ே)), “accept” 
refers to accepting the immoral job and “refuse” refers to accepting the neutral job. 
Labor demand: Labor demand is represented by an interval of firms,  ݇ ∈ [0,1]. Each 
firm can produce a neutral or an immoral product. Firms that produce immoral products 
offer immoral jobs, firms that produce neutral products offer neutral jobs. Firms profits are: 
ߨ௞(݆,ݓ) = ܽ௞(݆) −ݓ(݆) 
where ܽ௞(݆) measures firm ݇’s earnings by producing good ݆ . Firms offer an immoral job iff 
∆ܽ௞(݆ூெ) = ܽ௞(݆ூெ) − ܽ௞(݆ே) ≥ ݓ. We assume that ∆ܽ௞(݆ூெ) is distributed according to a 
distribution with cdf ܩ௝಺ಾ. An increase in immorality of the job does not decrease firms 
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earnings,96 that is, i) ܩ௝(0) = 0 for all ݆ ∈ ܬூெ , and ii) for all ݆, ݆′ ∈ ܬூெ with  ܫ(݆′) > ܫ(݆) and 
all ݔ ∈ ℝ, ܩ௝ᇱ(ݔ) ≤ ܩ௝(ݔ). In addition, ܩ௝಺ಾ is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞). 
The labor demand function for the immoral job is then given by ܦ(ݓ, ݆ூெ) = 1 − ܩ௝಺ಾ(ݓ). 
Note that ܦ is continuous in ݓ, strictly decreasing in ݓ on [0,∞), with ݈݅݉௪→ஶ ܦ(ݓ, ݆ூெ) =0  and ܦ(ݓ, ݆ூெ) = 1 for ݓ ≤ 0. In addition, ܫ(݆′) > ܫ(݆) implies ܦ(ݓ, ݆′) ≥ ܦ(ݓ, ݆) for all 
ݓ ∈ ℝ. Note that the labor demand corresponds to the labor demand in section 5.3. The 
only difference lies in the interpretation: ܦ(ݓ, ݆) now measures the share of firms that offer 
the immoral job ݆, while 1 −ܦ(ݓ, ݆) measures the share of firms that offer the neutral job 
݆ே.  
The equilibrium wage, ݓ∗(݆ூெ), is implicitly defined by ܵ (ݓ∗(݆ூெ), ݆ூெ) − ܦ(ݓ∗(݆ூெ), ݆ூெ) =0.97 As both labor demand and labor supply correspond to their counterparts in section 5.3, 
the Lemma and Proposition 1 to 4 (with ݆ ∈ ܬூெ) apply. In particular, ݓ∗(݆ூெ) is strictly 
positive (Lemma), so there is an immorality premium, and this immorality premium is 
increasing in the immorality of ݆ூெ , ܫ(݆ூெ) (Proposition 1). The immoral types sort into 
accepting the immoral jobs while the moral types sort into accepting the neutral jobs 
(Proposition 2). 
                                       
96 One interpretation is, for example, that ܫ(݆) measures negative externalities in production. Avoiding these 
externalities is costly, decreasing the immorality therefore increases production costs  (see also Rosen, 1986). 
97 Note that market clearance for the immoral job market implies market clearance for the neutral job market, 
൫1 − ܵ(ݓ∗(݆ூெ), ݆ூெ)൯ − ൫1 −ܦ(ݓ∗(݆ூெ), ݆ூெ)൯ = 0. 
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Tables 
Table D-1: Distribution of behavior regarding the behavioral measure of 
concern for morality 
Number of lies 
Reported number 
for state: Frequency Share Classification 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 (Honest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 161 0.671 High-theta 
1 
6 2 3 4 5 6 6 
0.038 Low-theta 
2 2 3 4 5 6 3 
2 
6 6 3 4 5 6 12 
0.104 Low-theta 
1 2 3 6 6 6 2 
1 3 3 5 5 6 1 
1 4 4 4 5 6 1 
5 6 3 4 5 6 2 
6 5 3 4 5 6 1 
3 2 3 5 5 6 1 
3 3 3 4 5 6 5 
3 
6 6 6 4 5 6 11 
0.050 Low-theta 
4 2 3 6 6 6 1 
4 
6 6 6 6 5 6 3 
0.017 Low-theta 
6 5 5 5 5 6 1 
5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 15 
0.067 Low-theta 
2 3 4 5 6 6 1 
Lied in a self-
harmful manner 
1 2 3 4 3 3 1 
0.054 High-theta 
1 2 3 4 4 4 1 
1 2 3 4 5 5 1 
1 3 2 5 4 6 1 
1 4 2 4 5 6 1 
1 4 6 3 5 6 1 
2 1 3 4 5 6 1 
3 4 5 4 6 2 1 
5 1 3 6 4 2 1 
5 2 3 4 1 6 1 
5 4 6 4 6 5 1 
6 2 5 5 1 3 1 
6 6 6 6 6 5 1 
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Table D-2: Relationship between participation decision/reservation wage and ӨExp (Hurdle 
model) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Participate Reservation 
wage 
Participate Reservation 
wage 
Reservation 
wage 
Reservation 
wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low-theta 
(ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖) 
1.024*** -0.494* 0.925*** -0.362 -0.018 -0.060 
(4.64) (-1.79) (4.64) (-0.99) (-0.22) (-0.39) 
Period   -0.019** -0.047  -0.050***   (-2.40) (-1.64)  (-5.74) 
Period * 
ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ 
  0.012 -0.015  0.005 
  (1.14) (-0.40)  (0.54) 
Constant 
0.295** 4.056*** 0.449*** 4.425*** 2.909*** 3.312*** 
(2.41) (20.20) (3.86) (14.76) (43.79) (25.63) 
Sigma  2.64***  2.630*** 0.609*** 0.571***  (7.72)  (7.69) (10.57) (10.58) 
Market Immoral Immoral Immoral Immoral Neutral Neutral 
N 2520 1755 2520 1755 1077 1077 
LL (pseudo) -1427.9 -4194.1 -1424.0 -4187.4 -993.9 -924.3 
 p-value: t 
+ t* ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖= 
0 
  0.422 0.001  0.0000 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs Model: (1) and (3) are probit models; (2), (4), (5) and (6) are truncated linear regressions 
(truncated from above at 50 CHF). Models (1) to (4) use only data from the immoral markets, models (5) and (6) use only 
data from the neutral markets. For neutral markets, we do not report the regression of market participation as we have only 
3 incidences where a subject did not participate. Independent variables: Low-theta in {0, 1}, Period between 1 and 15. 
Standard errors clustered at market level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
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Table D-3: Relationship between the behavioral 
measure of concern for morality and outcomes in 
the experimental labor markets 
Dependent 
variable: Employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of lies     
1 lie 0.201 0.128 0.004 -0.008 
(1.05) (0.53) (0.11) (-0.12)   
2 lies 0.220** 0.182 -0.011 -0.049 
(2.17) (1.39) (-0.21) (-0.84)   
3 lies 0.398*** 0.351*** -0.296*** 
-
0.326*** 
(5.29) (3.57) (-12.89) (-15.52)   
4 lies 0.392*** 0.279** 0.171*** 0.167*** 
(4.94) (2.61) (7.43) (7.18) 
5 lies 0.286*** 0.233** 0.037 0.018 
(3.26) (2.48) (0.49) (0.17) 
self-harmful 
     lies 
0.252** 0.182 -0.0516 -0.001 
(2.53) (1.37) (-1.25) (-0.04)   
Constant 
0.475*** 0.517*** 0.829*** 0.806*** 
(11.6) (32.97) (36.11) (35.35) 
Market Immoral Immoral Neutral Neutral 
N 168 168 72 72 
R2 0.121 0.263 0.085 0.250 
Market FE No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Models (1) and 
(2) use only data from the immoral markets, models (3) and (4) use only 
data from the neutral markets. Standard errors clustered at market level; 
t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
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Table D-4: Relationship between ӨExp and welfare 
Dependent variable: Market welfare 
Self-reported 
happiness 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Low-theta (ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖) -1.07** 
(-2.42) 
-0.99* 
(-1.89)  
0.64 
(1.03) 
0.43 
(0.60) 
 
 
Immoral market (Im) 
8.83*** 
(9.93) 
  -0.07 
(-0.25) 
   
ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ * Im 8.12*** 
(3.22) 
9.92*** 
(3.57) 
 
 
-0.48 
(-0.64) 
-0.20 
(-0.22) 
  
 
N 240 240  240 240  
R2 0.134 0.235  0.006 0.113  
p-value: ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ 
+ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖*IM=0 0.007 0.002  0.719 0.670 
 
Market FE No Yes  No Yes  
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Low-theta in 
{0, 1}, Immoral market in {0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in 
parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
Table D-5: Relationship between ӨExp and market income/welfare, 
depending on the behavior of other market participants 
Dependent variable: Market income Market welfare 
Low-theta (ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖) -3.679 
(-1.05) 
-1.455 
(-0.39) 
More θH types 
4.334* 
(2.05) 
0.480 
(0.27) 
ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ * More θH types 
16.348*** 
(3.53) 
13.270*** 
(2.85) 
Constant 18.046*** (11.61) 
13.993*** 
(10.09) 
N 168 168 
R2 0.089 0.072 
p-value: More θH 
types + ીࡸ
ࡱ࢞࢖ * More 
θH types=0 
0.0002 0.0068 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Low-theta in {0, 1}, More θH types in 
{0, 1}. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p 
< 0.05; *** - p < 0.01.  
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Table D-6: Description and summary statistics of survey scales 
Variable 
Number 
of items 
Mean 
(Sd) 
Interpretation 
Protected 
value 1 5 
 
 
0.75 
(0.19) 
 
First measure of protected value, = 1 if the 
person finds that the behavior of a banker who 
recommends sub-optimal assets to his clients 
because he has larger margins on them is: very 
outrageous, very blameworthy, very immoral, 
not at all acceptable and not at all 
praiseworthy.  
Protected 
value 2 4 
0.63 
(0.18) 
Second measure of protected value, = 1 if the 
person thinks that truthfulness is a value that 
cannot be sacrificed. 
Work ethics 1 1 0.38 (0.29) 
= 1 if the person thinks that people are 
generally dishonest. 
Work ethics 2 1 0.55 (0.36) 
= 1 if the person thinks that calling sick to 
have a free day at work is really bad. 
HEXACO 
sincerity 
3 0.59 
(0.19) 
= 1 if the person is very sincere. 
HEXACO 
fairness 
3 0.68 
(0.22) 
= 1 if the person is very fair. 
HEXACO 
greed 
avoidance 
2 0.58 (0.23) = 1 it the person is not at all greedy. 
HEXACO 
modesty 2 
0.66 
(0.22) = 1 if the person is very modest. 
Charity 
attitude 
index 
9 0.69 (0.13) 
= 1 if the person’s attitude towards charities is 
very positive. 
Source: on-line survey. Notes: N = 237, every survey scale is obtained by averaging the individuals’ answers 
to every item constituting the scale under consideration.  
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Table D-7: Relationship between ӨSur and outcomes in the 
experimental labor market 
Dependent 
variable: 
Employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
-0.008 0.036 0.104 0.150 0.0103 0.015 
(-0.06) (0.22) (0.45) (0.75) (0.06) (0.06) 
Immoral 
market (Im) 
-0.046  0.013  0.133  
(-0.37)  (0.07)   (0.59)  
Өࡿ࢛࢘ * Im 
-0.431 -0.366 -0.558 -0.537 -0.648* -0.505 
(-1.64) (-1.14)  (-1.53) (-1.26) (-1.69) (-1.05) 
Aggregation 
Өࡿ࢛࢘ 
Factor 
Analysis 
Factor 
Analysis 
Equal 
weight 
Equal 
weight 
Theta- 
Exp 
Theta-
Exp 
N 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R2 0.137 0.294 0.132 0.291 0.133 0.293 
p-value: Өࡿ࢛࢘+ 
Өࡿ࢛࢘*Im = 0 
0.0569 0.237 0.0924 0.311 0.0708 0.252 
Market FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variables: Models 
differ in how Өௌ௨௥  is constructed from the nine psychological measures. Columns (1) and 
(2) report our main results, using factor analysis to aggregate the psychological measures. 
Columns (3) and (4) give the result if equal weight is given to each measure instead. 
Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are determined by a regression of the 
survey measures on Өா௫௣. Immoral market in {0, 1}. Өௌ௨௥ is in [0,1], where 0 means 
immoral and 1 means moral. Standard errors clustered at market level; t-statistics in 
parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
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Table D-8: Relationship between participation decision/reservation wage and ӨSur 
(Hurdle model) in the immoral market 
Dependent 
variable: 
Participate  Reservation 
wage 
Participate  Reservation 
wage 
Participate  Reservation 
wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
-1.614** 0.432 -1.971** 0.571 -2.177** 0.373 
(-2.44) (0.60) (-2.08) (0.61) (-2.13) (0.33) 
Constant 1.326*** 3.674*** 1.806*** 3.515*** 1.841*** 3.657*** (3.98) (10.39) (2.99) (6.12) (3.01) (5.25) 
Sigma  2.679***  2.679***  2.680***  (7.71)  (7.72)  (7.70) 
Aggregation 
Өࡿ࢛࢘ 
Factor 
Analysis 
Factor 
Analysis 
Equal 
weight 
Equal weight Theta- 
Exp 
Theta-Exp 
N 2475 1711 2475 1711 2475 1711 
LL (pseudo) -1478.3 -4114.1 -1488.2 -4114.2 -1490.9 -4114.6 
Notes: Estimates from Craggs Model: Regressions (1), (3) and (5) are probit models, regressions (2), (4) and (6) 
are truncated linear regressions (truncated from above at 50 CHF). Independent variables: Regressions differ in 
how Өௌ௨௥ is constructed from the nine psychological measures. Columns (1) and (2) report our main results, using 
factor analysis to aggregate the psychological measures. Columns (3) and (4) give the result if equal weight is given 
to each measure instead. Columns (5) and (6) give the results if weights are determined by a regression of the survey 
measures on Өா௫௣.. Өௌ௨௥ is in [0,1], where 0 means immoral and 1 means moral. Standard errors clustered at market 
level; z-statistics in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. In the moral market, the coefficient of 
Өௌ௨௥ is not significant for any of the above specifications. 
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Table D-9: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types, robustness checks aggregation ӨSur 
Dependent 
variable: 
Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived 
immorality (I(j)) 
0.089 
(1.05) 
0.090 
(1.05) 
0.122 
(1.37) 
0.122 
(1.38) 
0.396*** 
(4.89) 
0.391*** 
(4.87) 
0.337*** 
(4.07) 
0.327*** 
(3.96) 
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
-0.154* 
(-1.95) 
-0.149* 
(-1.77) 
-0.131 
(-1.46) 
-0.158 
(-1.65) 
-0.200* 
(-1.81) 
-0.267** 
(-2.57) 
-0.243** 
(-2.12) 
-0.298** 
(-2.58) 
Ө܁ܝܚ  ∗  ۷(ܒ) -0.583*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.583*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.671*** 
(-4.78) 
-0.671*** 
(-4.78) 
-0.998*** 
(-8.08) 
-0.990*** 
(-8.06) 
-0.961*** 
(-7.23) 
-0.944*** 
(-7.10) 
Aggregation Өࡿ࢛࢘ Equal 
weight 
Equal 
weight 
Theta- 
Exp 
Theta- 
Exp 
Equal 
weight 
Equal 
weight 
Theta- 
Exp 
Theta- 
Exp 
N 4715 4715 4715 4715 5064 5064 5064 5064 
R2 0.098 0.119 0.105 0.127 0.126 0.158 0.121 0.153 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Independent variables: Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) give the result 
if equal weight is given to each measure. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) 
or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Column (3), (4), (7) and (8) give the results if weights are determined by 
a regression of the survey measures on ߠ௅
ா௫௣. Өௌ௨௥ is in [0,1] where 0 means immoral and 1 means moral, willingness to 
work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much 
willing to work. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. 
Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study. Standard errors clustered at individual level; t-statistics 
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table D-10: Regressions of willingness to work for 
diverse industries and firms on perceived immorality and 
moral types, robustness checks classification firms 
immorality 
Dependent 
variable: 
Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Perceived 
immorality (IAlt(j)) 
-0.157*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.156*** 
(-4.20) 
0.141** 
(2.73) 
0.138** 
(2.68) 
Type experiment 
(Өࡱ࢞࢖) 
-0.045 
(-1.62) 
-0.053** 
(-1.99)   
Өࡱ࢞࢖ * IAlt(j) 
-0.174*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.175*** 
(-4.04)   
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
  -0.184** 
(-2.35) 
-0.222*** 
(-2.90) 
Өࡿ࢛࢘ * IAlt(j)   
-0.848*** 
(-8.52) 
-0.840*** 
(-8.45) 
N 5064 5064 5064 5064 
R2 0.107 0.138 0.125 0.157 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Perceived immorality 
is calculated different then in our main analysis: clients that did not know a 
firm are classified as giving a neutral rating. Dependent variable:  Willingness 
to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 
0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations 
where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did 
not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Independent variables: (1) and (2) 
use Өா௫௣ to classify participants, where Өா௫௣=0 for low- theta types and Өா௫௣=1 
for high-theta types, while (3) and (4) use  Өௌ௨௥ (in [0,1]) instead. Perceived 
immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 
means very immoral. Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject 
of study. Standard errors clustered at individual level; t-statistics in parentheses; 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table D-11: Regressions of willingness to work for diverse industries and firms on 
perceived immorality and moral types, robustness checks “I don’t know this 
organization” 
Dependent 
variable: Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived 
immorality (I(j)) 
-0.123*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.123*** 
(-4.51) 
0.088** 
(2.35) 
0.088** 
(2.35) 
-0.092* 
(-1.92) 
-0.092* 
(-1.91) 
0.159** 
(2.19) 
0.159** 
(2.18) 
Type experiment 
(Өࡱ࢞࢖) 
-0.034 
(-1.51) 
-0.040* 
(-1.87)   
-0.039 
(-0.56) 
-0.056 
(-0.86)   
Ө۳ܠܘ  ∗  ۷(ܒ) -0.131*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.131*** 
(-4.07)   
-0.158** 
(-2.61) 
-0.158** 
(-2.59)   
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
  -0.127** (-2.02) 
-0.165*** 
(-2.63)   
-0.156 
(-1.07) 
-0.204 
(-1.10) 
Ө܁ܝܚ  ∗  ۷(ܒ)   -0.613*** (-8.29) -0.613*** (-8.28)   -0.792*** (-4.95) -0.792*** (-4.92) 
N 6162 6162 6162 6162 1352 1352 1352 1352 
R2 0.096 0.123 0.110 0.139 0.086 0.157 0.110 0.182 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of linear regression models. Dependent variable:  Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 
0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where 
subjects did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. Columns (1) to (4): Observations where subjects did not know the 
firm (“I don’t know this organization”) are classified as having willingness to work of 0.5. Columns (5) to (8): only 
participants that did know all firms (N=52) are included. Independent variables: (1), (2), (5) and (6) use Ө୉୶୮ to classify 
participants, where Ө୉୶୮=0 for low- theta types and Ө୉୶୮=1 for high-theta types, while (3), (4), (7) and (8) use  Өୗ୳୰ (in 
[0,1]) instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. 
Control variables: age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study. Standard errors clustered at individual level; t-statistics 
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table D-12: Summary of main variables from the Swiss Labor Force Survey, overall and by industry 
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All industries 18514 
41.35 3.6 42.37 0.57 0.58 0.36 0.5 0.63 9.62 0.86 0.16 -0.18 
(20.24) (0.56) (11.25) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.5) (0.48) (9.26) (0.24) (0.37) (0.22) 
Processing of tea and 
coffee 75 
40.73 3.65 39.13 0.78 0.63 0.29 0.54 0.45 9.42 0.97 0.07 -0.11 
(13.65) (0.34) (9.18) (0.42) (0.49) (0.46) (0.5) (0.5) (9.93) (0.12) (0.25) (0.41) 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 88 
52.94 3.91 38.95 0.61 0.5 0.54 0.32 0.48 9.44 0.93 0.03 0.47 
(17.19) (0.38) (7.14) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.47) (0.5) (7.88) (0.09) (0.16) (0.42) 
Manufacture of paper 
and paperboard 54 
38.83 3.63 43.73 0.83 0.72 0.24 0.61 0.48 15.48 0.97 0.07 -0.06 
(10.25) (0.24) (11.07) (0.38) (0.45) (0.43) (0.49) (0.5) (12.65) (0.08) (0.27) (0.37) 
Manufacture of weapons 
and ammunitions 57 
48.91 3.83 46.61 0.96 0.64 0.53 0.43 0.88 15.94 0.97 0.08 0.71 
(18.69) (0.34) (10.55) (0.21) (0.48) (0.5) (0.5) (0.32) (13.46) (0.04) (0.28) (0.4) 
Manufacture of 
electronic components 656 
45 3.73 43.49 0.69 0.64 0.51 0.37 0.56 10.77 0.92 0.05 -0.01 
(18.62) (0.42) (10.73) (0.46) (0.48) (0.5) (0.48) (0.5) (9.59) (0.15) (0.21) (0.42) 
Construction of 
buildings 2,022 
38 3.58 43.63 0.92 0.7 0.22 0.47 0.48 11.14 0.95 0.14 -0.28 
(12.91) (0.45) (10.74) (0.28) (0.46) (0.41) (0.5) (0.5) (9.76) (0.15) (0.34) (0.39) 
Maintenance and repair 
of motor vehicles 1,508 
35.11 3.49 41.02 0.82 0.59 0.21 0.71 0.66 11.28 0.92 0.23 -0.28 
(13.03) (0.37) (12.06) (0.38) (0.49) (0.4) (0.45) (0.47) (10.27) (0.21) (0.42) (0.4) 
Wholesale of tobacco 
products 51 
62.67 4.02 43.14 0.57 0.72 0.53 0.47 0.62 11.64 0.94 0.12 0.44 
(29.55) (0.52) (9.5) (0.5) (0.45) (0.5) (0.5) (0.49) (8.12) (0.14) (0.33) (0.38) 
Wholesale of clothing 
and footwear 166 
39.62 3.56 40.09 0.37 0.46 0.41 0.52 0.51 7.28 0.83 0.16 0.1 
(19.26) (0.49) (10.99) (0.48) (0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (6.45) (0.26) (0.37) (0.46) 
Wholesale of perfume 
and cosmetics 
200 
51.02 3.78 41.3 0.26 0.61 0.54 0.4 0.44 8.25 0.88 0.13 0.12 
(27.74) (0.57) (10.64) (0.44) (0.49) (0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (7.18) (0.19) (0.34) (0.37) 
See next page for the rest of the table. 
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Wholesale of watches 
and jewelry 91 
44 3.7 44.21 0.39 0.58 0.45 0.47 0.47 8.25 0.87 0.16 0.04 
(19.12) (0.4) (10.69) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (7.96) (0.19) (0.37) (0.41) 
Hotels and similar 
accommodation 1,514 
27 3.22 40.47 0.39 0.55 0.18 0.57 0.4 6.94 0.84 0.16 -0.34 
(10.51) (0.47) (11.45) (0.49) (0.5) (0.38) (0.5) (0.49) (7.56) (0.27) (0.36) (0.37) 
Restaurants and mobile 
food activities 3,137 
25 3.14 40.67 0.43 0.56 0.15 0.56 0.46 6.77 0.8 0.21 -0.33 
(10.37) (0.48) (11.96) (0.5) (0.5) (0.36) (0.5) (0.5) (7.6) (0.29) (0.4) (0.37) 
Monetary 
intermediations 4,146 
56.56 3.95 42.53 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.72 10.87 0.91 0.19 0.11 
(22.02) (0.46) (10.49) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.49) (0.45) (9.7) (0.19) (0.39) (0.4) 
Credit granting 44 
52 3.86 41.15 0.41 0.53 0.46 0.51 0.68 6.02 0.86 0.05 0.15 
(22.91) (0.41) (8.81) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.51) (0.47) (5.51) (0.2) (0.23) (0.41) 
Non-life insurance 1,484 
50 3.84 42.11 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.44 0.78 9.91 0.88 0.08 -0.13 
(19.05) (0.4) (10.97) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.41) (8.97) (0.2) (0.27) (0.44) 
General public 
administration activities 2,615 
44.24 3.69 45.16 0.48 0.59 0.43 0.51 0.91 10.62 0.79 0.13 -0.41 
(17.3) (0.57) (10.99) (0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5) (0.29) (9.58) (0.28) (0.34) (0.36) 
Gambling and betting 
activities 91 
40.57 3.61 42.58 0.6 0.51 0.29 0.55 0.46 7.07 0.86 0.09 0.42 
(18.55) (0.45) (10.26) (0.49) (0.5) (0.46) (0.5) (0.5) (5.4) (0.22) (0.29) (0.41) 
Organization and 
operation of sport 
facilities for indoor and 
outdoor sports events 
288 
 
32.76 
 
3.36 
 
43.48 
 
0.48 
 
0.52 
 
0.27 
 
0.58 
 
0.68 
 
7.61 
 
0.7 
 
0.08 
 
-0.49 
(14.53) (0.67) (13.19) (0.5) (0.5) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47) (8.55) (0.35) (0.27) (0.4) 
Fitness facilities 227 
31.15 3.29 40.2 0.25 0.6 0.33 0.57 0.64 5.69 0.5 0.19 -0.35 
(16.31) (0.58) (11.21) (0.43) (0.49) (0.47) (0.5) (0.48) (6.53) (0.35) (0.39) (0.38) 
Source: Weighed data from the SLFS, years: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (wage) and our own survey (Perceived immorality). Same sample used in Table 15, Figures 13 and D1. Notes: N=number of observations 
per industry in the SLFS dataset, Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Education high: higher vocational education and training or university/college, Education middle: apprenticeship, full-time vocational school, 
matura or pedagogical training, Education low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Tenure = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = (working 
hours /42), set to 1 for working hours >= 42, Board member in {0, 1}, Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Standard deviations in 
parentheses
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Table D-13: Perceived immorality of firms 
Firms 
Perceived 
immorality I(j) Firms 
Perceived 
immorality I(j) 
Marlboro 0.54 Swisscom -0.07 
Monsanto 0.52 Firmenich -0.09 
Glencore 0.46 
Winterthur 
Assurance 
-0.1 
Philip Morris 0.46 Swiss Life -0.13 
Nestlé 0.39 Swatch -0.17 
Tamoil 0.37 Adecco -0.18 
Syngenta 0.23 ABB -0.2 
UBS 0.19 Migros -0.38 
Novartis 0.18 WWF -0.66 
Credit Suisse 0.17 Pro Juventute -0.66 
Roche 0.13 Pro Natura -0.67 
Holcim 0.03 UNICEF -0.72 
Ernst and 
Young 
-0.05 Red cross -0.81 
Source: own survey. Notes: Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral 
and 1 means very immoral. 
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Table D-14: Ordered logit estimates of willingness to work for diverse industries and 
firms on perceived immorality and moral types 
Dependent 
variable: 
Willingness to work for industry j Willingness to work for firm j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Perceived 
immorality (I(j)) 
-1.474*** 
(6.88) 
-1.502*** 
(6.97) 
-1.403*** 
(9.70) 
-1.434*** 
(9.81) 
-0.799*** 
(3.92) 
-0.797*** 
(3.88) 
-0.89*** 
(6.54) 
-0.893*** 
(6.50) 
Type experiment 
(Өࡱ࢞࢖) 
-0.186 
(1.4) 
-0.188 
(1.45) 
  -0.259 
(1.59) 
-0.3* 
(1.9) 
  
Ө۳ܠܘ  ∗  ۷(ܒ) -0.608** 
(2.46) 
-0.613** 
(2.46) 
  -0.902*** 
(3.77) 
-0.918*** 
(3.79) 
  
Type survey 
(Өࡿ࢛࢘) 
  -0.323*** 
(2.67) 
-0.35*** 
(2.93) 
  -0.273** 
(1.98) 
-0.316** 
(2.26) 
Ө܁ܝܚ  ∗  ۷(ܒ)   -1.085*** 
(5.24) 
-1.089*** 
(5.23) 
  -1.219*** 
(5.97) 
-1.232*** 
(6.00) 
N 4,715 4,715 4,715 4,715 5,064 5,064 5,064 5,064 
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Dependent variable: Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to work, 0.5 
means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not know the firm (“I don’t 
know this organization”) are dropped. Independent variables: (1), (2), (5) and (6) use Өா௫௣ to classify participants, where 
Өா௫௣=0 for low- theta types and Өா௫௣=1 for high-theta types, while (3), (4), (7) and (8) use  Өௌ௨௥(in [0,1]) instead. Perceived 
immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Control variables: age, 
gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study. Standard errors clustered at individual level; z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 
0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Figures 
Figure D-1: Correlation between wages (residual) and perceived industry 
immorality 
 
Source: Weighted data from the SLFS, years: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 (wage) and our own survey (perceived 
immorality). Notes: Cross-section with N = 18514. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] where -1 means very 
moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Dependent variable: logarithm of real gross hourly wage 
(in 2010 CHF). Control variables: Male in {0, 1}, Married in {0, 1}, Edu high in {0, 1}: Higher vocational 
education and training, or University college, Edu middle in {0, 1}: Graduate school, apprenticeship, full-
time vocational school, Matura, Teacher seminar, Edu low (reference category): compulsory schooling or pre-
vocational education, Swiss in {0, 1}, Tenure = number of years in the firm, Full-time equivalent = working 
hours/42, set to 1 for working hours >= 42, Board member in {0, 1}, seven industrial branch dummies 
(manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicle and motorcycles; financial and insurance 
activities; accommodation and food service activities; construction; public administration, defense and 
compulsory social security; arts, entertainment and recreation). Number of observations: Credit granting=44, 
Monetary intermediations=4146, Gambling and betting activities=91, Manufacture of tobacco products=88, 
Manufacture of weapons and ammunitions=57, Wholesale of tobacco products=51, Non-life insurance=1484, 
Organization and operation of sport facilities=288, Processing of tea and coffee=75, Manufacture of electronic 
components=656, Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics=200, Wholesale of clothing and footwear=166, 
Wholesale of watches and jewelry =91, Manufacture of paper and paperboard=54, Maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles=1508, Construction of buildings=2022, Restaurant and mobile food activities=3137, Hotels 
and similar accommodation=1514, Fitness facilities=227, General public administration activities=2615. For 
credit granting: extrapolation based on less than 50 observations; this result must be interpreted with great 
caution.
APPENDIX D 
211 
 
Figure D-2: Labor supply for neutral and immoral work in the 
laboratory (last 5 periods only) 
 
 
 
Figure D-3: Employment rate by the two types in the neutral 
treatment 
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Figure D-4: Probability distribution of ӨSur 
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Figure D-5. Difference in willingness to work for diverse firms and industries 
between moral and immoral types, with respect to the perceived immorality 
of these institutions, and controlling for demographics. 
(a) Firms, Өா௫௣ (b) Firms, Өௌ௨௥ 
(c) Industries, Өா௫௣ (d) Industries, Өௌ௨௥ 
 
Source: Survey study (Perceived immorality), on-line survey (Willingness to work, Өௌ௨௥), Laboratory 
experiment (Өா௫௣). Notes: Differences in willingness to work: Coefficient estimates of linear regression 
models of the participants’ willingness to work for different industries (a and b) or firms (b and c) on Өு
ா௫௣ 
(a and c) or Өுௌ௨௥ (b and d), and control variables (age, gender, Swiss nationality, subject of study). 
Dependent variable: Willingness to work is in {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} where 0 means not at all willing to 
work, 0.5 means indifferent and 1 means really much willing to work. Observations where subjects did not 
know the firm (“I don’t know this organization”) or did not fill out the questionnaire are excluded. 
Independent variables: a and c use Өா௫௣ to classify participants, where Өா௫௣=0 for low- theta types and 
Өா௫௣=1 for high-theta types, while b and d use Өௌ௨௥ in [0,1] instead. Perceived immorality is in [-1, 1] 
where -1 means very moral, 0 means neutral and 1 means very immoral. Standard errors clustered at 
individual level.  
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